The European Union Democratic Deficit
| Published date | 01 April 2006 |
| Author | Jonathan Bowman |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885106061606 |
| Date | 01 April 2006 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The European Union Democratic
Deficit
Federalists, Skeptics, and Revisionists
Jonathan Bowman Saint Louis University
abstract: I outline the current debate over the European Union democratic deficit
in terms of differing methodological approaches towards the realization of freedom
and basic rights to political participation. Federalists opt for a model of freedom as
noninterference and autonomous self-determination by proposing to tie basic rights
in the EU to a univocal form of European-wide popular sovereignty. Although
skeptics argue that the EU lacks the fundamental basis for such European-wide
democratic self-determination, they ultimately defend a similar view of freedom as
noninterference with their appeal to the collective will of the member states.
Democratic revisionists instead point to the novel democratic potential of institutions
in the EU such as the Open Method of Coordination for mediating overlapping
sovereignties. I conclude using the example of basic rights to effective participation
for immigrants and minorities to illustrate the strengths of the revisionist view over
views that appeal to the principle of subsidiarity.
key words: democratic deficit, democratic revisionism, European Union, federalism,
freedom, nondomination, Open Method of Coordination, republicanism, sovereignty, subsidiarity
As a condition for European Union (EU) membership, member states must
respect human rights and uphold democratic principles. However, critics argue
that the EU as a transnational polity fails to live up to the criteria set for its
member states. Even though respect for human rights is a condition for the
accession of applicant states, the EU has yet to formulate a common human rights
policy. And although the number of EU policies and laws that affect its citizens
increases every year, critics remain doubtful whether citizens have real delibera-
tive influence over its decision-making. Most simply stated, the EU would not
accept itself if it were to apply for membership. Hence arises what has come to be
known as the democratic deficit.
Contemporary responses to the lack of real citizen influence over EU laws and
policies are centered on practical questions of the best institutional design to
ensure popular sovereignty and the protection of basic rights to effective political
191
article
Contact address: Jonathan Bowman, Department of Philosophy, Saint Louis University,
3800 Lindell Blvd, St Louis, MO 63156–0907, USA.
Email: bowmanjm@slu.edu
EJPT
European Journal
of Political Theory
© SAGE Publications Ltd,
London, Thousand Oaks
and New Delhi
issn 1474-8851, 5(2)191–212
[DOI: 10.1177/1474885106061606]
participation. While the institutional proposals differ, most replies to the demo-
cratic deficit fall into the conventional template of popular sovereignty as the
minimal threshold for democratic self-rule, employing the principle of sub-
sidiarity to ensure that what can be done at a more local level is not raised to a
higher level.1These proposals primarily view the self-legislating autonomy of a
demos as the best way to realize popular sovereignty and basic rights to effective
participation in decision-making processes. I overview the general contours of
this current debate, setting up the three main positions stylistically in terms of
skeptics who want to preserve the autonomous will of member states, federalists
who want European-wide autonomous legislation, and revisionists who instead
propose a democracy of demoi with multiple sovereignties.
More importantly, however, motivating these practical debates concerning the
best institutional design for enhanced influence over EU laws and policies are
more pressing normative and philosophical questions concerning republican
ideals of freedom and equality necessary to allocate basic rights to effective
political participation. Freedom and equality thus serve as standards of democratic
rule by which the three competing designs will be assessed. Framing the debate
primarily in terms of freedom, I show how differing conceptions of freedom sub-
sequently influence one’s views about how best to devise republican institutions
that ensure norms of equal political participation fitting for this unique trans-
national order.
Following some opening remarks that set the problem of the democratic deficit
in terms of freedom, I move into my three-step argument. First, while federalists
and skeptics propose very different institutional designs for the EU, they are both
committed to a normative view of freedom traditionally associated with the
self-legislation of a demos. Second, along with revisionists, I reject popular
sovereignty and the notion of freedom as autonomous self-determination as a
satisfactory democratic ideal. In particular, the model of freedom as self-determi-
nation cannot realize an adequate norm of equality when conceived in terms of
equal rights to political participation for all those most immediately affected by
EU policies, including non-citizens who are a significant group in its increasingly
multicultural civil society.
Third, I introduce my main contribution to the democratic deficit debate,
which is to develop the revisionist position positively beyond its negative rejection
of freedom as self-determination. Self-legislation at both the higher level of
European-wide policy objectives and at the lower levels of member state jurisdic-
tion, while consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, can turn into a different
conception of freedom as noninterference that is implausible for the overlapping
sovereignties of the EU.2Instead, freedom as nondomination can preserve the
best features of the republican tradition and prove to be a more fitting normative
ideal for the EU.3This third republican view of freedom more adequately incor-
porates into deliberations all subjects affected by EU law and policy, including
member states, citizens, and, in some cases, even non-citizens.
European Journal of Political Theory 5(2)
192
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