The Emotional Underpinnings of Attitudes toward Transitional Justice
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321717723508 |
| Author | Joan Barceló |
| Published date | 01 May 2018 |
| Date | 01 May 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321717723508
Political Studies
2018, Vol. 66(2) 480 –502
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321717723508
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The Emotional Underpinnings
of Attitudes toward
Transitional Justice
Joan Barceló
Abstract
What explains citizens’ attitudes toward transitional justice? Studies that examined the support
for transitional justice mechanisms identified three sets of factors: individual, socialization, and
contextual. Building on the hot cognition theory, this article argues that the past political regime is
an emotionally charged sociopolitical object encoded with its evaluative history with consequences
in people’s opinion-formation process. Drawing on a specialized survey in Spain, the results first
suggest that negative emotions, especially anger and fear, significantly influence the support for
stronger transitional justice measures, even after adjusting for relevant confounders such as
ideology, religiosity, or victimization. Second, the findings show that those who lack an emotional
engagement toward the past regime, the so-called bystanders, hold attitudes toward transitional
justice that are indistinguishable from those who report positive feelings (pride, patriotism, and
nostalgia) toward the past regime. The effects of emotions are sizable relative to other important
determinants, including ideology, religiosity, and family’s ideology.
Keywords
transitional justice, democratization, political attitudes, emotions, Spain
Accepted: 13 June 2017
Transitional justice (TJ) is at the heart of the peace-building process of democratizing
countries.1 In many instances, negotiated transitions lead to the forgive-and-forget
amnesty policy to criminals of the past regime. In this post-transitional scenario, the legit-
imacy of the newly created institutions might be vulnerable to the justice deficit that
derives from an unsatisfied societal demand for justice. Much research on TJ has attempted
to understand the effects of historical justice mechanisms on macro- and micro-political
factors. Scholars have found that some of these mechanisms can reduce conflict, as well
as consolidate democratic institutions (Sikkink and Walling, 2007), people’s perceived
justice, fairness and acceptance (Gibson, 2002, 2004; Gibson and Gouws, 1999), societal
Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, USA
Corresponding author:
Joan Barceló, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA.
Email: joanbarcelosoler@wustl.edu
723508PSX0010.1177/0032321717723508Political StudiesBarcelo
research-article2017
Article
Barcelo 481
reconciliation (Gibson, 2006), or psychological healing (Sonis et al., 2009). By contrast,
skeptics have pointed out that digging into the past may, under some circumstance, rein-
vigorate the past conflict and undermine the supposed beneficial effects of TJ (Backer,
2010; Meernik, 2005; Olsen et al., 2010; Thoms et al., 2010).
While research on the consequences of historical justice abounds, fewer scholars have
paid attention to the determinants of the demand for TJ mechanisms. International actors
ranging from foreign countries to the UN have played active roles in determining the
justice mechanisms to implement in transitional countries. Additionally, democratic the-
ory suggests that as a country transitions from an authoritarian to a democratic regime,
institutions should become more responsive to citizens’ preferences. The passage of time
consolidates democratic institutions and reduces concerns about reprisals, as well as wor-
ries of return to the conflict. Not only does time attenuate people’s demands for justice it
can also exacerbate them. As Skaar (1999) argues, government’s choice for transitional
policy is largely a product of the relative strength of public’s demand for truth and justice.
In sum, understanding the dynamics of TJ mechanisms around the world requires dissect-
ing how citizens are willing to punish or forgive the past regime.
Mass surveys on attitudes toward TJ have shed some light on attitudes toward peace,
justice, and reconciliation in a number of countries, including Hungary, Poland, and the
Czech Republic (Nalepa, 2010); South Africa (Gibson, 2002, 2004); RD Congo (Vinck
et al., 2008); Cambodia (Pham et al., 2004, 2009; Sonis et al., 2009); Liberia (Vinck et al.,
2011), Northern Uganda (Pham and Vinck, 2010); Burundi (Samii, 2013); and Spain
(Aguilar et al., 2011; Balcells, 2012). However, most of these surveys either have been
reported in a purely descriptive manner (e.g. Pham et al., 2009; Pham and Vinck, 2010;
Vinck et al., 2011) or have focused on the effect of TJ on people’s preferences (e.g.
Gibson, 2002, 2004).2 Those few studies that focused on attitudes identified three types
of determinants of preferences for TJ: individual factors (e.g. educational level, ethnic-
ity), socialization (victimization and early politicization), and contextual factors (e.g.
conflict versus non-conflict areas). Even though the role of emotional engagement is
assumed to underlie some of their findings, it has not been empirically explored.
Consequently, because the literature does not formally and empirically incorporate the
emotional engagement with the past, it remains incomplete.3
This article begins to fill this gap by bringing together an emerging literature on emo-
tions in politics to push the boundaries of what we know about individual attitudes toward
TJ policies. I argue that affective dimensions, constituted by positive versus negative
emotions, strongly predict preferences toward TJ policies even after adjusting for relevant
confounders. Consistent with the view of the role of passive agents or bystanders in
human rights violations and war crimes (Barnett, 1999; Staub, 1993; Verdeja, 2012), I
also contend that those who lack an emotional engagement with an authoritarian past
regime implicitly conform with the status quo, which leads to a lower demand for further
TJ mechanisms.
To test these relationships, I draw from a nationally representative survey with 2936
respondents conducted in Spain in 2008. This survey allows me to measure six emotions:
three negative (anger, fear, and sadness) and three positive (pride, patriotism, and nostal-
gia), and an item tapping into individuals’ lack of emotional engagement. In addition, I
use controls for individual-level determinants (basic demographics, education, religios-
ity, ideology, political knowledge, and engagement in politics), socialization factors (per-
sonal and familial victimization, family’s ideology, and early political socialization), and
contextual factors (region).
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