The Debate within NATO and the 'China Card'
| Author | Matthias Nass,Andreas Oldag |
| DOI | 10.1177/002234338302000202 |
| Date | 01 June 1983 |
| Published date | 01 June 1983 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The
Debate
within
NATO
and
the
’China
Card’
MATTHIAS
NASS
&
ANDREAS
OLDAG
Institute
of
Political
Science,
University
of
Hamburg
In
recent
years
the
’traditional’
alliance
system
of
the
post
World
War
II
period
has
undergone
rapid
change.
Both
superpowers,
the
U.S.
and
the Soviet
Union,
which
have
dominated
the
East-West
conflict,
and
similarly
the
organization
of
intra-alliance
relationships
in
the
Eastern
and
Western
bloc,
are
today
confronted
with
relatively
strong
’second’
powers.
The
superpower
conflict
U.S.-USSR
is
complemented
by
ascending
hegemonic
conflicts
U.S.-Western
Europe
and
USSR-China.
The
Soviet-Chinese
schism
started
already
in
the
late
1950’s.
In
the
early
eighties
the
Western
Alliance
is
strained
by
severe
con-
flicts,
perhaps
demonstrating
a
political
process
which
started
much
earlier
in
the
Eastern
bloc.
There
are
not
only
different
perceptions
of
the
Soviet
threat
but
also
different
approaches
to
security
policy
between
Western
Europeans
and
Americans.
The
’diversion
of
power’
within
the
Western
and
Eastern
bloc
has
initiated
a
political
process
in
which
the
’second’
powers
like
Western
Europe
or
China
are
trying
to
define
their
own
security
interests.
The
article
tries
to
examine
the
current
political
situation
in
NATO
and
possible
forms
of
cooperation
between
Western
Europe
and
China.
Introduction
The
perception
of
a
Soviet
military
threat
has
guided
the
security
policies
of
both
the
West
European
NATO
countries
and
the
People’s
Republic
of
China.
During
the
1970’s
there
were
many
speculations
that
parallel
security
interests
would
lead
to
a
growing
cooperation,
eventually
including
military
cooperation,
although
obviously
different
positions
existed
among
the
West
European
countries;
relevant
political
groups
in
Western
Europe
took
a
sceptical
or
negative
view
of
closer
relations
with
China.
Nevertheless,
the
assumption
was
that
because
of
common
security
interests
the
political,
economic
and
military
cooperation
between
China
and
Western
Europe
would
increase.
But
the
political
and
economic
relations
between
Western
Europe
and
China,
which
reached
a
peak
of
intensity
in
the
years
1978-79,
de-
creased
somewhat
again
in
the
following
two
years.
This
downward
trend
is
reflected
in
the
foreign
trade
figures
as
well
as
in
the
less
frequent
contacts
on
the
official
political
level.
Also,
closer
military
cooperation
did
not
materialize.
China
did
not
buy
military
equipment
from
Western
Europe
in
any
significant
numbers.
In
addition,
it
became
more
apparent
that
the
West
European
countries
differ in
their
willingness
to
co-
operate
with
China
in
military
and
security
affairs.
Whereas
Great
Britain
and
France,
and
to
a
certain
extent
Italy,
established
official
military
relations
with
China,
fre-
quently
exchanging
high-ranking
military
delegations,
West
Germany
carefully
sought
to
avoid
any
appearance
of
a
military
col-
lusion
with
China
that
would
be
interpreted
by
the
Soviet
Union
as
being
directed
against
itself.
At
the
same
time
the
U.S.
government
showed
a
growing
interest
in
a
strategic
relationship
with
the
PRC.
Quite
contrary
to
what
might
have
been
expected,
the
Reagan
Administration,
in
spite
of
ideological
reservations,
proved
to
be
a
willing
sup-
porter
of
China’s
program
of
military
modernization.
Secretary
of
State
Alexander
Haig
announced
in
June
1981
that
his
govern-
ment
was
willing
to
sell
weapons
to
the
Chinese.
The
active
China
policy
of
the
U.S.
con-
108
trasted
with
the
rather
reluctant
attitude
of
the
West
Europeans,
who
were
not
ready
to
renounce
the
policy
of
d6tente
towards
the
Soviet
Union -
even
after
the
Soviet
invasion
of
Afghanistan
and
the
declaration
of
the
state
of
war
in
Poland.
