The Canadian Middle Power Myth
| Published date | 01 June 2000 |
| Author | Adam Chapnick |
| Date | 01 June 2000 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070200005500202 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
ADAM
CHAPNICK
The
Canadian
middle
power
myth
TE
RHETORIC
OF
'MIDDLEPOWERHOOD'
has
dominated
Canada's
external
political
identity
since
the
Second
World
War.
Middle-power
status
has
been
used to
justify
a
voice
in
international
organizations,
leadership
in
international
initiatives,
and
consultation
with Canadian
officials
on
matters
of
concern
to
the international
community.
Canada
has
used
the
middle
power
concept
to further
its
foreign
policy
aims
and
to
promote
nationalism through
an
internationally
recognized
identity.
For
all
its
importance,
'middle
power'
is
rarely
defined,
and
limited
explanations
are
never
specific.
This
vagueness
is
deliberate
and
con-
ceals
a
striking
reality:
Canada's
status
as
a
middle
power
is
a
myth.
The
history
of
middlepowerhood
uncovers
a
tradition
of
Canadian
rhetoric
crafted
to
justify
the
attainment
of
disproportionate
influence
in
inter-
national
affairs.'
This
subtle
process
of
nationalist
self-promotion
had
This
essay
was
awarded
the
Marvin
Gelber
prize.
Established
in
recognition
of
the
abiding
inter-
est
of
Marvin
Gelber
in
international
affairs
and
of
his
many
years
of
service
to
the
Canadian
Institute
of
InternationalAffairs,
the
prize
is
awarded
annually
to a
superior
article
by
ajunior
Canadian
scholar
on
a
subject
in
the
area
of
international
affairs
and
foreign
policy
Adam
Chapnick
is
completing
an
MA
at
the
Norman
Paterson
School
oflnternationalAffairs,
Carleton
University
Ottawa.
He
would
like to
thank
the anonymous
reviewers
for
their
assistance
andfeedback.
i
For
an
early
discussion
of
the
theory
of
middle
power
status,
see
David
Vital,
The
Inequality
of
States:
A
Survey
of
the
Small
Power
in
International
Relations
(Oxford:
Clarendon
Press
1967),
esp
37.
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Spring
2000
The
Canadian
middle
power
myth
its
genesis
in
1942
when
diplomat
Hume
Wrong introduced
the
func-
tional
principle,
and
it
continues
to be
manifest
in
the
Canadian
human
security
agenda
today.
In
1933,
David
Mitrany
legitimized
the
concept
of
functionalism
in
international
relations,
evaluating the
potential
for
a
successful
world
government
by
dividing
the world into
two
types
of
states:
great
and
small.
Recognizing
that
some
of
the
smaller
states
were
increasing
in
strength,
and
seeking
to
ensure
successful
and
co-operative
internation-
al
governance, he
proposed
to
acknowledge
the differing
capacities
of
the
smaller
powers
through
'a
functional
structure
of
political
authority.'
2
Mitrany's
ideas
undoubtedly
influenced
Hume
Wrong
when
he
wrote
to
Norman
Robertson,
the
undersecretary
of
state
for
external
affairs,
about
Canada's
role
and
status
in
the direction
of
war
and
the
shaping
of
peace
during
inter-allied World
War
II
negotiations:
'the
principle,
I
think,
is
that
each
member
of
the
grand
alliance
should
have
a
voice
in
the
conduct
of
war
proportionate
to
the
general
war
effort.
A subsidiary
principle
is
that
the
influence
of
the
various
coun-
tries
should
be greatest in
connection
with
those
matters
with
which
they
are
most directly
concerned."
Wrong's
'functional
principle'
was
narrower
than
Mitrany's
'functionalism.'
It
stipulated
that
individual
small-state involvement
in
international
affairs
should
be based
upon
certain
conditions:
the
relevance
of
the
state's
interests,
the
direct
con-
tribution
of
the
state
to
the
situation
in
question,
and
the
capacity
of
the
state
to
participate.
4
Wrong did not
intend
to
contest the
role
of
the
great
powers
-
their
inherent
right
to
influence
over
all
aspects
of
glob-
al
governance
was
conceded.
The
principle
was
to
apply
to
all
remain-
ing
states.
There
were
indeed
two tiers
of
powers
in
the
international
system. However,
some
of
the
smaller
powers
deserved greater
relative
status
predetermined
by
three
criteria:
relevance,
contribution,
and
capacity.
Functional
powers
were
small
powers.
The
functional
princi-
ple
was
a
'functional'
means
of
differentiating
between smaller
states,
based
on
their
relative
capacities
at
a specific
time.
2
David
Mitrany,
The
Progress
of
International
Government
(London:
George
Allen
&
Unwin
1933),
118.
3
Wrong
to
Robertson,
Washington,
20
January
1942,
in
John
F.
Hilliker,
ed,
Documents on
Canadian
External Relations.
IX:
1942-43
(Hull
PQ:
Government
of
Canada
Publishing
Centre
198o),
107.
4
For
a
more
detailed
description
of
Wrong
and
the
functional principle
see
J.L.
Granatstein,
The
Ottawa
Men:
The
Civil
Service
Mandarins,
1935-1957
(Toronto:
University
of
Toronto
Press
[198211999).
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Spring2000
189
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