The Effect of Domestic and Foreign Pressure on Israeli Decisions To Use Limited Military Force
| DOI | 10.1177/00223433030406004 |
| Author | Ranan D. Kuperman |
| Published date | 01 November 2003 |
| Date | 01 November 2003 |
| Subject Matter | Journal Article |
677
International and Domestic
Constraints Influencing Israeli
Military Retaliations
When Kant (1795/1983) envisioned the
emergence of a society of democratic states,
he reasoned that because the governments
within these countries were accountable to
their publics they would be more reluctant
to suffer the consequences of a violent
conflict. Yet, there are indications that the
public’s moods can be molded by foreign
policy even in democratic societies (Foyle,
1997; Monroe, 1998; Cohen, 1973: 44,
168), including the possibility that aggressive
foreign policies can strengthen militant
trends within the public. This phenomenon,
referred to as ‘rallying ’round the flag’
(Mueller, 1994: 72–73; Baker & Oneal,
2001), can boost a leader’s approval ratings,
especially when such bellicose policies are
not economically too costly and do not
produce substantial human casualties
(Schweller, 1992; Bennett & Stam, 1996;
Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999).
Most of the empirical evidence support-
ing the ‘rallying ’round the flag’ hypothesis is
from the experiences of the United States
(Ostrom & Job, 1986; Fordham, 1998;
James & Oneal, 1991; Meernik, 1994),
although similar findings have been reported
for Great Britain (Morgan & Anderson,
1999) and Israel (Barzilai & Russett, 1990).
While it would seem that there should be no
difference between other democracies and
the USA, other states are exposed to
additional constraints that might mitigate
the influence of domestic pressures. Bar-
Siman-Tov (1987) notes that, contrary to the
© 2003 Journal of Peace Research,
vol. 40, no. 6, 2003, pp. 677–694
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New Delhi) www.sagepublications.com
[0022-3433(200311)40:6; 677–694; 038287]
The Effect of Domestic and Foreign Pressure on
Israeli Decisions To Use Limited Military Force*
RANAN D. KUPERMAN
Division of International Relations, University of Haifa
The influence of domestic politics on international relations is a very popular theme in US foreign
policy analysis. Numerous studies have demonstrated that presidents sometimes tried to improve their
public ratings by adopting populist militant foreign policies. The question is whether such behavior is
characteristic of democracies in general, or limited to the United States. While there is no reason to
assume that in other democracies, or even non-democratic regimes, aggressive actions against a foreign
threat will likewise receive popular support, other states that lack superpower capabilities do not have
as much freedom of action as the United States. Smaller states must be more cautious in their behav-
ior, since they are more susceptible to foreign pressure than the United States. This argument is illus-
trated by analyzing patterns of Israeli limited military actions against its neighbors between 1950 and
1982, which reveals that despite popular demands within the Israeli parliament to pursue more militant
policies, the government tended to restrain its actions when faced with foreign pressure from the United
States, Great Britain, and the United Nations Security Council.
* The data used in this article are available at
http://uhda.haifa.ac.il. Correspondence: ranank@poli.
haifa.ac.il.
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USA, which is a superpower, a small state
like Israel cannot ignore the fact that it is a
‘client state’ highly dependent on foreign aid.
Israel must therefore consider the reaction of
its patrons whenever making foreign-policy
decisions. A good example of this constraint
was Israel’s decision in 2000 to retract a $1
billion deal to sell China four Phalcon spy-
planes due to US pressure. Besides losing the
potential revenues from the sale, Israel paid
China $350,000 as a compensation fee for
breaching the contract (Voice of Israel, 2002).
Even if small states are more attentive to
foreign pressure than to domestic pressure,
one can still question the relevance of foreign
pressure when matters of national security
are at stake. The costs of canceling the
Phalcon deal with China were strictly
economic. Israel was not requested to com-
promise its national security. Waltz (1979:
195) suggests that, when issues of national
security are threatened, small states might
actually be more resistant to both foreign and
domestic demands, since a small state cannot
afford to bear the risks that a large power can.
Although defying the patron is costly, sacri-
ficing national security might be far more
disastrous.
An example of the dilemma described
above is the Israeli tendency to launch pre-
emptive wars. Levite (1989) explains that the
Israeli sense of vulnerability, especially before
1967 when it was a very small country, led
Israeli decisionmakers to the conclusion that
Israel should never allow itself to be in a
position where it is attacked first, since Israel
might fail to recover from the initial blow.
Thus, although it is possible that the
Egyptian mobilization of its forces along the
Israeli borders in May 1967 was intended to
deter Israel from attacking Syria rather than
a plan to invade Israel (Sharabi, 1970), since
the Israelis were not sure what the Egyptians’
real intentions were, they refused to take any
chances and launched a pre-emptive strike
despite foreign demands for restraint, which
included an arms embargo (Stein & Tanter,
1980). But, after Israel expanded its frontiers
and acquired a buffer zone in case of a
foreign attack, to avoid US reproach, the
Israeli government preferred not to launch a
pre-emptive strike when Egypt and Syria
mobilized their forces along the ceasefire
lines in October 1973 (Bar Joseph, 2001).
Waltz’s argument regarding the priority of
national security over domestic or foreign
pressure might be limited to relatively
extreme situations. It is very likely that when
a state is confronted with a very serious
national threat, the general public also per-
ceives such a threat, making it impossible to
distinguish between a policy motivated by
pure security concerns or popular domestic
demand. Also, the policies of a patron state
might interact with the rise of national
threats to its client, since even the patron will
recognize that its client is faced with a high-
risk situation. Therefore, it is suggested that
the impact of foreign or domestic pressure
should be observed under non-extreme con-
ditions, where the decisionmakers are
exposed to a moderate security threat, which
allows them to tolerate a possible failure.
Low-intensity assaults against Israeli
citizens and property serve as a good case for
testing the impact of foreign and domestic
pressure, since the Israeli army has tended
not to treat these types of attacks as a ‘basic
security’ threat. Despite the terrible pain and
suffering endured by the victims and their
families, Prime Minister and Defense
Minister David Ben Gurion (1949) asserted
that such actions could not defeat Israel.
Therefore, this was a problem of personal
security and not national security.1
Consequently, the initial Israeli response
to limited Arab violence was of a defensive
nature, guarding the borders and settlements
journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 40 / number 6 / november 2003
678
1In fact, Ben Gurion insisted that because this was not an
issue of national security, it was the responsibility of the
police and not the Israeli Defense Forces to protect Israeli
civilians and property.
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