The frequency of corporate misconduct: public enforcement versus private reality

Published date07 October 2019
Pages923-937
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-10-2018-0107
Date07 October 2019
AuthorEugene Soltes
The frequency of corporate
misconduct: public enforcement
versus private reality
Eugene Soltes
Department of Business Administration, Harvard Business School,
Boston, Massachusetts, USA
Abstract
Purpose Perceptions about the frequency of misconduct among the public, academics and even
regulators have largelybeen formed by examining enforcement statistics, whichrely on the detection and
sanctioning of the misconduct. This study aims to illuminate the real occurrence of corporate misconduct,
much of which escapespublic detection.
Design/methodology/approach By examining condential rm records describing misconduct
within organizations, the author shows that public enforcement statistics signicantly underestimate the
amount of seriousmalfeasance that arises withinrms.
Findings Through analyzingrecords for several large multinational rms,the author nds that there are,
on average,more than two instances of internally substantiatedmisconduct per week per rm.
Originality/value Ultimately,this analysis illustrates the challengeof addressing corporate malfeasance
within largeorganizations.
Keywords Fraud, Bribery
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
One question that researchers,regulators and the public perennially ask is whether the level
of corporate misconduct is risingor falling over time. Responses to this question tend to be
quite speculative, as the most basic fact the base rate of actual corporate misconduct is
unknown. Without more information on the true frequency of offenses, researchers often
rely on public enforcement statistics to ascertain the level of misconduct and the
effectiveness of regulatory bodies. However, based on prior scholarship (Dyck et al.,2017)
and investigative journalistswork (Eisinger, 2017), there is strong suspicion that a
considerable amount of misconductgoes undocumented in these public statistics. Assessing
how much misconduct lies outside the enforcement records has been challenging because
this malfeasanceis not usually publicly observable.
In this paper, I begin to offer a more thorough depiction of the amount of corporate
misconduct by examining the frequencyof offenses within rms based on companiesown
internal investigative data. Publicly traded rms are required to have an anonymous
reporting channel or hotlinefor accounting and nancial matters. In practice, rms use
these hotlines to receive information about a variety of issues that potentially constitute
legal and regulatory violations (Soltes, 2018a). Supplementing these hotlines, rms often
I would like to thank Jihwon Park, Alexa Scherf, Grace Liu, participants at the Cambridge
International Symposium on Economic Crime and students in Corporate Criminal Investigations at
Harvard Law School for helpful feedback on earlier drafts.
Frequency of
corporate
misconduct
923
Journalof Financial Crime
Vol.26 No. 4, 2019
pp. 923-937
© Emerald Publishing Limited
1359-0790
DOI 10.1108/JFC-10-2018-0107
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
www.emeraldinsight.com/1359-0790.htm

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT