The Evolution of Communism
| DOI | 10.1177/019251218901000405 |
| Author | Karol Sołtan,Bartłomiej Kamiński |
| Date | 01 October 1989 |
| Published date | 01 October 1989 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
371-
The
Evolution of
Communism
BARTŁOMIEJ
KAMIŃSKI
AND
KAROL
SOŁTAN
ABSTRACT.
The
paper
presents
a
framework
for
understanding
the
evolution
of
communism.
We
suggest
that
the
politico-economic
system
of
communist
regimes
may
be
usefully
seen
as
an
institutionally
and
ideologically
constrained
bargaining
game.
We
distinguish
three
stages
of
the
develop-
ment
of
this
"game"-pure
communism,
late
communism,
and
constitutio-
nal
communism.
Pure
communism
is
characterized
by
an
aspiration
to
the
total
control
over
society,
and
a
strong
commitment
to
ideology.
Constraints
on
bargaining
weaken
in
late
communism,
resulting
in
a
system
with
distinctive
economic
and
political
features,
which
we
describe.
Constitutio-
nal
communism
is
an
ideal
type
based
on
the
current
wave
of
reform,
in
which
the
power
of
communists
is
limited
without
being
undermined.
Its
chief
ingredients
are
the
rule
of
law,
separation
of
powers,
communist
corporatism,
glasnost,
and
the
market.
Marxist-Leninist
regimes
seem
to
be
on
the
verge
of
major
changes,
prompted
chiefly
by
economic
stagnation.
Facing
deteriorating
economic
growth
and
the
prospect
of
being
left
out
of
a
changing
world
economy,
a
number
of
communist
countries
have
started
looking
for
ways
to
alter
some
of
the
basic
tenets
of
central
planning
and
of
the
existing
modes
of
governance.
In
spite
of
different
political
and
economic
circumstances,
as
well
as
different
levels
of
industrialization,
the
blueprints
now
being
considered
have
one
feature
in
common.
They
all
envisage
some
retrenchment
of
the
party-state
from
direct
control
over
the
society
and
the
economy.
The
party-state
apparatus
is
to
be
streamlined
and
its
authority
to
make
decisions
curtailed.
Proposals
for
economic
reform
have
been
increasingly
accompanied
by
recognition
of
the
need
to
curb
the
dominance
of
the
party,
and
by
the
introduction
of
other
serious
institutional
reforms
in
a
number
of
spheres.
Our
scholarship
has
not
caught
up
with
these
developments.
In
marked
contrast
to
the
modernization
theory
which
dominated
comparative
communist
studies
in
the
1960s,
the
current
focus
has
been
narrowed
to
the
study
of
the
politics
of
economic
reform.
These
studies
fall
short
on
several
accounts.
First,
they
tend
to
be
descriptive
rather
than
analytic.
Second,
the
links
among
law,
politics,
and
economics
tend
to
372
be
ignored
or
underplayed,
despite
the
obvious
significance
of
politico-economic
integration
in
communist
regimes.2
A
proliferation
of
theories
and
concepts
explains
various
aspects
of
contemporary
changes
or
gives
an
account
of
some
periods
of
the
evolution,
without
setting
them
within
a
broader
theoretical
framework.
As
a
result,
these
studies
fail
to
offer
reliable
clues
as
to
the
possible
trajectory
of
change
and
the
likely
shape
of
the
political
and
economic
future.
In
this
paper
we
propose
an
alternative
way
to
understand
change
within
communism.
In
a
general
politico-economic
framework
we
construct
a
typology
of
communist
regimes,
distinguishing
pure
communism
(or
totalitarian
communism),
late
communism,
and
constitutional
(or juridical)
communism.
All
three
share
the
basic
&dquo;official&dquo;
identifying
properties
of
a
communist
regime,
the
leading
role
of
the
party
and
public
ownership
of
the
means
of
production.
We
use
this
typology
to
identify
what
we
consider
the
central
tendencies
of
evolutionary
change
under
communism.
The
first
tendency
takes
us
from
pure
to
late
communism;
the
second
leads
to
constitutional
communism.
These
are
not
inevitable
tendencies,
of
course.
A
return
to
the
pure
communist
type
is
always
possible
(though
costly,
in
various
ways).
There
are
also
the
alternatives
of
stasis
or
revolution.
But
in
this
paper
we
focus
on
the
potential
for
reform
of
communist
regimes.
It
is
crucial
in
this
task
to
show
that
the
constitutionalization
of
communism,
the
self-imposition
of
limits
by
communist
rulers,
can
be
in
the
interest
of
those
rulers
and
can
even
enhance
their
power.
We
do
this
below
(see
p.
384).
Thus
prospects
for
reform
do
not
depend
(at
least
not
entirely)
on
the
public-spiritedness
of
those
rulers,
or
their
commitment
to
socialist
ideals.
They
depend
in
part
on
those
rulers’
desire
to
preserve
and
enhance
their
power,
a
far
more
reliable
motive.
The
identification
of
communism
with
its
totalitarian
version
(with
what
we
call
&dquo;pure
communism&dquo;)
makes
it
all
but
impossible
to
understand
changes
within
communism.~
Many
other
commonly
used
concepts
are
of little
use
as
well.
At
best,
they
&dquo;evoke
considerable
nostalgia,
especially
when
the
model
happens
to
be
called
’bureaucratic’
and
the
theory
is
that
of ’convergence’
(Korbonski,
1988:
46).
Or,
as
in
some
recent
loose
applications
of
concepts
developed
to
understand
Western
democracies
(e.g.,
pluralism
or
corporatism),
they
have
a
mostly
distorting
effect
on
our
view
of
communism.
Our
suggestion
is
that
we
shift
to
a
higher
level
of
abstraction
and
think
of
the
different
types
of
communism
as
(weakly
or
strongly)
constrained
bargaining
regimes,
or
bargaining
games.
The
simplest
pure
case
of
a
bargaining
game
is
the
standard
two-person
game
that
has
been
the
foundation
of
formal
theory
of
bargaining
since
Nash
(1950)
and
others.
A
game
with
minimal
structure,
it
features
two
players,
their
interests,
the
set
of
possible
outcomes,
and
perhaps
a
status
quo
point.
The
poverty
of
structure
is
one
reason
why
formal
bargaining
theory
has
developed
relatively
slowly.
As
Schelling
pointed
out
(1963),
outcomes
in
real
bargaining
are
heavily
influenced
by
various
aspects
of
the
background
to
the
bargaining
not
recognized
in
the
formal
model.
Institutional,
cultural,
and
ideological
factors
constrain
bargaining
in
this
way.
A
bargaining
game
is
thus
better
characterized
not
simply
by
the
nature
of
the
players
and
the
range
of
possible
outcomes,
but
also
by
these
background
conditions,
which
we
call
&dquo;constraining
factors.&dquo;
The
level
of
complexity
increases
dramatically,
of
course,
as
we
move
from
a
simple
two-person
bargaining
game
to
a
whole
politico-economic
system.
But
we
need
not
modify
the
basic
model.
A
politico-economic
system
can
be
thought
of
as
a
bargaining
game
identified
by
the
nature
of
the
players
and of
the
background
constraints.
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