The Early Warning System and policymaking in the European Union
| Author | Martijn Huysmans,Philippe van Gruisen |
| DOI | 10.1177/1465116520923752 |
| Published date | 01 September 2020 |
| Date | 01 September 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
The Early Warning
System and policymaking
in the European Union
Philippe van Gruisen
Department of Economics, Leiden University, Leiden,
The Netherlands
Martijn Huysmans
School of Economics, Utrecht University, Utrecht,
The Netherlands
Abstract
Does the Early Warning System alert the European Commission about the prospects of
passing new policy? We present a model of European Union policymaking in which the
Early Warning System plays an important signalling role. In our model, the Commission
uses signals from the Early Warning System to update its belief about governments’
voting strategies in the Council. The Commission may then anticipate difficult negotia-
tions by withdrawing its proposal early. We find empirical evidence for our theory:
(1) reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments strongly predict opposition
from their governments and (2) the Commission is more likely to withdraw proposals
that receive reasoned opinions, even in the absence of a yellow card. Our results run
counter to the dominant view in the literature that the Early Warning System is not a
very relevant aspect of EU decision-making. Instead, reasoned opinions constitute a
clear signal that negotiations are more likely to fail.
Keywords
Early Warning System, EU policymaking, political institutions, signalling, voting
Corresponding author:
Philippe van Gruisen, Department of Economics, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Email: p.van.gruisen@law.leidenuniv.nl
European Union Politics
2020, Vol. 21(3) 451–473
!The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/1465116520923752
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Introduction
Does the Early Warning System (EWS) alert the European Commission about the
prospects of passing policy in the European Union (EU)? The answer to this
question touches upon the core of political economists’ research agendas: How
do political institutions work? The EWS is a political institution of which the
performance is arguably not clear cut. Yet, it appears prominently in current
debates in the EU.
Proposals to reform the EWS circulate regularly, with recent suggestions for
green and red cards, next to the already existing yellow and orange card system.
The EWS is also likely to feature on the agenda of the upcoming Conference on the
Future of Europe, that is to be held within the next two years. Understanding how
the EWS works, and any impact it may have on policymaking is thus fundamental
to judge whether institutional reform is warranted.
The EWS, introduced with the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, had the objec-
tive to increase the EU’s legitimacy by strengthening the role of national parlia-
ments (NPs) and allowing them to directly intervene in EU policymaking. It allows
NPs to raise objections to legislative proposals submitted by the European
Commission if they believe the draft proposal violates the principle of subsidiarity.
They can do this up to eight weeks after receipt of the Commission’s proposal. If
enough NPs raise such objections in the form of reasoned opinions (ROs), a
‘yellow card’ is triggered, and the Commission is formally obliged to reconsider
its proposal.
1
At first glance, both logic and anecdotal evidence seem to suggest that the EWS
fell short of increasing parliaments’ power. Nor does it appear to have a consid-
erable impact on EU policymaking more broadly, perhaps aside from increasing
parliaments’ awareness of EU affairs (Miklin, 2017). For instance, parliaments
only submit ROs sporadically, resulting in isolated occurrences of objections,
which are likely not to matter much. Moreover, even if parliaments succeed in
collectively submitting ROs, the impact is questionable, as the yellow card against
the Posted Workers Directive demonstrated. Apart from the fact that this yellow
card was only the third such instance since the EWS’s introduction, the
Commission – undeterred by the yellow card – simply decided to proceed with
the legislative process. So not only do individual ROs seem to have little impact,
neither does a collective yellow card.
The picture sketched above of the EWS as irrelevant is misleading. Not merely
because systematic empirical analysis is lacking, but primarily because the EWS
has a role that has not been considered thus far: it provides information. In this
regard, it may provide an important signal to a variety of actors about bargaining
difficulties that will arise later during negotiations in the Council, the EU’s most
important legislative institution, but also infamous for its lack of transparency.
In this article, we present a simple model of EU policymaking in which the EWS
may serve as a signal to the European Commission. The Commission, uncertain
about how governments will vote in the Council, can resolve part of this
452 European Union Politics 21(3)
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