The Canadian government’s response to foreign disinformation: Rhetoric, stated policy intentions, and practices
| Author | Nicole J. Jackson |
| DOI | 10.1177/00207020221076402 |
| Published date | 01 December 2021 |
| Date | 01 December 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essay |
Scholarly Essay
International Journal
2021, Vol. 76(4) 544–563
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00207020221076402
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The Canadian government’s
response to foreign
disinformation: Rhetoric,
stated policy intentions, and
practices
Nicole J. Jackson
School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
Abstract
In recent years, governments have considered how to respond to “disinformation.”
However, there is little academic literature on Canada’s response in the area of security
and foreign policy. This paper addresses this gap by analyzing how and why Canadian
government foreign and security actors have “securitized”foreign disinformation. It
argues that, since 2014, they have increased awareness about disinformation and
transformed it into a matter of “security”through rhetoric and discursive framing, as
well as stated policy intentions and actions. This has occurred in response to perceived
threats, but without coherent policy. The findings suggest that challenges are linked to
persistent difficulties in defining and understanding disinformation. The result has been
fragmented actions, some of which may legitimate actions that deviate from “normal
political processes.”The implications are that definitional challenges need to be ad-
dressed, the role of security actors assessed, and a clearly articulated and holistic
strategy drawn.
Keywords
Disinformation, security, Canadian foreign policy, information warfare, securitization,
resilience, hybrid threats, foreign interference
Corresponding author:
Nicole J. Jackson, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, British Columbia
V6B 5K3, Canada.
Email: nicole_jackson@sfu.ca
Disinformation
1
is a complex and contentious phenomenon that has become a major
challenge at multiple levels worldwide. In recent years, governments, private sector
entities, and members of the public have confronted issues and controversies about
whether and how to respond to it. In Canada, a complex myriad of counter-
disinformation efforts has been initiated by the government, the private sector, and
civil society (including the technical community, academia, and non-governmental
organizations). However, there has been little academic cataloguing and analysis of all
that is being done, and little debate about its merits and drawbacks.
The purpose of thispaper is to provide a case study on howthe Canadian government
has responded to foreign disinformation nationally and internationally in security and
foreign policy. In doing so,it seeks to fill a significant gap in the academic literature,
2
but
also to inspire and contribute to a more robust public conversation about Canada’s
emerging approach and its benefits and limits. It therefore provides an analytical
overview of the government’s foreign and security actors’rhetoric, policies, and actions.
“Securitization”is used as a framework to highlight the processes and ways in which
these government actors have rhetorically addressed the Canadian public and prac-
tically considered and acted upon foreign disinformation as an existential “threat”and a
matter of “security.”This framework clarifies how non-military threats are brought into
the domain of security policy, raising their profile in the government’s agenda, mo-
bilizing greater attention and resources to address them.
3
This may enable “extraor-
dinary”action (breaking established rules) in the name of security.
4
In contrast, when an
issue is “desecuritized,”it goes off the security agenda; it may fade away or more
actively be removed. It is then no longer discussed in terms of security or perceived as a
threat, and new measures are not seen as necessary to address it.
This is not a theory paper. Rather, its contribution is in its empirical analysis of
the Canadian government’s overall approach (rhetoric and practice) to foreign disin-
formation in security and foreign policy. While assessments of the effectiveness of these
1. Academics today commonly define disinformation as the deliberate dissemination of intentionally false or
inaccurate information. The ambiguity and contested nature of this term are explored in the paper.
2. Chris Tenoveand Heidi Tworek, “Managing Canadian elections into the future: Online disinformation and
harmful speech: Dangers for democratic participation and possible policy responses,”Journal of Par-
liamentary and Political Law 13 (2019): 215–232; Alex S. Wilner, “Cybersecurity and its discontents:
Artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things and digital misinformation,”International Journal 73, no. 2
(2018): 308–316. Canadian reports (as opposed to academic journal articles) are referred to below.A case
study of Canadian practices can also be found in Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer,“Effective state practices
against disinformation: Four country case studies,”Hybrid CoE research report no. 2, July 2021.
3. Ole Waever, “Securitizationand desecuritization,”in Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed., On Security (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1995), 46–86; Barry Buzan, Ole Waever,and Jaap de Wilde,Security: A New
Framework for Analysis (Boulder: LynneRienner Publishers, 1998); Rita Floyd,The Morality of Security:
A Theory of Just Securitization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Rita Floyd, “States,last
resort, and the obligation to securitize,”Polity 51, no. 2 (2019): 378–394.
4. Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 25; Michael C. Williams, “Words, images,
enemies: Securitization and international politics,”International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 4 (2003): 511–
531.
Jackson 545
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