The challenges of opposition.
| Author | Green, Jane |
| Position | Features |
There is a classic paradox in the study of political parties: when they are defeated, they act in ways which prevent them from regaining power.
The Labour Party of 1983, and the Conservative Party of 2001, appeared to confirm this view. Both parties were criticised for fighting ineffective campaigns. Both were described as lurching to the left, and right, respectively. They had both experienced internal pressure on policy and ideological direction. Each had unpopular leaders who were accused of eschewing polling research.
They focused their election campaigns on low salience issues which made them appear out of touch and preoccupied with internal policy commitments--rather than the issues of concern to the wider electorate. These were campaigns that history remembers as a play to the base. Rather than a 'vote maximising' strategy addressing a broad number of salient issues in line with the policy views of the majority of voters, both parties appeared to go after their core vote. The result, in both cases, appeared to be a self-inflicted prolonged period in opposition.
The reasons given for these campaigns in 1983 and 2001, and for both parties' responses to defeat, are related to classic and predictable challenges of opposition. Those challenges are very similar--if not identical--to the ones the Labour Party faces today.
This article defines the classic challenges of opposition, revealing the arguments a new Labour leader will encounter. The article also presents an alternative interpretation of the 1983 Labour campaign and the Conservative campaign of 2001. It challenges the application of core vote explanations and shows that parties need not be driven off votemaximising strategies if they understand the true constraints of their electoral context. The article concludes by highlighting more important challenges--and opportunities--facing the Labour Party in its current period of opposition.
Classic opposition problems
The following features of opposition reflect those discussed in extensive academic work, highlighting incentives which force political parties away from vote-winning appeals.
A narrow base
A defeated party will have lost a lot of votes, obviously, but its more stable voters may also have voted for other parties or stayed at home. Without these voters a party cannot build, and although more committed party identifiers are diminishing in number in Britain (and in many Western electorates), their votes are important. These voters may be the first to return when the party remains in opposition, sharing the party's philosophy and being rooted in social ties and relevant communities.
These voters, it is argued, have different issue concerns and hold more polarised opinions: they are further to the left (or right) than more moderate swing voters. Defeated parties face particularly strong incentives, therefore, to focus on traditional issues and on policies designed to appeal to these core and pivotal voters. Remaining MPs will be those in the safest seats, and those safer seats will be populated by traditional voters in higher proportions, giving these voters a particularly strong voice in any debate regarding party renewal and change.
Weak organisation
Money and members will be in short supply, and the central party organisation will be depleted. A convincing victory sends a powerful signal about the popularity of a party. When Tony Blair took the Labour Party into government in 1997, Labour Party membership increased more after that election than it did before it. A convincing election loss has the opposite effect. A defeated party, already weakened by a period of unpopularity in government, may encounter further losses in money, members and votes. For activists and party members, the experience of being unpopular on the doorstep, their efforts being spent in vain, the loss of even more members and donors, and the experience of being relegated in importance, will all mean that the party machine requires considerable commitment.
The demand to increase membership, to energise activists, and to encourage donations can motivate parties to focus on more traditional policies. It has been argued, for example, that because the Conservative Party deepened member opportunities for policy influence between 1997 and 1999, this had the effect of pulling the party away from the issues important to the broader electorate. As I argue below, this reflects a misunderstanding of the concerns and priorities of activists, who primarily want to see the party re-elected.
Discord and disloyalty
Internal divisions, legacies and disunity can all appear when the relative discipline of government has gone. Opposition is viewed as a prime opportunity by competing factions to redirect a party towards preferred policies. The parliamentary party may be disgruntled, some of the best talent depleted, those MPs who served in government may be seeking backbench roles, others may be tainted with the blame of office, and new MPs won't be entering parliament. Without realistic rewards, MPs have fewer immediate reasons to be loyal.
All of this means that a new leader has...
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