The Falkland Islands: Origins of the British Involvement
| Author | F.S. Northedge |
| Published date | 01 October 1982 |
| Date | 01 October 1982 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/004711788200700403 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
2167
THE
FALKLAND
ISLANDS:
ORIGINS
OF
THE
BRITISH
INVOLVEMENT
F.
S.
NORTHEDGE
IT
is
a
sad
reflection
on
the
nature
of
international
affairs,
and
of
the
human
beings
who
conduct
them,
that
for
almost
three
months
in
the
early
summer
of
1982
Britain
and
Argentina,
two
countries
which
had
everything
to
gain
from
friendly
relations,
were
for
all
practical
purposes
at
war
with
each
other,
at
no
inconsiderable
loss
of
life
and
expenditure
of
resources
on
both
sides,
over
the
possession
of
a
group
of
poor
and
rocky
islands
in
the
South
Atlantic.
No-one
could
seriously
suggest
that
the
Falkland
Islands
had
any
more
than
minimal
economic
or
strategic
importance;
such
efforts
as
were
made
to
prove
that
they
had
looked
like
desperate
attempts
to
pour
some
rationality
into
a
struggle
over
inconsequental
things.
Both
Britain
and
Argentina
have
substantial
economic,
and
perhaps,
in
Argentina’s
case,
political,
problems
on
their
hands,
to
which
all
their
energies
in
any
rational
world
should
be
directed.
Yet,
for
a
time
something
impossible
to
describe
except
as a
sense
of national
honour,
entangled
with
a
host
of
folk
memories,
herd
feelings,
sentiments,
made
the
affair
one
of
extreme
importance
to
both
states.
How
long
residues
of
the
national
fervour which
swept
through
Britain
during
those
summer
months
will
remain,
how
far
the
Falklands
campaign
will
have
long-term
effects
on
British
life
and
affect
the
currents
of
our
thinking
about
foreign policy
and
defence
strategy,
is
impossible
to
say.
The
fact
remains
that
the
British
operation
to
recover
the
Falklands
and
the
outlying
dependency
of
South
Georgia
after
their
seizure
by
Argentina
in
March
and
early
April
proved
to
be
a
brilliant
success,
both
in
terms
of
cool
political
management
and
sheer
technical
excellence.
After
so
many
setbacks
and
disappoint-
ments
since
the
Second
World
War,
the
island
race
showed
that
it
was
still
capable
of performing
feats
on
a
par
with
those
immortalised
by
Shakespeare.
Partly
no
doubt
because
of
Prime
Minister
Thatcher’s
combative
personality,
partly
because
the
struggle
to
recover
the
islands
inevitably
aroused
in
Britain
a
strong
pro-
tectiveness
towards
1,800
somewhat
romanticised
folk
threatened
by
a
not
too
tender-minded
military
regime
in
Buenos
Aires,
British
sovereignty
over
the
Falklands
ended
by
being
more
forcefully
asserted
than
it
had
been
before,
and
sovereignty,
as
the
Foreign
Secretary,
Mr
Francis
Pym,
said
in
the
Commons
on
4
May,
was
’at
the
heart
of
the
issue
and
dispute’.’
After
all,
for
a
1
23
H.C.
Deb.
6th
Series
Col
25.
2168
decade
or
more
before
the
Argentinian
invasion of
the
main
islands
on
2
April,
British
Foreign
and
Commonwealth
Office
officials,
including
senior
and
junior
Ministers,
had
been
talking
with
the Argentinians
about
future
arrangements
for the
Falklands,
and
Falkland
Island
councillors
were
often
included
as
part
of
the
British
delegation.
Such
arrangements,
if
they
did
not
exactly
contemplate
a
transfer
of
sovereignty
to
Argentina,
suggested
enough
of
a
move
in
that
direction
to
arouse
fears
among
supporters
of
the
Falklands
connection
in
Westminster
that
something
on
those
lines
was
afoot.
Even
during
the
negotiations
involving
Peru
and
the
United
Nations
Secretary-General
as
intermediaries
which
accompanied
the
despatch
of
the
British
task
force
to
the
South
Atlantic,
formulae
were
passed
to
and
fro
which
assumed
some
dilution
of
British
control
in
the
form
of
a
negotiated
interim
administration
pending
a
definitive
settlement.
In
Parliament,
the
Government
were
urged
to
consider
such
solutions
as
a ’lease-back’
arrangement,
or
a
multinational
form
of
administration,
or
a
trusteeship
under
the
United
Nations.
But
now
it
seems
that
the
British
Government
will
accept
nothing
less
than
the
full
assertion
of
its
sovereignty
over
the
Falklands.
’I
do
not
intend
to
negotiate
on
the
sovereignty
of the
islands
in
any
way,
except
with
those
who
live
there’,
said
Mrs
Thatcher
in
the
House
on
15
June.
’We
need
the
friendliness
of
neighbouring
States.
We
do
not
negotiate
sovereignty
with
them‘.
And
again:
’we
do
not
need
to
negotiate
with
the
United
Nations
or
anyone
else
about
British
sovereignty
of
the
islands’.2
It
is
important
to
understand
what
this
means,
both
for
the
present
and
in
the
months
to
come,
when
the attention
of
British
people
is
likely
to
focus
more
and
more
intently
on
strictly
domestic
matters,
such
as
the
unemployment
problem
and
the
approaching
general
election.
Although
for
some
time
to
come
the
Argentinians
will
no
doubt
be
nursing
their
wounds
and
examining
the
reasons
for
their
reverse
in
the
Falklands,
it
seems
improbable
that
they
will
abandon
their
claim
to
the islands
as a
lost
cause
and
leave
Britain
in
tranquil
occupation
of her
possessions.
They
have
nourished
that
claim
without
much
intermission
since Britain
assumed
control
of
the
islands
in
January
1833,
and
although
the
intensity
of
Argentinian
resentment
against
Britain
has
varied
over
the
intervening
century
and
a
half,
there
can
be
little
doubt
that,
almost
without
exception,
all
Argentinians,
including
perhaps
substantial
numbers
among
the
20,000
or
so
inhabitants
of British
extraction
in
Argentina,
still
believe
as
an
incontrovertible
truth
2
132
H.C. Deb.
6th
Series
Cols
734,
738,
741.
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