The Future History of the Arctic
| Published date | 01 February 2012 |
| Date | 01 February 2012 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2011.00162_2.x |
| Author | Michael Byers |
Reviews
Moral Movements and Foreign Policy by Joshua W.
Busby. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 327
pp., paperback, 978 0521125666
Most political science and international relations theory
presumes that valid causal explanations emerge from the
analysis of the self-interest, usually fairly crude material
self-interest, of relevant actors and institutions. The ambi-
tious reductionism of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (briefly
addressed in the conclusion of this book), which purports
to explain all foreign policy outcomes by politicians’
desires to remain in office and to enrich themselves, can
be taken as emblematic. Busby argues that such material-
istic rationalism can take us only so far. First, it is clear
that people involved in various ‘advocacy movements’ )
for example, to ban landmines or save the whale )are
primarily motivated by moral value considerations. Sec-
ond, such movements sometimes succeed in having their
goals adopted, in whole or in part, by various states. Bus-
by’s concern is to investigate the conditions for their suc-
cess or failure. Eschewing any simple, direct causal line
between advocacy and achievement, he develops a sub-
tle and nuanced explanatory model that accommodates
value motivations (as well as other motives, such as pres-
tige and reputation) that operate in addition to the omni-
present and complex interplay of interests. This model he
tests by process tracing particular outcomes for several
causes pursued by advocacy groups )Third World debt
relief, climate change, combating AIDS, and founding the
International Criminal Court.
Busby’s model deploys, in effect, the elements that
Aristotle identified as determining the success of any
rhetoric: the inherent persuasiveness of the argument
(for Busby the content or message, which must be suc-
cessfully ‘framed’); the authority and trustworthiness of
the speaker (for Busby the identity and perceived charac-
ter of the ‘messenger’); and the speaker’s capacity to
appeal emotionally to the relevant audience (for Busby a
matter of ‘cultural fit’ with the values of a society, but
particularly of ‘gatekeepers’ among political elites). Rela-
tively weak advocacy groups must win ‘frame contests’
with opponents if they are to succeed, first, in gaining
attention for a cause and, second, in mobilising support
behind it. Their chances are enhanced or diminished
depending on the number of gatekeepers they must
persuade, which in turn depends on the centralisation or
pluralism of particular political systems. (The concept of
gatekeepers is a refinement of veto player analysis,
which recognises that many players lacking veto power
nevertheless have the capacity to obstruct.) Their
chances are also affected by the perceived costs (mate-
rial and other) of adopting a cause, whether high or low,
as well as its perceived importance. For Busby, seeking
to carve out a space for value motives and ‘specify the
conditions under which values based appeals, in
combination with other factors, influence state behav-
iour’ (p. 42), the most salient cases are those which have
a high fit with gatekeeper values but also high perceived
costs of implementation.
In each of the detailed case studies that occupy the
bulk of the book, Busby begins by demonstrating the, at
best, partial success of conventional material interest
explanations, then proceeds to offer a more complete
explanation using his ‘framing meets gatekeepers’
model. The results are by and large persuasive. A con-
cluding chapter considers the future of principled advo-
cacy under the straitened circumstances of financial crisis
as well as various lessons that advocacy groups might
take away from the work. Indeed, there is much to learn
here about the histories of particular causes and of the
conditions for success or failure of principled advocacy in
general. The book is also a valuable theoretical corrective
to so called ‘realist’ orientations (and even constructivist
ones), that succeeds in showing how value commitments
can and do play influentially in the real world (or at least
the liberal democratic part of it). It is accessibly written,
subtly and sensitively argued, and recommended to
students of politics and international relations.
John Kane
John Kane is Professor in the School of Government and
International Relations, Griffith University, Queensland, Australia.
The Future History of the Arctic by Charles Emmerson.
London: Bodley Head, 2010. 432 pp., £20.00 hardcover,
978 1847920256.
The Arctic Ocean, which separates North America from
Russia, was smack in the middle of the Cold War.
Nuclear submarines prowled the depths while long
range bombers circled overhead. Now, climate change
and peak oil create a risk of new struggles for territory
and resources. In August 2007, Artur Chilingarov, the
flamboyant deputy speaker of the Russian Duma, caused
a global media frenzy by planting a titanium flag on the
seabed at the North Pole and declaring ‘the Arctic is
Russian’.
Yet there is also a strong cooperative dimension to
Arctic politics. In 1990, Moscow and Washington negoti-
ated a maritime boundary in the Bering Strait. In 1996,
the eight Arctic countries – Russia, the US, Canada, Den-
mark (Greenland), Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland
– created the Arctic Council to provide an intergovern-
mental forum for the discussion of nonmilitary issues.
Global Policy Volume 3 . Issue 1 . February 2012
Global Policy (2012) 3:1 doi: 10.1111/j.1758-5899.2011.00162.x ª2012 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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