The European Crisis of Liberal Internationalism
| Date | 01 June 2009 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070200906400208 |
| Published date | 01 June 2009 |
| Author | Jean-Yves Haine |
| Subject Matter | Over the Transom |
The European
crisis of liberal
internationalism
The liberal international agenda promoted by the European Union is in
crisis. At a time when America is rediscovering the merits of multilateralism,
engagement, and diplomacy, Europe is slowly acknowledging that its ethical
and moral foreign policies have reached their limits. Clearly, a liberal
international agenda is filled with strategic dilemmas, political frustrations,
and mixed results. Nonetheless, the current European crisis runs deeper
than the ordinary and familiar vices of liberal internationalism. As
demonstrated below, Europe has a problem of mindset, commitment, and
capabilities. This article will review these issues with a special emphasis on
military developments, and in particular, the European security and defence
policy (ESDP) side of current EU external actions.
Some caveats are, however, in order. First, the European security and
defence policy framework—the adjective “common” has now replaced
“European” in the official documents, a dubious hyperbole to say the least—
is still in its infancy and remains a work in progress. Considerable
Jean-Yves Haine is professor in the department of political science at the University of Toronto.
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| Jean-Yves Haine |
achievements have been made in the last 10 years, yet important gaps and
inadequacies remain. Institutional developments have been numerous, some
more formal than others, but they have once again been put on hold since the
Irish “no” to the Lisbon treaty last June. Second, there remains significant
room for improvement. Learning by doing is the favoured incremental
method in defence matters; learning from failure is the main internal
dynamic behind foreign policy initiatives.1 After each crisis, new and greater
ambitions are set, new tools and institutions are created, and fresh practices
emerge. It took German reunification to launch a monetary, and a stronger
political, union; the Balkan fiasco to initiate a defence and security policy;
and the divide over Iraq to craft a European security strategy. The current
crisis, however, is latent and the lessons are not so clear as to trigger a new
impetus. Third, any assessment of military and security developments is by
nature a subjective undertaking. Specifically, to evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of a military tool is by definition an educated guess at best. The
relevant evaluation belongs either to Europe’s eventual adversaries or
potential allies. A conservative assessment of European security tools will
look at the ambitions and responsibilities they are designed to fulfil, but the
European Union is a special case. The union has adopted a security strategy
but there is no organic link between this strategic framework and the shape
of European forces. There is no European white paper comparable to those
that defence ministries at the national level publish on a regular
basis.Nonetheless, the December 2003 Solana document—“A secure Europe
in better world”—offers a clear benchmark to assess ESDP capabilities and
missions to the overall strategic framework.2
With these caveats, this article will review the European strategy broadly
defined by the Solana paper, analyze its limitations in theory and practice,
and offer some tentative conclusions.
1 See Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane, “The European convention and EU foreign
policy: Learning from failure,” Survival 45, no. 3 (autumn 2003): 167–86; and Philippe
de Schoutheete, “La cohérence par la defense: Une autre lecture de la PESD,” Chaillot
paper no. 71, October 2004.
2 See Jean-Yves Haine (rapporteur), “Proposal for a white paper,” EU-ISS, 2004. It
should be noted, however, that defence and strategy white papers published recently
by France, the United Kingdom, and Germany are largely congruent on strategic goals
and the means to achieve them. “A secure Europe in a better world,” Brussels, 12
December 2003, can be found at http://ue.eu.int.
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| The European crisis of liberal internationalism |
THE ORIGINS OF EUROPE’S LIBERAL STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
As noted above, foreign and security policies are relatively new features
developed by the European Union, most of them imposed by external factors
and shocks. The Saint-Malo agreement, which launched the ESDP process,
was first and foremost a consequence of Europe’s failures in the Balkans. In
the same vein, the Solana document was a direct lesson from the divide about
Iraq. The European security strategy was a clear reminder to member-states
that disunity has a strategic cost and that Europe’s influence ultimately rests
on its capacity to get its act together. Drawing up a security concept involved
difficult dilemmas: to reach a broad consensus while acknowledging the
different strategic traditions and cultures of member-states, to map strategic
threats while recognizing that they affect member-states differently, and to
outline an overall approach in addressing them while taking into account
the union’s particular acquis and specific identity. Inevitably, the document
was thus more about a vision than about strategic interests, more about
attitude than policies.3 If it was never intended to be a guidebook for specific
foreign policy initiatives, it did, however, present a genuine European
worldview and approach to world affairs that amounts to a specifically
European liberal internationalism. The EU, by identity rather than practice,
presents itself to the world as a unique and successful civilian and ethical
actor that articulates a prudent liberal vision to promote democracy and the
rule of law, defend and protect human rights, and support the peaceful
resolution of conflicts. Based on diplomacy rather than force, on incremental
change rather than big bangs, Europe’s liberalism presupposes a global reach
posture and an interventionist mindset. Both elements are currently highly
questionable in the union, which is still trying to solve a constitutional crisis
that has inflicted many deep wounds and left few credible leaders. The
inward-looking tendency remains a serious obstacle to a truly “global” and
effectively “moral” Europe. Ethics are not only a subject of discourses; they
are most importantly a matter of effective actions.
Despite all its deficiencies, and some will argue its urgent need for an
update—a clear but failed objective of the French presidency—the Solana
paper remains an inspiration for myriad actors involved in Europe foreign
3 On the document, see, among others, Alyson Bailes, “The European security
strategy,” SIPRI policy paper no. 10, Stockholm, February 2005; Bischop Sven, ed., “An
audit of European strategy,” Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels,
January 2005; and Jean-Yves Haine, “The EU soft power: Not hard enough?”
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 5, no. 1 (winter 2003-spring 2004): 69-77.
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| Jean-Yves Haine |
and security policies. From the document, European liberal internationalism
is based on two pillars: preventive engagement and effective multilateralism.
Prevention refers to the union’s approach to crisis management and nation-
building, which includes not only traditional military peacekeepers but also
police personnel, civil administration officials, and justice officers to
strengthen the rule of law. This preventive approach relies first and foremost
on diplomacy and economic assistance, yet military and civilian interventions
remain an important component of prevention. The link with ESDP
developments is the strongest in this regard. As discussed below, since 2000
ESDP capabilities have been developed along these objectives. On the
military side, battle groups—force packages of about 1500 troops, two of
them on standby—can now be deployed rapidly to restore order and prevent
further aggravation in a civil conflict. A European gendarmerie force has
been set up, aimed at postconflict stabilization. On the civilian side, the
union has a 5000-strong reserve police force that could be sent abroad, as is
the case for Kosovo. This wide range of tools embodies the comprehensive
approach promoted by the union.
The second concept—effective multilateralism—captures the essence of
the union’s ruled-based security culture. The fundamental framework for
international relations remains the UN charter and organization—the EU
contributes up to 38.9 percent of the UN’s budget. Unilateral action is
deemed both illegitimate and counterproductive. Multilateralism is a
condition for success, not a legalistic or formal obligation. The intervention
in Kosovo under NATO was an exception to this rule. No nation, however
powerful, can pretend to address contemporary threats alone. At the same
time, the union recognizes that multilateralism alone is no guarantee of an
effective response: “collective tools and collective will to use them must be
built together.”4 Clearly, the implicit references were, on the one hand, the
US invasion in Iraq—an example of what not to do in world politics—and on
the other hand, the precedent of Kosovo, an example of what should be done.
By endorsing international legitimacy as a condition for action, the union
relies on the goodwill of necessary partners and on the collaboration of
potential foes to pursue its own interests and achieve its specific goals. At
the UN security council, but also in other forums, the collaboration of...
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