The Diffusion of Maritime Power
| Date | 01 October 1982 |
| Author | James Cable |
| DOI | 10.1177/004711788200700401 |
| Published date | 01 October 1982 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
2139
THE
DIFFUSION
OF
MARITIME
POWER
JAMES
CABLE
Power
does
not
exist;
not
in
any
absolute
sense.
It
is
the
ability
to
apply
appropriate
force
about
a
given
point.
Though
true
of
any
kind
of
power-thermonuclear
fusion
will
not
propel
so
much
as
a
vacuum
cleaner-this
is
an
axiom
which
has
often
proved
politically
indigestible.
Academics
have
been
no
less
inclined
than
rulers
to
measure
power
by
the
aggregation
of
resources
and
to
expect
that
power
to
be
reflected
in
the
attainment
of political
objectives.
The
frequent
disappointment
of
such
expectations
has
been
attributed,
as
usually
happens
with
unsound
theories,
to
errors
in
observation,
mensuration,
calculation.
Much
effort
has
accordingly
been
devoted
to
refining
and
elaborating
the
criteria
of
power:
not just
the
obvious
economic,
technological,
military,
and
demographic
constituents,
but
such
less
tangible
factors
as
political
organisation,
morale
or
motivation.
The
purpose
has
been
to
produce
a
definition
of
power
that
would
not
only
be
comprehensive,
but
would
offer
a
reliable
basis
for
comparing
the
power
of one
state
with
that
of
another.
A
recent
study
of
the
more
limited
subject
of
maritime
power
identified
no
less
than
thirty-nine
constituent
elements.
It
would
be
wrong
to
describe
these
efforts
as
wasted.
They
dredged
up
much
that
was
interesting
and
a
little
that
was
valuable.
But
they did
not
answer
the
essential
question
confronting
every
student
of
power.
Power
to
do
what?
It
is
a
terrible
question.
It
opens
an
entire
Pandora’s
box.
Lenin’s
famous
Who?
Whom?
is
only
the
first
to
emerge.
There
is
When?
and
Why?
and
Where?
Political
considerations,
geographical
limitations,
the
exigencies
of time,
climatic
factors
buzz
distractingly
about
the
ears
of
decision-makers.
The
power
accumulated,
with
effort
and
foresight,
for
one
scenario
proves
irrelevant
to
another.
In
1917
the
world’s
strongest
battle
fleet
offered
Britain
no
escape
from
the
imminent
prospect
of decisive
defeat
in
the
U-boat
war.
In
1980
the
United
States,
by
any
conventional
measure
a
Super-Power,
were
as
deeply
humiliated
by
the
Iranians
as,
in
1968,
they
had
been
by
the
North
Koreans.
Power
to
do
what?
There
is
no
single
answer
to
that
question.
One
was
once
thought
to
exist
for
maritime
power:
command
of
the
sea,
the
advantage
from
which
all
else
flowed.
Even
in
its
palmiest
days
this
was
a
concept
exposed
to
numerous
qualifications
and
exceptions.
The
appropriate
force
it
permitted
could,
for
instance,
2140
only
be
exercised
against
those
who
were
vulnerable
at
sea
or
from
the
sea.
That
was
why
Bismarck
could
afford
to
declare
his
intention
of
sending
for
the
police
if
the
British
fleet
appeared
off
the
coast
of Pomerania
during
the
Schleswig-Holstein
crisis.
The
extent
of
this
vulnerability
has,
moreover,
greatly
diminished
with
the
improvement
of
terrestrial
communications
and
of
the
political
organisation
of
coastal
states.
The
changes
in
what
command
of
the
sea
can
do
are
nevertheless
less
fundamental
than
the
new
obstacles
to
its
creation.
A
century
ago
a
fleet
at
sea
was
safe
from
anything
but
a
stronger fleet.
Insofar,
therefore,
as
command
of the
sea
provided
a
force
appropriate
to
the
objective,
that
force
could
be
an
almost
direct
function
of
naval
power.
Command
of
the
sea
and
all
the
benefits
of
that
command
were
the
predestined
reward
of
a
sufficiently
superior
fleet.
Mines,
torpedoes,
aircraft.
submarines
and
missiles
have
changed
all
that.
In
the
words
of
Admiral
Turner:
&dquo;it
is
no
longer
conceivable,
except
in
the
most
limited
sense,
to
totally
control
the
seas
for
one’s
own
use
or
to
totally
deny
them
to
an
enemy.&dquo;
The
most
he
thought
the
United
States
Navy
could
hope
for
was
&dquo;realistic
control
in
limited
areas
and
for
limited
periods
of
time.&dquo; ’
1
Nowadays
force
can
be
used
on,
over
or
under
the
sea
to
protect
or
to
deny
a
particular
use
of
the
sea.
If
even
the
United
States
can
do
so
only
&dquo;in
limited
areas
and
for
limited
periods
of
time&dquo;,
it
is
clearly
important
to
specify
the
use
of the
sea
in
question
and
the
nature
of
the
dispute.
Both
could
vary
enormously,
as
could
the
kind
of force
that
might
be
appropriate.
If
we
want
to
measure
maritime
power,
there
are
as
many
yardsticks
as
there
are
disputes.
In
the
first
thirty-six
years
after
the
end
of
the
Second
World
War,
for
instance,
the
Royal
Navy
were
defeated
by
two
countries:
Albania,
who
inflicted
severe
damage
and
casualties
on
two
British
destroyers
in
1946,
and
Iceland,
whose
gunboats
successfully
asserted
her
successive
claims
to
exclusive
fishing
rights.
No
conceivable
method
of calculating
resources
could
have
supported
the
proposition
that
either
possessed
a
maritime
power
remotely
comparable
to
Britain’s,
yet
each
proved
able,
in
the
special
circumstances
of
a
particular
dispute,
to
make
more
effective
use
of
appropriate
force.
Some
disputes
(though
these
were
not
among
them)
are
so
idiosyncratic
that
the
kind
of force
appropriate
to
their
resolution
1
Admiral
Stansfield
Turner
USN-quoted
in
Nathan.
James
A. &
Oliver.
James
K. - The
Future of United
States
Naval Power
- Indiana
University
Press
1979
p.
48
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