The Cuban Crisis and World Order
| Date | 01 April 1967 |
| Published date | 01 April 1967 |
| DOI | 10.1177/004711786700300101 |
| Author | G.S. Windass |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
1
THE
CUBAN
CRISIS
AND
WORLD
ORDER
G.
S.
WINDASS
I.
Orderly
Disorder
The
Cuban
crisis
of
October
1962
presents
some
curious
problems
to
the
international
lawyer.
An
understanding
of
these
problems
can
throw
a
great
deal
of
light
on
the
relation
of
law
to
power
in
the
present
ambiguous
world
structure.
On
October
23rd,
1962,
as
a
result
of
information
received
concerning
the
shipment
of
medium-range
ballistic
missiles
from
the
Soviet
Union
to
Cuba,
the
United
States
government
pro-
claimed
a
’quarantine’
of
the
island,
with
the
purpose
of
preventing
any
further
importation
of
’offensive
missiles’,
and
of
procuring
the
withdrawal
of
those
already
there.
The
quarantine
was
put
into
effecfi
by
US
Naval
Forces
on
October
24th,
was
denounced
in
the
Security
Council
by
Cuba
as
’an
act
of
war’,
and
by
the
Soviet
Union
as
a
’threat
of
war’
in
violation
of
the
UN
charter.
The
result
of
the
quarantine
was
a
qualified
success
for
the
US.
The
missiles
were
withdrawn,
and
the
Soviet
Union
and
Cuba
received
in
exchange
a
not-too-clear
undertaking
by
the
US
not
to
invade
Cuba.
The
success
of
the
operation
did
not,
however,
resolve the
problem
of
its
legality.
There
was
a
fairly
convincing
prima
facie
case
that
the
US
had
broken
the
law.
It
had
interfered
with
the
well-established
principle
of
the
freedom
of the
seas,
by
claiming
a
right
of
search
and
arrest
of
vessels
bound
for
Cuba.
It
had,
in
contravention
of
the
UN
Charter,
failed
to
submit
a
’threat
to
the
peace’
to
the
Security
Council
before
taking
unilateral
enforcement
action,
and
it
had
used
force
in
a
manner
which
could
not
easily
be
fitted
into
any
of
the
categories
of
permissible
force
allowed
by
the
Charter.
A
similar
case
can
not
be
made
out
against
either
the
Soviet
Union
or
Cuba,
against
whom
the
quarantine
was
principally
directed.
Neither
of
them
used
force
during
the
crisis.
Russia
was
shipping
missiles
to
Cuba
under
a
legally
normal
trade
agree-
ment,
and
at
the
request
of
the
Cuban
government.
It
could
perhaps
be
argued
that
the
carrying
out
of
this
agreement
was
a
’threat
to
the
peace’,
and
therefore
an
act
forbidden
by
the
Charter - though
this
of
course
would
not
legalise
the
US
quarantine;
but
Cuba
would
have
a
ready
defence
against
this
charge
in
the
argument
that
the
shipment
of
the
missiles
was
a
necessary
means
of
preparing
for
self-defence
in
view
of
an
imminent
danger
of
armed
attack
from
America-an
argument
that
could
be
backed
up
by
reference
to
the
US
complicity
in
the
Bay
of
Pigs
invasion
of
the
previous
year,
the
economic
measures
already
taken
against
Cuba,
and
the
public
appeals
by
many
US
politicians
for
an
instant
invasion
of
the
island.
The
argument
that
the
weapons
were
’inherently
offensive’
was
of
course
useless
in
international
law,
since
the
’offensive’
or
’defensive’
nature
of
a
weapon
could
only
depend
on
the
use
to
which
it
was
put
-
and
the
argument
of
’inherent
offensiveness’
could
in
any
case
hardly
be
put
forward
by
the
US,
which
had
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