The conditional effect of audiences on credibility
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343319871983 |
| Date | 01 May 2020 |
| Published date | 01 May 2020 |
| Author | Matthew Hauenstein |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
The conditional effect of audiences
on credibility
Matthew Hauenstein
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame
Abstract
How do leaders signal their intentions during a crisis? Scholars point to audience costs, potential political punishment
for bluffing during bargaining, to explain how accountable leaders communicate. However, the empirical support for
audience costs is mixed. I argue that this apparent disconnect between theory and evidence is due to different ways
that audiences can threaten to use their sanctioning power during a crisis. When determining whether to punish a
leader for a failed coercive threat, their domestic supporters should balance concerns over consistency and policy
outcomes. As such, accountable leaders’ ability to credibly communicate is not automatic, rather it depends on their
supporters’ policy preferences. I apply this insight using casualty sensitivity as a conditioning policy preference. I
expect, and find, that audiences only help a leader commit to fight when fighting is low-cost, and actually prevent
commitment when fighting is high-cost. Using compellent threat data, I find that audiences have countervailing
effects on credibility due to their preferences for leaders who are both consistent and avoid costly conflict. This
conditional effect could explain prior mixed support for audience costs in observational data, as prior studies pool
together instances where I find audiences have strong, but opposing, effects.
Keywords
audience costs, bargaining, coercion
One day after announcing an agreement to destroy Syr-
ia’s chemical weapons, President Obama defended his
diplomatic solution in an interview. A year prior, Obama
threatened the Syrian government with ‘enormous con-
sequences if we start seeing movement on the chemical
weapons front, or the use of chemical weapons’ in the
Syrian civil war (Snyder & Borghard, 2012). In August
2013, the Syrian government crossed Obama’s ‘red line’,
killing 1,400 civilians near Damascus with chemical
weapons (Warrick, 2013). Obama requested a skeptical
Congress authorize military intervention, which his Sec-
retary of Defense later claimed was ‘an almost certain
way to scotch any action’ (Panetta & Newton, 2014:
450). With congressional approval doubtful, the United
States struck a deal with Russia to eliminate Syria’s
chemical weapons. Pressed over backing down from his
threat, Obama responded that he was ‘less concerned
about style points (and) [ ...] more concerned about
getting the policy right’ (This Week, 2013). Obama bet
the public cared more about avoiding conflict than his
flip flop.
1
Obama’s belief that outcomes trump consistency in
the eyes of voters breaks with research on audience costs,
which assumes that people dislike inconsistent leaders.
However, the response of Obama’s own Secretary of
Defense to his decision illustrates the core logic. Secre-
tary Panetta argued that ‘[w]hen the president as com-
mander in chief draws a red line, it is critical that he act if
the line is crossed. The power of the United States rests
Corresponding author:
mhauenst@nd.edu
1
Polling at the time suggested that after the attack a majority of
Americans both disapproved of even limited force in Syria and
supported the diplomatic initiative despite believing it was unlikely
to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons (Washington Post–ABC News,
2013).
Journal of Peace Research
2020, Vol. 57(3) 422–436
ªThe Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343319871983
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