The ethics of diplomatic criticism: The Responsibility to Protect, Just War Theory and Presumptive Last Resort
| Author | James Pattison |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066115572491 |
| Published date | 01 December 2015 |
| Date | 01 December 2015 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of
International Relations
2015, Vol. 21(4) 935 –957
© The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066115572491
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E
JR
I
The ethics of diplomatic
criticism: The Responsibility to
Protect, Just War Theory and
Presumptive Last Resort
James Pattison
University of Manchester, UK
Abstract
This article presents the ethical case for diplomatic criticism as a response to mass
atrocities and serious external aggression. It argues, in short, that states have a moral
duty to criticise the offending parties. More specifically, it argues that diplomatic
criticism is often a plausible and preferable alternative to other means of addressing
serious external aggression and mass atrocities (such as war, economic sanctions and
other diplomatic measures). It also argues that diplomatic criticism is often preferable
to doing nothing, and that even if other means are undertaken, states should engage in
diplomatic criticism as well. There are two subsidiary aims of the article. The first is to
reject some of the worries surrounding international hypocrisy — I aim to show that
even hypocritical diplomatic criticism may be obligatory. The second is to highlight the
impact on Just War Theory of considering in more detail the ethical issues raised by the
alternatives to war, such as diplomatic criticism, and, more specifically, to present a new
account of the last resort principle, which I call ‘Presumptive Last Resort’.
Keywords
Diplomatic criticism, duty to criticise, ethics, hypocrisy, Just War Theory,
Responsibility to Protect
Introduction
How should states and supranational bodies respond when faced with a state that threat-
ens another political community or initiates mass atrocities against its own population?
The most frequently discussed options in the literatures on collective self-defence and
Corresponding author:
James Pattison, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, UK.
Email: james.pattison@manchester.ac.uk
572491EJT0010.1177/1354066115572491European Journal of International RelationsPattison
research-article2015
Article
936 European Journal of International Relations 21(4)
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine are war and military intervention. Almost all
accounts of Just War Theory and R2P assert that coercive military action should be
avoided as far as possible: war and intervention should be the last resort. Stricter accounts
of the last resort principle take the ‘last’ element literally, requiring that war or interven-
tion should be pursued only after all the alternatives have been tried. More permissive,
non-literal accounts of last resort assert that war or intervention should be pursued only
if the other options are unlikely to succeed or if war or intervention would lead to the
least amount of harm.1 Notwithstanding, the notion that alternatives to war should be
pursued is one of the least controversial elements of Just War Theory and R2P. Yet, if war
is to be avoided, what should be done instead? Economic sanctions are a notable alterna-
tive, but, as has been well documented, they can cause devastation on a similar scale to
that of war, such as the economic sanctions against Iraq in the 1990s (Gordon, 2010), and
their effectiveness is highly contested.2
The alternative viewed perhaps most favourably is diplomacy. Diplomacy is widely
cited in the discussions of last resort in Just War Theory and R2P as a desirable alternative
to war and intervention that should be pursued first.3 However, almost all accounts of last
resort do not consider in detail what diplomacy would or should involve. Nor do they
explore the ethical issues surrounding diplomacy as a means of addressing external
aggression and mass atrocities. In a similar vein, pacifists often call for diplomacy as an
alternative to war but do not consider the moral issues for and against this option (beyond
the repudiation of war). For its part, the field of diplomatic studies is largely disparate and
multidisciplinary, involving disciplines such as communication studies, foreign policy
analysis, International Relations (IR), public relations and sociology. However, within
this field, there is very little written on diplomacy from a normative perspective.4
Accordingly, in this article, I will consider the ethics of diplomacy. I will focus, in
particular, on the use of diplomatic criticism as a response to serious external aggression
and mass atrocities. The main aim of the article is to present the case for diplomatic criti-
cism as a response to such situations. To that extent, in regard to responding to mass
atrocities (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity), I will
defend diplomatic criticism as a central means of helping to fulfil the R2P. Overall, I will
argue that states have a prima facie moral duty to engage in international criticism.
More specifically, I will argue that diplomatic criticism is not simply doing nothing
and standing by (as is often perceived in the public debate), but, rather, (1) is often a plau-
sible and preferable alternative to other means of addressing mass atrocities and serious
external aggression, such as war, economic sanctions and other diplomatic measures (dia-
logue, mediation and the cutting and downgrading of political ties). In addition, I will
argue (2) that diplomatic criticism is often a plausible and preferable alternative to doing
nothing; I will argue that staying silent in the face of serious external aggression or mass
atrocities is morally problematic. That is to say, states are often morally required to criti-
cise the offenders, in contrast to the numerous cases where they have stayed silent in the
face of human rights abuses (cases include: South African failure to criticise Robert
Mugabe’s Zimbabwe; Australian failure in the 2013 Commonwealth Meeting to criticise
the abuses of human rights by the Sri Lankan government; the failure of the UK (under
Margaret Thatcher) to criticise General Pinochet’s human rights abuses in Chile; and
British and American failure to criticise human rights abuses in Uzbekistan).5 I will also
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