The Creeping Politicisation of the World Bank: The Case of Corruption
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00488.x |
| Published date | 01 October 2004 |
| Date | 01 October 2004 |
| Author | Heather Marquette |
| Subject Matter | Article |
The Creeping Politicisation of the World
Bank: The Case of Corruption
Heather Marquette
University of Birmingham
This paper looks at the increasing politicisation of the World Bank through its work on corrup-
tion. Historically, the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, which forbid it from involving itself in the
politics of its recipient countries, have excluded work on corruption. In the 1990s, internal and
external demands grew for the Bank to address the problem of corruption, despite earlier reti-
cence. Much research done over the past decade, often commissioned by the Bank or done in-
house, has worked to turn corruption into an economic and social issue, rather than a political
one, in order to conduct anti-corruption work while evading accusations that it is violating this
non-political mandate. Now this pretence is gradually slipping away and the Bank is becoming
overtly political, despite its Articles and a lack of international consensus that this is the direction
in which it should be heading.
This paper looks at the increasing politicisation of the World Bank through its work
on corruption. In the past, the Bank has avoided addressing corruption, both
implicitly and explicitly, through its lending. Historically, its Articles of Agreement,
which forbid it from involving itself in the politics of its recipient countries, have
excluded work on corruption. However, in the 1990s, we saw a reversal of earlier
policy, following internal and external demand for the Bank to address the problem
of corruption. Its Articles have not been changed, however, and much research
done over the past decade, often commissioned by the Bank or done in-house, has
worked to turn corruption into an economic and social issue, rather than a politi-
cal one, in order to conduct anti-corruption work while evading accusations that
it is violating this non-political mandate. Not only has this non-political approach
to corruption impacted its work thus far, but now this pretence is gradually
slipping away and the Bank is becoming overtly political, despite its Articles and a
lack of international consensus that this is the direction in which it should be
heading.
In this work, and the wider study on which it is based (Marquette, 2003), I used
both data analysis and interviews (face-to-face and phone). The World Bank has
had a reputation for being reticent in releasing information to the public, making
analysis of its projects and programmes by outsiders problematic. This has changed
somewhat over the past few years, following the implementation in 1993 of the
Disclosure of Information Policy (World Bank, 2000a). As the Bank began to re-
quire transparency and accountability from its borrowers, it was subject to similar
calls from its members (notably the US) and from critics. It now makes much more
information available but maintains discretion on this availability. In addition, all
documents must pass through a lengthy vetting process in order to move into the
public realm. The combination of this ad hoc approach to publication and the
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2004 VOL 52, 413–430
© Political Studies Association, 2004.
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
414 HEATHER MARQUETTE
vetting process leaves considerable gaps in information within its documents,
despite the new approach to disclosure.
I would like to offer a couple of caveats here. Firstly, the World Bank is a vast and
complex institution. It appears to some as an unchanging and highly technocratic
bureaucracy that either does its job well and is a highly efficient leader in the global
marketplace, or instead a behemoth that never learns the lessons of its failures and
always insists on ‘business as usual’. On the other hand, some see it as a vastly
changing and fluid institution that either easily adapts to the changing political and
economic environments in a way that reflects the needs of its members, or instead
insists on simply tacking on new philosophies and new sectors without any real
rethink of the needs of its members. The truth is that it can be all of these things
at the same time. By using documents, news reports and interviews, one can shed
different light and shadow on the same issues depending on the sources used, thus
highlighting the need for openness and alertness when analysing the data. In addi-
tion, when the Bank does change, it does so rapidly. I have had to be flexible in
the development of this research to accommodate many changes in a vast pro-
gramme that the Bank refers to as ‘evolving’. Because of this, I have tried to balance
detailed analysis with some broad generalisations.
The World Bank, Corruption and Its
Non-political Mandate
In 1997, the World Bank announced its intention to provide a ‘systematic frame-
work for addressing corruption as a development issue in the assistance it provides
to countries and in its operation work more generally’ (1997, p. 2). Although it
acknowledged that some of these areas were new territory and would require new
staff, new areas of expertise, new procedures and new lending instruments, it
claimed that it had long been concerned with corruption. Indeed, a recent report
asserts that it has been ‘in the business’ of combating corruption, ‘since its very
inception’ (Linn, 2001, p. 2).
However, until the mid-1990s, the Bank always argued that its Articles of Agree-
ment (World Bank, 1944), the rules that govern its activity, prohibited it from
making decisions based on political considerations, and that a country’s political
structure, its human rights record and corruption were all too political for it to con-
sider. Instead, if there was an economic case for lending to a corrupt and abusive
regime, then it was obligated to do so. Despite the fact that these same Articles also
require it to ensure that its funds are spent as intended, it continued lending to
corrupt regimes even when it was aware that Bank funds were being siphoned off.
Indeed, it has been accused of using its non-political mandate to either avoid
working in controversial areas, such as corruption, or to explain away controver-
sial work, such as lending to countries regardless of human rights violations. It
defended this by arguing, firstly, that corruption is a political issue and therefore
not part of its mandate and, secondly, that even if only a fraction of aid reached a
country’s poor, it is still better than no aid at all. Therefore, contrary to recent
claims, its new framework for combating corruption does indeed mark a departure
from its past approach. Although it is part of a general process, it has accelerated
greatly and moved the Bank into new areas.
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