The Difference between an Analytical Framework and a Theoretical Claim: A Reply to Martin Carstensen
| Published date | 01 June 2012 |
| Date | 01 June 2012 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00960.x |
| Subject Matter | Response |
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P O L I T I C A L S T U D I E S : 2 0 1 2 VO L 6 0 , 4 7 4 – 4 8 2
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00960.x
The Difference Between an Analytical
Framework and a Theoretical Claim: A Reply to
Martin Carstensenpost_960474..482
Liam Stanley
University of Birmingham
Martin Carstensen’s recent article is a novel attempt to contribute a theory of incremental ideational change to the
relevant discourse and institutionalist literatures. Noticing a potentially problematic twin focus on stable ideas and
punctuated equilibrium, Carstensen outlines an alternative framework capable of capturing the true dynamism of
political ideas. However, his article and analysis are based on the problematic assumption that analytical frameworks,
such as historical institutionalism, make theoretical claims about politics, when instead their purpose is to create an
underpinning prism for the construction of explanations. By ignoring this important yet subtle distinction, I claim,
Carstensen creates a set of criteria for adjudicating the value of analytical frameworks that is both unfair and potentially
inappropriate.
Keywords: analytical frameworks; theory; ontology; ideas; historical institutionalism
Most [political scientists] employ approaches not because they seriously believe in them as the
be-all and end-all keys to unlock the mysteries of politics, but because they see them as the best
(and sometimes, I am afraid, the trendiest) tool to hand for the particular task ( Bale, 2006,
p. 102).
Show me an explanation that is not reductionist. All explanation consists of sentences which
reduce the complexity of the world to smaller components, in order that we may begin to make
sense of it (Dowding, 2001, p. 103).
Martin Carstensen’s (2011) recent article in Political Studies was an intriguing and clearly
argued attempt at articulating a ‘theory of incremental ideational change’. Such an interven-
tion, in identifying a problematic focus within (1) existing ideational literature on coherent
and stable ideas and (2) existing institutional literature on moments of ‘punctuated equilib-
rium’, should be welcomed. Carstensen draws on post-structuralist and interpretive
approaches to discourse analysis in an attempt to offer an alternative theory. This alternative
moves beyond ideas as static entities and instead attempts to show how ideas are essentially
‘relational’ (p. 600) and comprise many elements (pp. 601–2), meaning that actors use them
in a number of different ways depending on their circumstances (p. 602). Feeling unprepared
to offer an empirical analysis of incremental ideational change (p. 606), Carstensen draws on
examples to ‘illustrate the mechanisms of change that are analysed theoretically in the article’
(p. 606). Carstensen uses New Labour employment and welfare policies to highlight the
relational element of ideas and how different components of an idea can incrementally
change, respectively. The resulting conceptualisation of ideas is, according to Carstensen,
‘more dynamic’ (p. 603), more ‘diachronically sensitive’ (p. 602) and, ultimately,‘sensitises the
analyst to how ideas are made from horizontal, vertical and diachronic relations between
© 2012 The Author. Political Studies © 2012 Political Studies Association
A R E P LY TO M A RT I N C A R S T E N S E N
475
different elements and ideas’ (p. 612). While his analysis is logically coherent and the
theoretical innovations are interesting, there is a serious issue with the article: forwarding an
alternative set of ontological assumptions, as Carstensen does, cannot be verified, as is their
nature. As a result it is hard to see why the scholars whose work is critiqued here would
listen.
Carstensen’s problems emanate in part from a problematic understanding of the role
of theory in political science. In the abstract, Carstensen claims that ‘most theories about
ideas in politics implicitly conceptualise ideas as relatively stable entities’ (p. 596, emphasis
added) – and then goes to on to group this literature as a theory or set of theories four
more times in the abstract alone. However, Carstensen’s targets – the ideas and institu-
tions literature – are not aiming to explain or generalise about politics itself (i.e. ‘theo-
retical’ in a strict sense); they are instead aiming to offer an approach that political
scientists can adopt in order to generate explanations about politics in answering specific
research questions. Along with many others in the discipline, Carstensen is keen to label
historical or discursive institutionalism, or any analytical framework, as a theory. Unlike
most of the discipline, he actually treats these frameworks as making theoretical claims,
as opposed to assessing them on their ability to generate explanations. The distinction
between what exactly constitutes the difference between a theory and an analytical
framework is, at best, fuzzy. However, by taking advantage of this fuzzy distinction
Carstensen makes a number of critiques that are not in the spirit of the original inten-
tions of the targeted research.
This response attempts to highlight how this is so and, more importantly, how and why
such critiques should be avoided. As such, this article aims to highlight how the premise on
which Carstensen’s analysis is based is itself problematic. Carstensen’s piece is just one of
many articles to have appeared in recent times which are based on the muddled assumption
that approaches to the study of politics also claim to be ‘the be-all and end-all keys to unlock
the mysteries of politics’ ( Bale, 2006, p. 102). Quite simply, they are not. When this
assumption is problematised, part of the foundation on which work such as Carstensen’s is
built becomes questionable. This article aims to expand upon and, ultimately, justify this
claim.
The first section begins by outlining the aims and purposes of analytical frameworks
in political science. In particular, it homes in on the role that ontological assumptions
play in underpinning and ‘making possible’ explanations, in contrast to what can
principally be termed as making ‘theoretical claims’. The second section builds on this
stylistic distinction to argue that by unfairly treating the ontological assumptions inherent
in analytical frameworks as making theoretical claims – as Carstensen does – a number
of critiques become possible. Instead of judging ontological assumptions on their
‘closeness’ to the world (the classic yardstick of verifiability in science), they should be
judged on their ability to generate convincing explanations about politics itself. The
third section attempts to highlight how this understanding of meta-theory can avoid
accusations of relativism by demonstrating some of the ways in which ontological
assumptions can still be critiqued. The article concludes by recapping the argument and
examining some of the factors that lead to the meta-theoretical confusions reviewed
here.
© 2012 The Author. Political Studies © 2012 Political Studies Association...
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