The
problems
within
NATO
and
the
diver-
gent
political
assessments
in
Western
Europe
and
the
United
States
are
more
and
more
apparent.
It
has
become
clear
that
the
majority
of
West
Europeans
define
their
interests
in
other
terms
than
the
present
American
administration.
Our
study
addresses
three
major
areas
of
discussion:
-
Under
the
conditions
of
strategic
nuclear
parity
between
the
two
superpowers,
doubts
are
growing
as
to
whether
the
military
doctrine
of
’flexible
response’
is
still
appropriate
for
Western
European
defense.
-
The
more
positive
assessment
of
the
results
of
d6tente
among
West
Europeans
seems
to
originate
from
a
more
regionally
oriented
security
perspective.
The
Reagan
administration,
on
the
other
hand,
stresses
the
global
character
of
the
Soviet
military
threat
and
the
necessity
to
react
with
practical
countermeasures
on
a
world-
wide
scale.
In
addition,
there
exist
considerable
differences
in
the
assess-
ment
of
the
security
implications
of
East-
West
Trade,
which
is
far
more
important
economically
for
the
Europeans
than
for
the
U.S.
-
While
both
Western
Europe
and
the
U.S.
view
the
supply
of
energy
and
raw
materials
from
the
countries
of
the
Third
World
as
one
of
the
main
security
problems
in
the
1980s,
there
seem
to
exist
conflicting
opinions
over
which
practical
consequences
must
be
drawn.
Because
of
limited
military
capabilities
and
greater
dependence
on
imported
oil,
the
West
Europeans
pursue
a
more
co-
operative
strategy
towards
the
countries
of
the
Third
World.
Our
analysis
shows
that
the
three
actors
-
Western
Europe,
the
United
States,
and
the
People’s
Republic
of
China -
pursue
different
strategies
according
to
their
own
national
interests.
None
is
able
to
impose
his
own
policy
on
either
of
the
others.
There
is
some
justification
in
calling
the
relationship
between
China,
the
U.S.,
Western
Europe,
as
well
as
Japan,
a
’de
facto
alliance’
in
the
sense
that
all
four
are
eager
to
restrain
the
Soviet
Union’s
ability
to
further
expand
its
political
and
military
influence
in
the
world.
However,
the
translation
of
common
per-
ceptions
into
active
cooperation
proves
to
be
difficult.
For
Western
Europe,
China’s
role
as
a
military
partner
has
at
present
only
limited
relevance
as
compared
to
the
U.S.,
who
actively
seeks
to
build
up
China’s
military
potential
as
an
anti-Soviet
force
in
Asia.
There
are,
however,
discussions,
e.g.
in
the
context
of
the
’West
European
Union’
(WEU),
on
a
more
independent
West
European
defense
policy
which
could
also
take
China’s
military
capabilities
into
consideration.
This
security
option
could
become
politically
more
relevant
in
the
future.
l.
The
trans-Atlantic
crisis
in
the
early
eighties
At
the
beginning
of
the
1980’s,
there
seems
to
be
a
widening
gap
between
Western
Europeans
and
Americans
in
NATO.
Different
aspects
of
western
security
issues
have
constantly
opened
an
area
of
conflict
and
dispute.
First
there
is
the
question
of
how
to
deal
with
the
perceived
Soviet
military,
especially
nuclear
military,
threat
to
Europe,
which
is
exposed
to
the
deployment
of
new
SS-20
intermediate
nuclear
missiles.
Referring
to
the
NATO
decision
from
Dec.
12,
1979,
that
the
Western
alliance
will
deploy
new
NATO
INF-
forces
if
negotiations
with
the
USSR
do
not
prove
successful
by
the
end
of
1983,
the
Reagan
Administration
began
arms-control
talks
about
this
issue
in
autumn
1981.
Above
all
the
Western
European
allies
have
urged
the
U.S.
administration
to
start
arms-control
talks.
Nevertheless,
it
still
seems
unclear
how
to
come
to
an
agreement
with
the Russians.
It
is
no
secret
that
the
Reagan
administration
is
sceptical
about
the
success
of
the
negotia-
tions.
Officials
have
pointed
out
repeatedly
that
arms
limitation
would
not
be
a
first
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