The Current Constitutional Rules Relating to the Prorogation of Parliament are Unsatisfactory: A Call for Reform
| Author | Ned Sillett |
| Position | LLB (Soton) |
| Pages | 31-44 |
[2020]
Vol.10
31
The Current Constitutional Rules Relating to the Prorogation of
Parliament are Unsatisfactory: A Call for Reform
Ned Sillett*
Abstract
This paper looks at the current constitutional rules relating to the prorogation of Pa rliament and reveals the
problems associated with them. These rules put constitutional principles such as Parliamentary Sovereignty and
Parliamentary Accountability at risk. Recent clarification from the Supreme Court provided some relief for these
constitutional principles, however, pror ogation remains pr oblematic. This paper then questions whether
codification would provide suitable safeguards in the procedure of prorogation. Ho wever, it concludes that
prorogation is no longer necessary under the United Kingdom’s modern constituti on. Other methods, such as
adjournment, provide the same effect but without the problems of prorogation. Furthermore, with populism
becoming increasingly prevalent, prorogation could be used as a tool to avoid the checks and balances of a liberal
democracy. Therefore, the prorogation of Parliament should be abolished.
Introduction
rorogation recently gained attention due to the landmark case of Regina (on the
application of Miller) v The Prime Minister (Miller (No 2)), which challenged the
government’s prorogation of Parliament immediately before the United Kingdom’s
planned exit from the European Union.
1
This public spotlight has raised questions as to whether
the current constitutional rules on the prorogation of Parliament are appropriate or require
reform. This paper will endeavour to demonstrate why the current constitutional rules relating
to the prorogation of Parliament are unsatisfactory; they are archaic and no longer relevant.
Change, if enacted, could occur in a plethora of different methods. Therefore, this paper will
also evaluate the most satisfactory options for the much-needed reform of the constitutional
rules of prorogation.
The rules of prorogation preceding Miller (No 2)
Prorogation originates from a time in British history when Parliament met according to the will
of the British monarch. It was a method by which the monarch could end a Parliamentary
session, because they no longer wanted one, without incurring the expense of an election, in
* LLB (Soton)
1
Regina (on the application of Miller) v The Prime Minister (Miller (No 2)) [2019] UKSC 41, [2019] 3 WLR
589.
P
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