The Depoliticisation of Accountability Processes for Land‐Based Grievances, and the IFC CAO

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12275
AuthorSamantha Balaton‐Chrimes,Fiona Haines
Date01 November 2015
Published date01 November 2015
The Depoliticisation of Accountability
Processes for Land-Based Grievances, and
the IFC CAO
Samantha Balaton-Chrimes
Deakin University
Fiona Haines
University of Melbourne
Abstract
Many development f‌inance institutions have responded to calls for accountability for social and environmental harms
associated with their lending by creating Independent Accountability Mechanisms (IAMs). We argue that IAMs can, at
their best, provide relief for those concerned with the nature of the implementation of development projects, thereby
addressing what we call immanent complaints about social and environmental impacts. However, IAMs are poorly
placed to address what we call contestational grievances: those that entail a rejection of core tenets of the lending insti-
tutions development model. Such contestational grievances frequently arise when communities and their supporters
reject the commodif‌ication of land and associated displacement of people and their livelihoods. Analysis draws on the
International Finance Corporation Compliance-Advisor-Ombudsman (IFC CAO)s handling of a complaint about the palm
oil company Wilmar in Indonesia. We argue that because the CAO is institutionally embedded within the IFC, it shares
its normative grounding with the institution it holds to account, and therefore risks organising and legitimating
accountability failures related to contestational land-based grievances.
Policy Implications
Independent Accountability Mechanisms embedded within development f‌inance institutions are not well positioned
to accommodate alternative development paradigms, and are therefore challenged in adequately providing
accountability for land-based grievances that contest mainstream development paradigms.
Taking land-based grievances that contest development paradigms through such internal accountability mechanisms
risks neutralising and depoliticising the contestational dimensions of grievances, as they are transformed by the pro-
cess into complaints amenable to resolution within the terms of the lending institutions own assumptions and princi-
ples. Actors wishing to pursue more contestational grievances should consider alternative accountability channels.
Private investment in large-scale industrial and agricultural
developmentto achieve economic growth remainsa central
feature of the development paradigm embraced in varying
ways by all major development f‌inance institutions. These
institutions, such as the World Bank GroupsInternational
Finance Corporation (IFC), therefore frequently become
embroiled in conf‌licts over land. Development f‌inance insti-
tutions have responded to such conf‌licts through, among
other strategies, the development of Independent Account-
ability Mechanisms (IAMs), which handle complaints from
project-affected people. An increasingly important strategy
used by IAMs to manage complaints involves facilitation of
collaborativeproblem solving processes.
We argue that IAMs can provide relief for those con-
cerned with the way development projects of these kinds
are implemented, thereby addressing what we call imma-
nent complaints about social and environmental impacts.
However, IAMs are poorly placed to address what we call
contestational grievances that is, those that entail some
rejection of underlying capitalist models of development.
Contestational grievances are particularly pronounced in
relation to land conf‌licts in which affected communities
reject industrial capitalist approaches to the value, owner-
ship, control, access to and use of land.
We begin with a discussion of the changing forms
of accountability in the problem solving processes
©2015 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2015) 6:4 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12275
Global Policy Volume 6 . Issue 4 . November 2015
446
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