The Ecb's Powers and Institutional Role in the Financial Crisis
| Author | Chiara Zilioli |
| Published date | 01 February 2016 |
| Date | 01 February 2016 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1023263X1602300110 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
23 MJ 1 (2016) 171
THE ECB’S POWERS AND INSTITUTIONAL
ROLE IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
A Con rmation from the Court of Justice
of the European Union
C Z*
ABSTRACT
In the Gauweiler decision the Court of Justice of the European Union has con rmed that
the European Central Bank’s (ECB) non-conventional measures fall within its monetary
policy competence, ful l the proportionalit y requirement and contain safeguards ensuring
that the monetary nancing p rohibition is not infringed, fully legitimizing the ECB’s cri sis
management measures. e ECB enjoys broad discretion: the exi stence of di erent opinions
in these controversial question s does not put in doubt the legality of the decision tak en a er
careful and accurate analyses by the Governing Council says the Court, supporting the
ECB’s search for new measures to tackle the still critical economic s ituation. Risk taking is
an inherent part of monetary policy and it is for the ECB to assess how much risk can be
accepted (and how best to share this risk within the Eurosystem). Finally, subjecting press
releases to the Court of Justice’s interpretation might impact on the scope of ECB press
releases, balancing the two con icting interests of increasing transparency and limiting
liability.
Keywords: ECB’s broad policy discretion; justiciability of press releases; monetary
nancing prohibition; r isk-taking in monet ary policy; scope of monetar y policy
* Chiara Zi lioli, LL.M. (Harva rd), Ph.D. (EUI), is the Director General L egal Services of the E uropean
Central Bank. e views expressed in this a rticle are t he personal views of the author and do not
necessari ly represent those of the Europ ean Central Ban k.
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