The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Party System Fragmentation: A Test of Three Competing Arguments
| Author | Christopher D. Raymond |
| Published date | 01 December 2014 |
| Date | 01 December 2014 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.12055 |
| Subject Matter | Research Article |
Research Article
The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Party
System Fragmentation: A Test of Three
Competing Arguments
Christopher D. Raymond
University of New Orleans
Few studies have examined the impact that the adoption of the secret ballot had on party system fragmentation
outside the United States. This article tests arguments maintaining that the adoption of the secret ballot had a
negative, positive or nil effect on party system fragmentation. Using time-series cross-sectional data from
several countries adopting the secret ballot around the turn of the twentieth century, the results demonstrate
that the adoption of the secret ballot did not hinder – though did not favour, either – the development of
multiparty systems.
Keywords: secret ballot; party system fragmentation; voting
Introduction
Along with the extension of the franchise, the adoption of the secret ballot was one of the
most important electoral reforms in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and had
wide-ranging consequences for voting behaviour. Because the secret ballot allows citizens to
vote in secret for the party they most prefer, its implementation curbed the influence of local
notables by reducing the bribery, intimidation and corruption that characterised previous
voting occasions (Rokkan, 1961). While a considerable body of research focusing on the
United States has examined the consequences of the adoption of the secret ballot for the
fragmentation of the party system – and by ‘fragmentation’, I mean not only the number of
parties, but their relative voting strength as well – precious little research has examined the
consequences of the secret ballot for party system fragmentation outside the US. This article
helps to fill in this gap in the literature.
To improve our understanding of the effect of the secret ballot on the development of
multiparty systems, I examine changes in party system fragmentation before and after the
adoption of the secret ballot in eight Western democracies – Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom – using time-series cross-
sectional methods. Three arguments regarding the effect of the secret ballot can be identified:
that the secret ballot has a negative effect, a positive effect or no significant effect on party
system fragmentation. While most of the research examining the consequences in the US
supports the first of these arguments by maintaining that the adoption of the secret ballot
reduced the ability of third parties to compete with the two major parties (e.g. Evans, 1917;
Ranney, 1975; Rusk, 1970), some dissenting research exists. Some argue that the adoption of
the secret ballot helped third parties (e.g. Elklit, 2010, p. 503; Hurst, 1965) – thereby
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POLITICS: 2014 VOL 34(4), 378–390
doi: 10.1111/1467-9256.12055
© 2014 The Author.Politics © 2014 Political Studies Association
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