The Canada-European Union Turbot War
| Published date | 01 June 1998 |
| Date | 01 June 1998 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070209805300205 |
| Author | Donald Barry |
| Subject Matter | Article |
DONALD
BARRY
The
Canada-
European
Union
turbot
war
Internal
politics
and
transatlantic
bargaining
O
NE OF
THE
MOST
SERIOUS
ISSUES
FACING
COASTAL
STATES
and
their
distant
water
counterparts
is
the
exploitation
of
straddling
fish
stocks (stocks
that
span
the
boundary
between
a
coastal state's
200-
mile zone
and
adjacent
international
waters).
This
was
dramatically
demonstrated
in
the
spring
of
1995
when
Canada
and
the
European
Union
(EU)
engaged in
a
show-down
over
access
to
turbot,
also
known
as
Greenland
halibut,
in
the
northwest
Atlantic beyond
Canada's 200
mile
limit
where
fishing
is
regulated
by
international
agreement.
The
conflict
was
the
culmination
of
a
decade
of
controversy between
the
two
over
the
activities
of
EU
fishing
fleets,
especially
that
of
Spain,
in
the
region.
Most
studies
of
the dispute
have
focussed
on
the
interna-
tional
legal
implications.'
This
article
explores
the
impact
of
internal
politics
on
the
Canadian and
EU
approaches.
Professor
of
Political
Science,
University
of
Calgary
This
article
draws
on
confidential
interviews
with
government,
EU,
andffuhing
industry
offi-
cials
in
Ottawa,
St
John's,
and
Brussels.
Research
was
facilitated
by
a
grantfrom
the
University
Research
Grants Committee,
University
of
Calgary
I
would like
to
thank
Rob
Huebert,
James
Keele.y
Bennett
Ramberg,
Denis
Stairs,
and
the
Journals
anonymous
reviewers
for
their
helpful
comments
on
earlier
drafts.
i
For
a
survey
of
the
legal
debate over the
turbot
war
see
Yann-Huei
Song,
'The
Canada-European
Union
turbot
dispute
in
the
northwest Atlantic:
an
application
of
the
incident
approach,'
Ocean
Development
and
International
Law
28
(1997),
esp
282-91.
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Spring
1998
Donald
Barry
Internal
politics
is
central
to
the
fisheries
policies
of
Canada
and
the
EU.
In
Canada the
federal
government,
through
the
Department
of
Fisheries
and
Oceans
is
responsible
for
fisheries
policy.
Although
fish-
ing
is
of
limited
importance
to
the
national
economy,
it
is
a
substantial
contributor
to
the
economies
of
the
Atlantic
provinces,
especially
in
Newfoundland
where
it
accounts
for
10
per
cent
of
the
gross
provin-
cial
product
and
25
per
cent
of
employment.
Almost
700
Newfound-
land
coastal
communities
depend
in
whole
or
in
part
on fishing.
These
factors,
combined
with
the
fishing
constituency's
importance
in
regional
politics, make
fisheries
issues
important
to
all
levels
of
gov-
ernment.
Fishing
by
EU
states
is
governed
by the
Union's
common
fisheries
policy
(CFP).
2
Under the
CFP,
the
European
Commission
(the
EU's
executive
arm)
has
exclusive
authority
to
negotiate
and
conclude
fish-
eries
agreements
with
third
countries
and
to
represent
the
EU
in
inter-
national
fisheries
bodies.
Undertakings
are
normally
approved
by
the
Fisheries
Council,
which
is
composed
of
member
state
fisheries
minis-
ters, assisted
by
the
Committee
of
Permanent
Representatives
of
the
member
states
(COREPER).
Council
sessions
are
presided
over
by
the
presidency,
which
rotates
among
member
states
at
six-month
intervals.
Most Council
decisions
are
made
on
a
qualified
majority or
weighted
voting
basis,
although
consensus
is
generally
sought.
While
fisheries
policy
is
adopted
by
the
Union,
implementation
and
enforcement
are
left
in
the
hands
of
member
states.
