The effect of alternation in power on electoral intimidation in democratizing regimes
| Author | Rubén Ruiz-Rufino,Sarah Birch |
| Published date | 01 January 2020 |
| Date | 01 January 2020 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319885171 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
The effect of alternation in power on electoral
intimidation in democratizing regimes
Rube
´n Ruiz-Rufino
Sarah Birch
King’s College London
Abstract
There is as yet little consensus in the literature as to the underlying drivers of electoral violence. This article
identifies a key mechanism explaining the use of electoral intimidation, a form of violence, in democratizing
regimes. Within this context, we argue that the use of electoral intimidation against the opposition is most likely to
be observed when a country moving to democracy has not yet experienced an electoral turnover. Building on
previous theoretical and empirical findings, we provide evidence supporting the idea that alternation in power
serves as an effective tool to decrease the tensions between electoral winners and losers. Furthermore, we show that
alternation in power is conditional on the performance of electoral management bodies. Based on a sample of 331
elections in 53 countries that have inaugurated multiparty competition since 1989, we find strong and robust
support for our theoretical claims. Firstly, we show how alternation in power is determined by the degree of
autonomy the electoral management body adopted as part of the political opening process. Secondly, we provide
evidence that electoral turnover depresses the use of electoral violence after controlling for relevant variables and
correcting for selection issues.
Keywords
alternation in power, democratization, electoral intimidation, electoral management bodies, electoral violence
Introduction
Elections are generally recognized as a peaceful means of
resolving social differences, yet violence often besets elec-
toral processes, even in democracies. A burgeoning litera-
ture on electoral conflict has identified this as a distinct
form of politicalviolence (Bhasin & Gandhi, 2013; Birch
& Muchlinski, 2018;Collier & Vicente, 2014; Daxecker,
2012; Fjelde & Ho
¨glund, 2016; Taylor, Pevehouse &
Straus, 2017). In this article, we focus on incumbent-
instigated intimidation, the most common type of elec-
toral violence worldwide (Birch & Muchlinski, 2017).
Our aim is to understand the political and institutional
drivers of this form of violence in democratizing regimes
1
and, specifically, how intimidation is related to the con-
solidation of democratic practices.
State-initiated electoral intimidation has been ana-
lyzed in a number of recent studies that view this form
of electoral violence as being the result of the sociodemo-
graphic structure of society and the vulnerability of
underprivileged groups to coercion (Dercon & Gutie
´r-
rez-Romero, 2012; Gonzales Ocantos et al., 2020), the
dynamics of patronage and coercive clientelism (Mares
& Young, 2016), or the competitive context in which
elections are held (Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski,
2014; Wilkinson, 2006).
Elections in democratizing regimes have been found
to be more vulnerable to violence than those held in
Corresponding author:
ruben.ruiz_rufino@kcl.ac.uk
1
Our unit of analysis is countries which experience a spell of
institutional change towards democracy by allowing a certain level
of political competition, but which do not necessarily end up
becoming fully democratic regimes.
Journal of Peace Research
2020, Vol. 57(1) 126–139
ªThe Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343319885171
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