The Expanding Core and Varying Degrees of Insiderness: Institutionalised Interest Group Access to Advisory Councils
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9248.12112 |
| Date | 01 August 2015 |
| Published date | 01 August 2015 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
The Expanding Core and Varying Degrees of
Insiderness: Institutionalised Interest Group
Access to Advisory Councils
Bert Fraussen, Jan Beyers and Tom Donas
University of Antwerp
The interaction between organised interests and policy makers is an important ingredient of contemporary political
systems. In earlier work, interest group scholars have distinguished groups that enjoy access to consultation arrange-
ments from those that are bound to stand on the sideline. Frequently, these insiders are considered to be equally
connected to public authorities. Yet their degree of ‘insiderness’ differs significantly. By unpacking the set of
organised interests that have gained access, this article distinguishes core insiders from groups that occupy a more
peripheral position in an interest intermediation system. Empirically, we demonstrate and explain varying degrees of
insiderness in the community of insider groups in Belgium, using the extensiveness of representation in advisory
bodies as a proxy for access. Our findings show that, although nowadays a diverse set of organised interests gets
involved in policy-making processes, the inner circle is dominated by traditional economic interests.
Keywords: organised interests; access; corporatism
In most democratic countries, interactions between policy makers and societal interests are
structured through consultative arrangements, such as advisory bodies, working groups,
public committees and commissions. This coordinated interaction between organised
interests and policy makers is a key ingredient of contemporary policy-making processes
and plays an important role in transmitting societal concerns, political knowledge and
policy expertise to government officials. Various research demonstrates that the access
enjoyed by different group types relates to a range of internal and external factors,
including socio-economic inequalities, collective action problems, resources and govern-
ment policies (Binderkrantz, 2012; Lowery and Gray, 2004a; Schlozman, 2012). However,
the precise character of the community of policy insiders depends to a considerable extent
on how governments establish venues for the consultation of organised interests. Such
participatory systems show how societal conflicts are being resolved, and how organised
interests get involved in public policy-making processes. Although policy makers aim to
include societal interests in policy-making processes by establishing advisory bodies, these
venues also have exclusionary effects. The restricted number of seats means that some
organised interests might gain no or rather weak access, whereas others could enjoy a much
better representation. Hence, a crucial political science research question is whether
governments frequently interact with a high variety of organised interests, or whether they
mostly cooperate with a small set of privileged partners. In the latter case, the nature of this
inner circle, and how its quality of access differs from the broader community of consulted
organised interests, deserves close attention.
In many developed countries, as well as within several supranational and international
organisations, regular and broad formalised interactions with organised interests are a
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doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12112
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2015 VOL 63, 569–588
© 2014 The Authors. Political Studies © 2014 Political Studies Association
common practice (Hanegraaff et al., 2011; Jönsson and Tallberg, 2010; Quittkat, 2011;
Saurugger, 2007). Such systems are meant to facilitate political participation, acquire expertise
and enhance political legitimacy. Inclusion in these advisory bodies can be regarded as an
important form of (institutionalised) access, which David Truman considered the ‘facilitating
intermediate objective of political interest groups’. More precisely, he argued that ‘towards
whatever institution of government we observe interest groups operating, the common
feature of all their efforts is the attempt to achieve effective access to points of decision’
(Truman, 1951, p. 264). As a result, interest group scholars have spent much effort in
characterising systems of interest intermediation by identifying insiders and outsiders, distin-
guishing groups that enjoy access from those which are bound to stand on the sidelines
(Beyers, 2002; Binderkrantz, 2005; Eising, 2007; Lundberg, 2013; Poppelaars, 2007).
However, the distinction of insiders vs. outsiders is only one part, albeit an important one,
of the picture. If we seek to analyse the interaction between policy makers and organised
interests, the variation within the set of groups that regularly interacts with public officials
should be scrutinised more closely. Frequently, these insiders are considered to be equally
connected to public authorities, thus enjoying a similar quality of access. Yet as argued by
William Maloney et al., the degree of ‘insiderness’ of these groups may differ significantly, as
there exists ‘an important divide between the relatively few groups with privileged status and
the greater number of groups who find themselves consigned to less influential positions’
(Maloney et al., 1994, p. 17). That is, while the threshold to insider status might be relatively
low, by unpacking the set of organised interests that have gained access, core insiders can be
distinguished from groups that occupy a more peripheral insider position.
This article describes the varying involvement of organised interests in advisory bodies
and aims to identify the key factors explaining varying levels of insiderness. In the first two
sections we clarify the relevance of consultation practices theoretically and develop
hypotheses explaining degrees of insiderness. Subsequently, we demonstrate the relevance
of studying the role of advisory councils in a traditionally corporatist system, such as
Belgium, where consultation practices are strongly institutionalised. More specifically, our
focus on the advisory setting in one of Belgium’s regions, Flanders, enables us to assess the
extent to which this sub-national entity has adopted a system of interest intermediation that
resembles the neo-corporatist state from which it devolved. In the fourth section, we assess
the relation between varying degrees of insiderness and key organisational characteristics,
using non-linear multivariate regression analysis. Our analyses demonstrate that, although
policy makers involve a diverse set of interests in these advisory bodies, there are significant
differences regarding the quality of access enjoyed by different types of organised interest.
While resources and the representative character of an interest group play an important
role, we also notice that traditionally powerful economic interests have been able to expand
their involvement in this system of interest intermediation. The final section concludes and
reflects on some broader implications of our findings regarding interest group participation
and democracy.
Conceptualising Interest Group Participation through Advisory Bodies
Regarding the interaction between state actors and organised interests, a traditional typol-
ogy involves the distinction between corporatist and pluralist polities (Granados and
570 BERT FRAUSSEN, JAN BEYERS AND TOM DONAS
© 2014 The Authors. Political Studies © 2014 Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2015, 63(3)
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