The China fallacy: How the US can benefit from China's rise and avoid another Cold War by Donald Gross

Date01 March 2014
DOI10.1177/0020702013518496
Published date01 March 2014
AuthorAndrew Gawthorpe
Subject MatterBook Reviews
of inclusive behaviour by elites in post-conf‌lict countries, not only through the
standard quantitative analytical methods but also with comparative case studies
that illustrate the causal relationships between inclusive behaviour and the consoli-
dation of peace. A new edition of the book could usefully expand the policy
recommendations to guide the work of policymakers and international actors.
All that said, Call has conducted important and interesting research on the
puzzle of why peace fails, and this book will be of great interest to scholars and
practitioners alike.
Donald Gross
The China fallacy: How the US can benefit from China’s rise and avoid another Cold War
New York: Bloomsbury, 2012. 320pp., $120.00 (cloth) ISBN 978–1441100832
Reviewed by: Andrew Gawthorpe, King’s College London
Whether to wield the stick against adversaries or feed them carrots: that is one
of the perennial debates in Washington, DC. The debate has at its heart the belief
that American actions are one of the primary factors determining the behaviour of
other states. When the US runs up against a state whose core goals do not appear
susceptible to change under the pressure of threats or enticement of rewards, the
policy debate is liable to oscillate between extreme conciliation and extreme f‌irm-
ness. Desperately seeking to demonstrate that US inf‌luence can be decisive, policy
proponents are prone to make unlikely promises about the favourable outcomes
that will result from their chosen course of action.
Such an unlikely promise lies at the heart of Donald Gross’s book The China
Fallacy, which is otherwise an able overview of the state of Sino-American relations
and a useful corrective to an American policy debate on China that he contends is
‘‘far narrower’’ than it ought to be (37). Gross contends that the US debate is
dominated by ‘‘China hawks’’ who have succeeded in def‌ining China as a threat to
both the security and economy of the United States, when in reality much of
China’s military build-up and internal repression can be attributed to its own per-
ception of a ‘‘US threat.’’ It follows that, by reducing China’s perception of this
threat, its policy can be altered.
Gross argues that by reducing tension with China and ultimately arriving at a
framework agreement, the groundwork will be laid for the mutual strengthening of
the Chinese and American economies, the political liberalization of China, and an
enduring Sino-American peace that extinguishes the spectre of nuclear war between
the two countries. The central plank of the proposed agreement is for the United
States to follow a policy of ‘‘strategic restraint’’ in the Asia-Pacif‌ic and to reduce its
military forces and movements in the region in exchange for China formally
renouncing the use of force against Taiwan and agreeing to submit its maritime
disputes to international arbitration (44). China would exercise its own restraint by
sharply de-escalating tensions in the Taiwan Straits and increasing military trans-
parency, among other more minor measures.
120 International Journal 69(1)

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