The Democratic Turnout ‘Problem’
| Author | Ben Saunders |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00914.x |
| Date | 01 June 2012 |
| Published date | 01 June 2012 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
The Democratic Turnout ‘Problem’post_914 306..320
Ben Saunders
University of Stirling
A number of authors, including Lijphart, Hill and Engelen, have recently advocated compulsory voting. While
numerous justifications can be given for such measures,it is often said that they are necessary to realise democracy fully,
for instance ensuring that everyone casts one vote (no more and no less). This argument rests on the commonly held
assumption that low turnout is a problem for democracies – a claim that the present article resists. I argue that
democracy as it should be understood requires only that citizens have the opportunity to exercise power. I show that
the right to vote can be valuable,even if it is not actually exercised. Leaving people to decide for themselves whether
or not to vote is not only more liberal but democratic in so far as it respects their choices and makes it more likely
that decisions are made by the relevant constituency. Although voluntary voting makes it likely that different groups
will be unequally represented,this is not necessarily a problem; where some are more affected by a givendecision there
may be good democratic reasons to allow them more influence.Disproportionality can be bad where it exacerbates
existing social disadvantage, but here the problem is the social disadvantage, rather than that people do not vote.
Moreover,while universal turnout ensures proportionality, the problem of disproportionality is conceptually distinct
from low turnout. There may be other reasons to favourhigher turnout, including a concern to promote social justice,
but it is not necessarily better on democratic grounds.
Keywords: abstention; compulsory voting; democracy; representation; turnout
There has been much debate over whether or not individual citizens have a prima facie duty
to vote in democratic elections (Brennan, 2009;Lomasky and Brennan, 2000;Mor ris Jones,
1954) and, if so, whether this duty is properly enforceable by the state, through some system
of compulsor y voting that fines abstainer s ( Birch, 2009; Hill, 2002a; 2006; Lever, 2009;
2010).1According to many advocates of compulsory voting,such a scheme is necessar y in
practice to realise fully the ideals of democracy, understood in terms of the universal and
equal inclusion of all citizens in the decision-making process (Engelen, 2007; Lijphart,
1997). That is, these authors believe that compulsory tur nout can be justified because it is
the only means to secure the near universal turnout that is necessary for a well-functioning
democracy. My purpose in this article is to dispute this claim, by arguing that high levels of
turnout are not necessarily democratically better than low levels of turnout.2This does not,
of course, mean that there may not be other reasons to want high levels of turnout or even
compulsory voting. One might desire higher turnout not because it is more democratic but
because, for example, one thinks that it will increase the likelihood of substantively just
legislation or foster a sense of civic community among the citizens.3These other justifi-
cations are untouched here; my concern is simply with the requirements of democracy.
My motivation is to resist one particular set of arguments for compulsory voting, but I
want to do so by making a more general claim than simply that compulsory voting is bad.We
might distinguish three distinct claims:
(1) We should not compel people to vote, for instance because such compulsion is likely
to undermine whatever benefits voting is supposed to realise or because coercion is
inherently objectionable.
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doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00914.x
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2012 VOL 60, 306–320
© 2011The Author.Political Studies © 2011 Political Studies Association
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