The electoral consequences of compensation for globalization
| Published date | 01 September 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/14651165231157615 |
| Author | Stephanie J Rickard |
| Date | 01 September 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The electoral consequences
of compensation for
globalization
Stephanie J Rickard
Department of Government, London School of Economics, UK
Abstract
As opposition to globalization grows, many governments seek policy responses. One
response –the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund –provides support to workers
in European Union member states who are made redundant as a result of globalization.
Proponents argue that by offsetting some of the costs of globalization, the programme
may bolster public support for international economic integration and the political
parties that support it. I investigate the impact of the European Globalisation
Adjustment Fund on voters’support for protectionist political parties using a difference-
in-differences research design and official election results at the district and commune
level. I also examine individual-level voting data. I find that in regions exposed to rising
imports, assistance from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund generates a small
decrease in the vote share of one of Europe’s most prominent anti-globalization parties,
which ranges in magnitude from 0 to 1.5 percentage points. While consistent with the
logic of embedded liberalism, the finding suggests that the theorized connection between
compensation and support for globalization may be conditional rather than categorical.
Keywords
Compensation, elections, European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, globalization, trade
protection
Introduction
Opposition to globalization appears to be growing in Europe (e.g., O’Rourke, 2019).
Over the past decade, political parties opposed to international economic integration
Corresponding author:
Stephanie J Rickard, Department of Government, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London,
WC2A 2AE, UK.
Email: S.Rickard@lse.ac.uk
Article
European Union Politics
2023, Vol. 24(3) 427–446
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/14651165231157615
journals.sagepub.com/home/eup
have won legislative seats in an array of European democracies. In France, a presidential
candidate unabashedly in favour of higher barriers to international trade won sufficient
votes to make it to the final round of the 2017 and 2022 elections. And in one of the
most conspicuous expressions of anti-globalization sentiment seen in recent decades,
52% of voters in the United Kingdom chose to leave the European Union (EU) (e.g.
Hobolt, 2016).
Compelling evidence suggests that voters’hostility towards globalization is due, at
least in part, to economic openness. Skepticism about globalization increased after a
period of rising imports (Scheve and Slaughter, 2018). In regions exposed to surging
imports, voters across 15 European countries disproportionately turned to political
parties that opposed globalization (Colantone and Stanig, 2018b; Milner, 2021). This evi-
dence suggests that economic liberalism itself may contribute to the backlash against glo-
balization (Lake et al., 2021).
Faced with this dilemma, governments seek policy responses. One response is the
European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF), which provides assistance to workers
in EU member states made redundant as a result of globalization. Support measures
include personalized job-search assistance and guidance, career advice, training
courses, and assistance with setting up a business. Funds are also available to help trade-
displaced workers update their knowledge and skills and, in some cases, cover the costs
of childcare, as well as temporary financial incentives and allowances. These measures
are co-financed by the EU as well as member states and are provided in addition to
national support programmes. To qualify, workers must have lost their jobs due to a ‘sub-
stantial increase in imports, a serious shift in trade of goods or services, a rapid decline of
market share in a given sector, or the offshoring of activities’(Claeys and Sapir, 2020:
2).
1
When envisioning the EGF, policy makers invoked the logic of ‘embedded liberalism’
–an idea with a long intellectual history (e.g. Frieden, 2018; Hays, 2009; Hays et al.,
2005; Ruggie, 1982). In the post-war period, governments anticipated that policy
could be used to minimize socially disruptive adjustment costs and any national political
vulnerabilities that might accrue from the multilateral system. By reducing the negative
impacts of international economic integration on workers’material well-being, it was
believed that government-funded ‘compensation’programmes could bolster public
support for economic liberalism and the political parties that support it.
Building on this logic, proponents of the EGF argued that it would help to stem the rise
of protectionism and anti-globalization voting in Europe. The former European
Commissioner for Trade, Peter Mandelson, said that the EGF was an important policy
response in light of ‘a wind of opposition to openness and a certain populist drift’in
‘some member states’(Tovi, 2006).
In this study, I investigate how the EGF influences voters’support for one of Europe’s
most prominent anti-globalization parties –France’s National Front (Front national, FN)
which in June 2018 changed its name to Rassemblement National (RN).
2
The FN expli-
citly identifies globalization as the main culprit behind many of the economic difficulties
faced by workers. It advocates increased barriers to trade in order to combat ‘unfair com-
petition’from foreign imports (Ivaldi, 2013; Malgouyres, 2017b; Swank and Betz, 2003).
428 European Union Politics 24(3)
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