The Canadian Navy and the New Naval Environment in Asia
| Published date | 01 March 2003 |
| Date | 01 March 2003 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070200305800109 |
| Author | James A. Boutilier |
| Subject Matter | Article |
JAMES
A.
BOUTILIER
The
Canadian
Navy
and
the
new
naval
environment
in
Asia
CLAIMS
OF
NEWNESS
ARE
FREQUENTLY
OVERBLOWN.
But
an
examina-
tion
of
the
Indo-Pacific
naval
environment
over
the
past
half-dozen
years
reveals
a
number
of
remarkable
developments.
The
Chinese
bracketed
Taiwan
with
missiles
(the Americans
responded
by
inserting
aircraft
carriers),
the
Indians
acquired
the capability
of
deploying
nuclear weapons
at
sea,
and
both
India
and
China
undertook
historic,
long-range
voyages.
The
Japanese
Maritime
Self-Defense
Force
(JMSDF)
despatched
warships to
the
Indian
Ocean
for
the
first
time
since
1945
while
the
People's
Liberation
Army
Navy
(PLAN)
embarked
on
its
first
round-the-world
cruise.
The
JMSDF
opened
fire
in
anger
for
the
first
time
in
1999
when
it
sank
a
suspected
North
Korean
spy
ship.
Likewise,
the
Royal
Thai
and
Republic
of
(South)
Korea
navies
engaged
in armed
clashes
at
sea.
Regional
navies
began
to
build
or
buy
bigger
and
bigger surface
combatants
including
obsolescent
Russian
aircraft
carriers.
Warships
of
6000-tonnes
or
over
became
more
common
in
the
Pacific
and
Indian
Oceans.
Similarly,
the
number
of
conventional submarines
rose
dramatically
with
Australia,
South
Korea,
Singapore,
Malaysia,
India,
and
China
adding
them
to
their
inventories.
Even
Taiwan
attempted
to
acquire eight
new diesel-electric
boats
while
Canada
began
taking
SpecialAdvisor
(Policy),
Maritime
Forces
Pacific
Headquarters,
Canada.
The
views
expressed
here
are
the
authors
and
should
not
be
construed
in
any
way
as
the
officialpolicy
of
Canadai
Department
ofNational
Defence.
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Winter
2002-2003
James
A.
Boutilier
delivery
of
four
Upholder-class
submarines
from
the
United Kingdom.
These acquisitions
were
buttressed
by
the appearance
of
maritime
patrol
aircraft
and by
the
deployment
of
new
types
of
sea-going
missiles.
Piracy
and
sea
robbery
(attacks
on
ships
not
on
the
high
seas)
reached
unprecedented
levels
in
Southeast
Asia,
and
disputes
over
fish-
eries,
boundaries,
and
islets
kept
regional
navies
on
a
state
of
alert. At
the
same
time the
Indian
and
Chinese
navies
engaged
in high-level
naval
diplomacy
in
Southeast
Asia;
the
latter
establishing
its
presence
on the
Bay
of
Bengal
while
the
former
developed
links
with China's
rival,
Vietnam.
Both
navies
were
the subject
of
increased
attention
by
the
United
States
Navy
(USN).
The
growth
of
the
PLAN
was
a
source
of
concern
for
the
Pentagon,
and
United
States-China
relations
were
strained
by
the
willingness
of
the
administration
of
George
W
Bush
to
provide
naval
hardware
to
Taiwan.
While
relations
between
Washington
and
Beijing
deteriorated
in
early
2001,
following
the
collision
of
a
Chinese
inter-
ceptor
plane
and
an
American
EP-3
surveillance
plane on
1
April,
they
improved
markedly
between
Washington and
New Delhi,
even
before
the
events
of
11
September
2001
united
the
two
nations in
the
'War
on
Terrorism.'
Indeed,
the
revival
of
the relationship
between
the
USN
and
the
Indian
Navy
(frozen after
India's
nuclear
tests
in
May
1998) con-
stituted
one
of
the
major
maritime
developments
in
recent
years.
Elsewhere,
however,
USN-JMSDF
collaboration
on
a
theatre
missile
defence
system
for
northeast
Asian
waters
had
a
less
positive
impact,
exciting
vigorous
opposition
from the Chinese.
For
its
part, Canada
transferred
a
number
of
ships
from
the Atlantic
command
(MARLANT)
to
Maritime
Forces Pacific
(MARPAC),
the
naval
formation
on
the
West
Coast.
The
Canadian
Navy
operated
in
the
Persian
Gulf
from
the
early
1990s
onwards
as
part
of
the
United
Nations-sanctioned
maritime
interdiction
force
against Iraq.
Those
deployments
resulted
in
high
levels
of
interoperability
between
Canadian and
American
warships.
That
interoperability
facilitated
Canadian
naval
support
for
the Australian-led
humanitarian
interven-
tion
in
East
Timor
in
1999-2000
and underpins
Canada's
current
commitment
in
southwest
Asia
to
the
United
States-led War
on
Terrorism.
In
fact,
Canada
has
probably
contributed
a
larger
propor-
tion
of
its
navy
to
the
coalition
effort
than
any
other
nation,
and
the
Canadian
Navy
has
had more
ships engaged
in
the
Arabian
Sea
cam-
paign
than
at
any
time
since
1945.
182
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JOURNAL
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2002-2003
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