The Earthquake, Civil Society, and Political Change in Turkey: Assessment and Comparison with Eastern Europe
| Author | Paul Kubicek |
| Published date | 01 September 2002 |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9248.00006 |
| Date | 01 September 2002 |
| Subject Matter | Original Article |
The Earthquake, Civil Society, and
Political Change in Turkey: Assessment
and Comparison with Eastern Europe
Paul Kubicek
Oakland University
Civil society has been widely celebrated as instrumental in democratization, but in some countries
it remains poorly developed. Such was the case in Turkey, but many hoped that the 1999 earth-
quakes would lead to an invigoration of civil society and subsequent political liberalization.
Examining this claim shows that Turkish civil society has not been able to sustain the energy it
enjoyed immediately after the earthquake because of factors within civil society itself and the
attitude of the state. This relative failure is then contrasted with the more positive experience of
civil society in East-Central Europe. The comparisons reveal some limits to the utility of a civil
society approach to democratization. I conclude by assessing the ability of other actors and factors
to fashion political reform in Turkey today.
Turkey’s democratic credentials suffered a severe blow in 1997, when numerous
former communist states were accepted as potential candidate members to the
European Union (EU), while Turkey’s bid was rather undiplomatically rebuffed.
Many Turks interpreted this as a slap in the face to a loyal NATO member, as East
Europeans were allowed to cut into a membership queue in which Turks had
waited for several decades. While the justice of this decision is questionable – and
in December 1999 the EU reversed course and opened the possibility of member-
ship to Turkey – it nonetheless underscored the contrast between states moving
ahead with democratic consolidation and Turkey, where democracy is in many
ways still quite circumscribed despite a half-century of experience with multi-party
elections (Özbugun, 2000; Abramowitz, 2000).
While one can point to many differences between Turkey and the East-Central
European states (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia) that have come far-
thest in the post-communist period, one factor stands out: the role of civil society,
which has been lauded as ‘invaluable’ to the creation of a liberal, democratic order
(Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp. 8–9). Civil society, usually defined as a set of self-
organized groups and individuals that are relatively autonomous from the state,
capable of articulating values and interests, and able to check state power, was
widely celebrated in the collapse of communism. It also arguably played an impor-
tant role in fostering the nascent democracies in the region. While one can roman-
ticize civil society, its very ethos – one that values independence of citizens and a
limited state role – stands in stark contrast to the statist structure that historically
has characterized the Turkish polity. As one analyst suggested, Turkish laws are for-
mulated with a perspective that shows serious misgivings about organizations in
civil society (Kalayciogˇlu, 1998). If Vaclav Havel sought to empower citizens by
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2002 VOL 50, 761–778
© Political Studies Association, 2002.
Published by Blackwell Publishing, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
762 PAUL KUBICEK
portraying politics as the ‘art of the possible’, Turks are more familiar with the devlet
baba (father state), which dominates over all other institutions.
The Marmara earthquake of 17 August 1999 exposed fissures in the edifice of the
Turkish state. The numerous failures of the state and gaffes by state officials quickly
turned this natural disaster into a political crisis. Some suggested that the myth of
the devlet baba had been shattered, and that state-society relations would hence-
forth be re-ordered to the greater advantage of the latter. Alan Makovsky opined,
‘It was a cliché about Turkey for decades that civic associations do not work and
that people sit back and wait for the state to do everything. That’s a cliché in the
process of being erased from the Turkish lexicon’ (Washington Post, 1999a). The
hope among many was that civil society, activated by the disaster, would help
spearhead a movement to liberalize the state and remove obstacles to democratic
consolidation. One Turkish writer suggested, ‘We cannot change what is happen-
ing in the depths of the earth. We must change ourselves’ (Mengi, 1999).
Has this happened? Has the earthquake made a lasting difference in Turkish
politics? Has the agency of civil society broken through many of its structural and
historical impediments? These are the questions that guide this article, but it aspires
to make a broader statement about civil society and democratization by compar-
ing the Turkish case with those in East-Central Europe. These comparisons cannot
be definitive, but cursory examination suggests that civil society’s breakthrough
may be easier in a post-totalitarian state than in a state with some democratic insti-
tutions and pretensions, as in Turkey. Civil society may therefore not be the
primary vehicle for reform of ‘electoral’ or ‘delegative’ democracies – to invoke
adjectives that some have applied to Turkey (Özbugun, 2000; Kalayciogˇlu, 2001).
The implications, of course, go further. If civil society cannot be simply ‘turned on’
in such an environment, one might wonder what, if anything, will be the agent
for democratization in states stuck in a nether-world between democracy and
dictatorship, such as Russia.
This article will briefly examine the various barriers to liberal democracy in Turkey.
It then turns to the experience of the earthquake and civil society’s meteorite-like
appearance – one that was initially bright and dramatic but then faded. It com-
pares this failure with events in Eastern Europe, noting several important differ-
ences. It concludes by looking at factors for change in Turkey today, noting how
the hopes placed on civil society have been largely transferred to other actors who
may be better positioned to cultivate political reform.
Barriers to Civil Society in Turkey
Numerous reasons may account for the historical weakness of Turkish civil society
and the country’s mixed record in establishing democratic institutions. One expla-
nation is political culture. According to this line of thought, Turkish political culture
remains largely ‘traditional’ (Inglehart, 1997, p. 349). That is, respect for author-
ity is stressed over citizen empowerment and participation, and democracy has
been shallow, imposed from above by Westernizing elites on largely peasant,
passive society. While these arguments may have applied better 40–50 years ago,
there is some contemporary evidence to support the notion that Turkish political
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