The Concept of Discrimination
| Published date | 01 April 1985 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9256.1985.tb00101.x |
| Date | 01 April 1985 |
| Author | Eileen Fry |
| Subject Matter | Article |
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4
Mav.
AcknowZedgernents:
Howell for commenting upon earlier drafts of this article.
I
would like
to
thank Dave Marsh, Rod Rhodes and David
THE CONCEPT
OF
DISCRIMINATION
EILEEN
FRY
Introduction
While there has been much debate recently about the justification of
various forms of discrimination,and in particular about the justification of
reverse discrimination, little attention has been given
to
the question of what
is meant by discrimination. In what follows
I
shall suggest a definition and
look at some of its implications.
One possible source of confusion needs to be cleared up initially.
Discrimination is sometimes used to refer to a mental operation of distinguishing
between people and/or thinlgs.
I
shall be concerned with the meaning of
discrimination as
it
applies to actions and only with such a mental operation
insofar as discrimination in action presupposes this other kind of discrimination.
Arriving at a definition of discrimination
is
complicated by the fact
that many people consider that a necessary condition of an action being
described as discriminatory is that
it
is unjustified. Though
it
may invo
considerabledeparture from current usage there are good reasons
for
abandoning this prescripti,ve element in the definition. As long as
it
is
retained different views
of
what is justified
will
lead to different defin
of
discrimination. Abandoning the prescriptive element
will
remove the
ve a
t
ions
semantic component from dispuies about the justification of certain actions
and policies and provide a common basis for aqgurnent. Further,
if
discrimination
is
used as a term which is both descriptive and prescriptive these two elements
can easily become confused. Prejudgements about the justification of certain
actions and policies
will
be made on the basis of purely actual assertions.
If
the question of what is discriminatory is kept logical y distinct from the
question of what
is
justified, coherent argument about th
s
latter question
is
made much easier.
It
seems then that discrimination should be defined
without
reference to
normative considerations. On &at factual basis can an action be described as
discriminatory?
A
very brief and general answer is probably necessary before
I
go
on
to discuss various more specific definitions in greater detail.
Discrimination as
it
appliles to actions refers to some kind of differential
treatment.
It
is normally defined with reference to some characteristic on
the basis of which this differential treatment takes place. Thus racial
discrimination is differential treatment on the basis of race. In what
follows
I
shall make particular reference
to
racial discrimination though the
analysis could also be applied to other kinds of discriminatory action (like
those affecting women or the handicapped).
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