The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union — A Lesson in How Not to Make Policy
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9256.00087 |
| Date | 01 May 1999 |
| Published date | 01 May 1999 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
The Common Fisheries
Policy of the European
Union ± A Lesson in
How Not to Make Policy
Marc-Philippe Cooper
This article considers some salient theoretical
The common market shall extend to agri-
contributions which bear upon our under-
culture and trade in agricultural products.
standing of the Common Fisheries Policy
Agricultural products means the products
(CFP) of the European Union (EU). It out-
of the soil, of stockfarming and of ®sheries
lines the fundamental dilemma highlighted in
and products of ®rst stage processing
game theory known as `the tragedy of the
directly relating to these products.
commons' and goes on to examine whether
the CFP can be construed as a `policy ®asco'.
More seriously the CFP lacks legitimacy in
The article considers how the ®sheries of the
a broader sense, if one accepts that policy is
EU could be more eectively managed and
an expression of state power and that such `a
underlines the urgent need for international
power is exercised illegitimately if there is no
collective action. With the mismatch between
right to its exercise; otherwise it is exercised
the CFP and the scale of the problem it is
legitimately' (Scruton, 1982, pp. 263±4). Argu-
intended to address ®rmly in sight, the article
ably there is a crisis of legitimacy inherent in
concludes with an evaluation and some
the centralised, bureaucratic, decision ±
policy suggestions.
making structures and processes of the CFP
which has resulted in the creation of `an
unbridgeable gulf ' (Ritchie and Zito, 1998,
p. 165) between the ocials and inspectors of
Policy illegitimacy
the Commission, on the one hand; and the
®shermen and their organisations (often with
From its inception, the CFP was a `bas-
public support), on the other hand.
tardised'
policy
subsumed
under
the
Competing claims over the right to regulate
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and as
EU ®sheries are indicative of the diverse
such lacks legitimacy as a policy in the
range of perceptions amongst key policy
narrow, legalistic sense. It is referred to under
`stakeholders'. Such perceptions re¯ect the
Article 38(1) of the Treaty of Rome which
contrasting `world views' of the actors
states that:
involved, which invariably impacts adversely
Marc-Philippe Cooper, University of Luton.
# Political Studies Association 1999. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK
and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
61
Common Fisheries Policy . Cooper
Politics (1999) 19(2) pp. 61±70
upon policy coherence: whereas politicians
CFP by hundreds of years) as they com-
and bureaucrats tend to have a `global' out-
pete in what are now shared ®shing
look, `. . . the perspectives of those producing
grounds.
®sh are focused, understandably, on their
individual economic survival . . .' (Wise, 1984,
During the 1960s, the member-states were
p. 255).
divided over the issue of ®sh trade liberal-
In a general sense, the CFP is based on the
isation. Indeed as Leigh (1983) shows, it was
same principles as the CAP although it only
precisely due to strains in the weakest sectors
became a `supranational' policy with common
of the industry, arising from trade liberal-
rules covering all aspects of the ®shing indus-
isation, that led to demands for a CFP. He also
try in 1983. Thus Article 1 of Regulation 170/
acknowledges the signi®cance of the Commis-
83 set the CFP regime in place:
sion and the Court of Justice in laying the foun-
dations of the CFP whilst the Council of
the protection of the ®shing grounds, the
Ministers remained deadlocked. Only after pro-
conservation of the biological resources of
tracted negotiations did a package deal even-
the sea and their balanced exploitation on
tually emerge `. . . held together by a ®nely
a lasting basis and in appropriate economic
worked interstate bargain . . .' on 21st October
and social conditions.
1970 (Parrish, 1997, p. 227). Although a degree
of market liberalisation occurred, there was
Of course, it is not inconceivable for such
still the problem of equal access to both mar-
policies to acquire legitimacy over time, alas
kets and waters which led to further procrasti-
this has not happened in the case of the CFP.
nation regarding implementation of the policy.
Enlargement oered a `golden' opportunity
Political opportunism and the whereby this related issue could be resolved
as the four applicant states at the time
creation of the CFP
(United Kingdom, Denmark, Eire and
Norway) provided rich new ®shing grounds ±
Like all EU common policies the CFP is
especially Norway, which in the event did not
highly `politicised' given that it entails both a
join. Issue linkage of this kind characterises
signi®cant `pooling' of sovereignty by member
EU policy-making whereby `. . . decisions are
± state governments (thus giving the policy its
taken in a political marketplace and unfortu-
supranational qualities); and the ongoing co-
nately in the case of ®shing, a ¯awed decision
operation of the member-states in the imple-
is better than no decision at all . . .' (Parrish,
mentation of the policy. The CFP is more
1997, p. 230).
highly politicised than most EU common
policies given the `legitimacy de®cit' and the
fact that it is fundamentally about resource
EU policy-making and the
allocation between member states: `who gets
CFP
what, when and how' (Lasswell, 1965, p. 3).
Common solutions are impeded by two inter-
The level of political commitment under-
related factors:
pinning the CFP has not been sucient to
create a wide enough consensus for a radical
(i) the passions which the issue of ®shing
change in policy direction. This can be attrib-
arouses as `. . . man's last economically
uted to governments claiming the mantle of
signi®cant hunting activity . . .' (Leigh,
`the national interest' which in actual fact is a
1983, p. 5); and,
composite of diverse sectional claims (Webb,
(ii) the intense national rivalries amongst the
1983), underscoring the fragility of `national'
®shermen of the EU (that predate the
political commitment.
62
# Political Studies Association 1999
Politics (1999) 19(2) pp. 61±70
Common Fisheries Policy . Cooper
One of the most in¯uential and enduring
In trying to avert such a scenario it is
theories of European integration, Neo-
important to comprehend the CFP within the
functionalism, drew attention to the `. . . spe-
broader EU policy-making context, scholars
ci®c bargaining and consensus-producing
could do worse than deploy bargaining
mechanisms . . .' (Webb, 1983, p. 17) of the
theory. Apart from helping to develop alter-
EU policy-making process. A great deal of
native modes of con¯ict resolution, the latter
political activity has been generated by the
can provide a useful analytical tool by
CFP and contributed to the EU emerging as a
explaining how the actors, interests, and stra-
forum for the interplay of group interests in
tegies interact and aect policy outcomes.
accordance with neofunctionalism. However,
More signi®cantly, for the purpose of this
the shift in support and loyalties away from
paper, bargaining theory complements game
national authorities towards the EU institu-
theory (Rhodes and Mazey, 1995, p. 13) from
tions, as predicted, has not occurred. Further-
which the problem of the `tragedy of the
more, vital interests (notably those of the
commons' is derived.
®shermen) have not been satis®ed and nor
has the authority of the Commission at the
centre been enhanced ± far from it.
Defending the indefensible?
Although the CFP has `politicised' the
entire...
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