The Future of Strategic Stability and Nuclear Deterrence
| Published date | 01 June 2003 |
| Date | 01 June 2003 |
| Author | Frank P. Harvey |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070200305800205 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
FRANK
P.
HARVEY
The
future
of
strategic
stability
and
nuclear
deterrence
INTRODUCTION
Strategic
stability
is
a
catch-all
expression
used
by
scholars
and
prac-
titioners
to
describe
a
set
of
interrelated
concepts
(such
as
mutually
assured
destruction),
theories
(for
example,
nuclear
deterrence), poli-
cies
(massive
retaliation;
flexible
response;
no-first-use),
and
treaties
(Anti-Ballistic
Missile
treaty),
all
designed
during
the
cold
war
for
one
purpose
-
to
stabilize
the
longest
nuclear
rivalry
in
history
to
prevent
a
nuclear
exchange
between
the
United
States
and
Russia.
The
key
was
to
balance strategic
forces
so
that
each
side
could
survive
a
pre-emptive
nuclear
attack with
a
sufficiently
large
stockpile
of
ballistic
missiles
to
launch
a
retaliatory
strike.
The
logic
was
(and
remains)
elegant and
persuasive
-
so
long
as
the retaliatory
(second)
strike
threatened
suffi-
cient
devastation, there
would
be
no
rational
reason
to
launch
first.
Policy-makers
throughout
the
cold
war
were
preoccupied
with
three
central questions:
What
deters?
How
much is
enough?
And
what if
deterrence
fails?
The
enormous
appeal
of
nuclear deterrence
theory
was
its
simple
(and
impeccable)
logic,
which
provided straightforward
answers
to
the
core
questions
and
guidelines for
how to
achieve
deter-
rence
stability.
To
work
well,
according to
the
theory,
the
balance
of
Professor,
Department
ofPoliticalScience,
and
Director,
Centre
jfr
Foreign
Policy
Studies,
Dalhousie
Universiog
Halifax,
Nova
Scotia.
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Spring
2003
Frank
R
Harvey
strategic
forces
had
to
promise
crisis
stability
so
that
neither
side
would
perceive
an advantage in
escalating violence
in
a
crisis;
arms
race
stabil-
ity
to
minimize
incentives
to
build
more
weapons;
and
survivability
to
maximize
second-strike
potential
and
mutual
vulnerability.1
Although
the
perfect
balance
of
air-,
land-,
and
sea-launched
strate-
gic
missiles
was
never
entirely
clear,
there
was
one
principle
to
which
both
sides
adhered
-
nationwide
ballistic
missile
defence
systems
were
to
be
prohibited.
In
the
context
of
a
highly
charged
and competitive
cold
war
environment,
national
defence
systems
would
be provocative,
destabilizing,
and
exceedingly
dangerous.
They
would undermine
cri-
sis
stability
by
increasing
pressure in
a
conflict
to
pre-empt
so
as
to
overwhelm
the
opponent's
defences,
jeopardize
mutual
vulnerability
by
making
an
opponent's
second-strike
less
threatening
(and
a
first-
strike
less
costly
and
more rational),
and
create
enormous
incentives
for
vertical
proliferation.
The United
States
decision
to
withdraw
from
the
Anti-Ballistic
Missile
(ABM)
treaty
and
to
accelerate
the testing
and deployment
of
a
limited,
layered
ballistic
missile
defence system
by
2004
obviously
rais-
es
important
questions
about
the
future
of
strategic
stability
and
the
evolution
of
nuclear deterrence.
Given
Canada's
longstanding
com-
mitment
to
the
nuclear
arms
control, non-proliferation,
and
disarma-
ment
regime
(NACD),
itself
founded on
principles, theories,
and
doc-
trines
developed
throughout
the
cold
war,
the
demise
of
the
treaty
rais-
es
equally
important
questions
for
Canadian
officials
who
remain
exclusively
committed
to
multilateral
arms
control.
How
significant
are
these
decisions?
Do
they
indicate
fundamental
shifts
in
US-Russian
nuclear
doctrine?
Is
the
shift
permanent,
especial-
ly
in
the aftermath
of
the
attacks
on
New
York
and
Washington
on
11
September
2001?
What
are
the
implications
for
the
future
of
strategic
stability?
Are
the
concepts
(mutual
assured
destruction
or
MAD),
theo-
ries
(deterrence),
policies
and
treaties
(ABM)
that
were
the
cornerstones
of
strategic
stability
still
valid
and/or
relevant?
Do
we
need
a
more
com-
plex
approach
to
strategic
stability
and
arms
control
that
acknowledges
1
Colin
S.
Gray,
'The
definitions
and
assumptions
of
deterrence:
questions
of
theory
and
practice,'Journol
of
Strategic
Studies
13(December
199o),
6,13;
Christopher
H.
Achen
and
Duncan
Snidal,
'Rational deterrence
theory
and
comparative
case
stud-
ies,'
World
Politics
41(anuary
1989);
Edward
Rhodes,
'Nuclear
weapons
and
credi-
bility:
deterrence
theory
beyond
rationality,'
Review
of
International
Studies
140anuary
1988).
322
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Spring
2003
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