International
fisheries
matters
are
of
primary
concern to
Portugal
and
Spain
whose
vessels
have
a
long
his-
tory
of
fishing
in
the
northwest
Atlantic.
Spain
maintains
the
largest
fleet,
almost
half
of
which,
including
all
trawlers
involved
in
the
turbot
fishery,
is
based
in
the northwestern
region
of
Galicia,
where
fishing
is
a
pillar
of
the economy.
This
article
argues
that
the
EU
attempted
to increase
its
turbot
quota
in
response
to
pressures
from
the
Spanish
government and
industry.
Canada sought
to
impose
an
enforceable
limit
on
EU
vessels
to
main-
tain
a
viable
fishery
in the
face
of
long-standing
domestic
frustration
over
their
fishing
practices.
The
dispute
was
resolved
by an
agreement
that
raised
the
EU's
turbot
allocation
and
established
a
comprehensive
control
and enforcement
regime
to
govern
fishing
outside
Canada's
2
See
Mike
Holden,
The
Common
Fisheries Policy: Origin,
Evaluation
and
Future
(Oxford:
Fishing
News
Books
1994).
254
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Spring
1998
The
turbot
war
offshore zone.
The
agreement
addressed
both
the Union's
access
goal
and
Canada's
aim
of
effective
surveillance
and
policing.
It
also
gave
the
EU
an
additional
measure
of
assurance
of
member-state
compliance
with
EU
commitments.
BACKGROUND
Canada
is
one
of
a
handful
of
coastal states
in
which the
continental
shelf
extends beyond
its
200-mile limit.
About
10
per cent
of
New-
foundland's
Grand
Banks
is
located
outside
the
offshore zone
in
areas
known
as
the
nose
and
tail.
Important
fish
stocks,
including
cod,
flounder,
redfish,
and
turbot,
straddle
the
boundary.
Fishing
beyond
the
200-mile
limit
is
managed
by
the
Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries
Organization
(NAFO)
which
had
fifteen
members
in
1995
-
Bulgaria,
Canada,
Cuba, Denmark
(for
the
Faroe
Islands
and
Greenland),
Esto-
nia,
the
EU,
Iceland, Japan,
South
Korea,
Latvia,
Lithuania,
Norway,
Poland,
Romania, and
Russia. Each
year
on
the
advice
of
its
Scientific
Council,
composed
of
scientists
from
the
contracting
parties,
NAFO
establishes
total
allowable
catches
(TACs),
quotas,
and
conservation
measures
for
stocks
under
its
control.
Decisions
are
made by
majority
vote,
and
any
member
who
objects to
a
quota
within
sixty
days
is
not
bound
by
it.
The
EU
co-operated with
NAFO's
conservative
management
approach
until
1985,
prior
to
the
entry
of
Spain
and
Portugal
into
the
Union.
Because
there
were
no
additional
allocations
available in
its
own
heavily
fished
waters
and
prospects
elsewhere
were
limited,
the
EU
began
pressing
for
a
more
liberal
management
scheme
and
increased
quotas
in
the
NAFO
regulatory
area.
As
a
Spaniard
involved
in
negotiat-
ing the
fisheries
aspects
of
Spain's
entry
into
the
Union
put
it:
'With
Spain
and
Portugal's
accession
to
the
EEC
we
will
be
able
to
unite
to
reject
the
very
low
northwest
Atlantic
cod
quotas imposed
by
the
Northwest
Atlantic
Fisheries
Organization,
a
group
dominated
by
Canada,
which
wants
to
safeguard the
resources
for commercial not
biological
reasons.'
3
Between
1986
and
1992
the
EU
used
the
objection
procedure
53
times
to
set
much
higher
autonomous
quotas
than
those
3
Quoted
in
Tom
Wray,
'Spain
to
harden
EEC
line
on
fisheries,'
National
Fisherman,
November
1985,
5.
See
also
Donald
Barry,
'Canada-European
Community
fisheries
relations:
problems
and
prospects,'
Canada
and
the
European
Community,
1992,
Calgary,
Alberta,
October
1991.
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Spring
1998
255
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