The Duterte method: A neoclassical realist guide to understanding a small power’s foreign policy and strategic behaviour in the Asia-Pacific
| Date | 01 December 2020 |
| Published date | 01 December 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/2057891119882769 |
| Author | Michael Magcamit |
| Subject Matter | Research articles |
Research article
The Duterte method:
A neoclassical realist guide
to understanding a small
power’s foreign policy
and strategic behaviour
in the Asia-Pacific
Michael Magcamit
Queen Mary University of London, UK
Abstract
In the contemporary Asia-Pacific context, the fault lines leading to the Thucydides trap can be
attributed to the continuing strategic competition between a seemingly declining United States and
a rising China. Failure to circumvent this trap can ultimately result in a war of all against all. Against
this backdrop, this article investigates how a small power re-evaluates its foreign policy and
strategic behaviour using neoclassical realism theory. In particular, I examine President Rodrigo
Duterte’s method which is characterized by four key elements: cultivating a more favourable image
for China; moderating the country’s American-influenced strategic culture; mobilizing state-society
relations supportive of ‘Sinicization’; and reorienting the country’s Western-based institutions to
better accommodate Chinese pressures and incentives. Does a China-centric approach give a small
power an indispensable strategic capital to successfully navigate and exploit both the challenges and
opportunities of the impending new order? Do the Philippines’ shifting rules of engagement under
the Duterte administration represent a forward-thinking strategic outlook rather than a defeatist
and naı¨ve stance? The article answers these questions by examining the factors and dynamics
underpinning the conception and construction of the Duterte method, as well as its implications
vis-a-vis a small power’s foreign policy and strategic behaviour.
Keywords
China, Duterte method, foreign policy, neoclassical realism, Philippines, United States
Corresponding author:
Michael Magcamit, School of Politics and International R elations, Queen Mary University of London, Mile End Road,
London, E1 4NS, UK.
Email: m.magcamit@qmul.ac.uk
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
2020, Vol. 5(4) 416–436
ªThe Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/2057891119882769
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Navigating through shifting tides of power
The changing distribution of power has significant consequences for the foreign policy and stra-
tegic behaviour not only of the competing great powers but also of the smaller and weaker players
in the international system. Due to their limited capacity for acquiring the neces sary level of
security to guarantee their own survival, and even much lesser capability for shaping the conduct
of international politics to work to their advantage, the strategic choices of small powers are being
restricted to either neutrality or alliance (Mares, 1988; Toje, 2010; Rothstein, 1968). This under-
scores the rather dispensable role that small powers play vis-a-vis the great powers’ wide range of
political and military resources, and which in turn makes them highly dependent (Mares, 1988;
Toje, 2010). Consequently, the majority of small powers are bent on maintaining the existing
order, preferring to operate within the given status quo instead of attempting to alter the order
itself. As Vital (1967: 134) argues, the policy choices of small powers are primarily designed to
modify the external environment not by challenging the status quo per se but by ‘reducing an
unfavorable discrepancy in strength, broadening the field of maneuver and choice, and increasing
the total resources on which the state can count in times of stress’. Their scarce resources,
peripheral positions and the international system itself compel small powers to rank their security
goals and priorities. Based on this hierarchy, the existing security issues are individually assessed,
and ‘globalize’ those threats which they perceive to undermine their security interests the most
(Toje, 2010).
Meanwhile, in efforts to fortify their vulnerable positions, small powers utilize all available
multilateral institutions. These instruments benefit the small powers by easing the cost of con-
ducting foreign relations, and adding greater weight to their otherwise feeble foreign policies
(Barston, 1973; Elman, 1995; Keohane, 1969). Understandably, small powers play an active role
in adopting and propagating the principles, norms and rules of various international organizations.
By engaging in concerted efforts with other actors, the small powers are able to lobby for the
institutionalization of laws and regulations intended to control the behaviour of great powers (He,
2008). The defensive (as opposed to offensive) approach preferred by small powers highlights their
generally risk-averse nature which helps them avoid the possibility of extermination, especially
when discussing their grievances towards powerful states (Archer et al., 2014; Toje, 2010). The
focus is on minimizing the uncertainties created by the risks they have identified, and ensuring that
their uncontrollable impacts are effectively reduced (Magcamit, 2016). Accordingly, while great
powers rush to project their authority and influence on a worldwide scale, the small powers are
primarily motivated by the demands they can extract from their immediate environment (Fox,
1959; Toje, 2010).
In the case of the Philippines, however, the country’s foreign policy rhetoric and action –
specifically those concerning its geopolitical and maritime territorial disputes with China – seem
to go against these general rules. Under the current Duterte administration, the Philippine govern-
ment has been more vocal in challenging the Western-dominated status quo and has even threat-
ened to reconsider its longstanding alliance with the world’s superpower. Duterte has fiercely
criticized both the US and the European Union (EU), insisting that while the former continues to
treat the Philippines as its colony, the latter as a whole represents the last vestiges of imperialism in
Asia. This behaviour is in stark contrast with the security-maximizing, pro-establishment approach
of many small powers. In addition, rather than being a strong advocate of the key principles, norms
and rules being promoted by major international organizations, the Philippine government has
openly criticized the hypocrisies, double-standards and inefficiencies of these actors. In defending
Magcamit 417
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