The German Situation Today
| Date | 01 March 1947 |
| Published date | 01 March 1947 |
| Author | Robert W. Keyserlingk |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070204700200103 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
The
German
Situation Today
Robert
W.
Keyserlingk
G
ermany
as
I
saw
it
in
the
summer
of
1946
is
no
longer
a
state, the
most
one
can
say
is
that it
has
remained
a
people.
It
constitutes
the
most
gigantic
problem
any conquerors have
had
to face,
for
it
is
the
first
modern
experiment
in
the
ancient
practice
of
"unconditional
surrender." Italy
surrendered "un-
conditionally"
after
several
weeks' negotiations
over
conditions
with
Marshall
Badoglio.
Japan
surrendered
on
the
acceptance
of
certain
conditions
regarding
the
preservation
of a
Japanese
government
in
general
and
of
the
Mikado
in
particular.
Neither
of
these
constituted
unconditional
surrender
in
the
strict
sense
of
the
word, and
have
proved
to
be
more
intelligent
solutions
to
date
than the
invitation
to
chaos
which
"unconditional
-surrender"
spells
when
applied
to
modern
states,
especially
to
a
highly
organized
and
industrialized
society
like
the
Reich.
Unconditional
surrender
was
practised
up
to
the
Middle Ages
by
such
conquerors
as
Julius
Caesar,
Kublai and
Ghengiz
Khan,
the
great
Moor
leader,
Abduh-R.-Rahman
I,
or
Suleiman
the
Magnificent.
Then
the
complete
annihilation
of
an
enemy
state
always led
to
its
incorporation into another
military
or
imperial
orbit.
Moreover,
the
conqueror
could
pursue
his
policy
of
post-
war intentions
by
virtue
of
having annihilated
the
armed
forces
of
his
enemy.
While
the
policies
decided upon
at
Casablanca,
Yalta,
and
Teheran
were
by
no
means
new,
ýut
on
the
contrary
found
ample
precedent
in
the
histories
of
Africa and
the
Middle
East,
they
were
characterized
by
two
fundamental
differences.
First,
con-
quered
Germany
was
not included
in
the "imperium"
of
the
conqueror.
Nor
was
any
conqueror
at
liberty
to
decide
how
the
victim's
wealth,
manpower,
and
cultural
heritage
could
best
be
ranged
into
the new
comity
of
peoples.
By
the
very
act
of
victory,
the
defeated became
automatically
the
responsibility
of
the
victor,
the
"arbiter
maximus." But
strife
prevented
there
being
any
"arbiter
maxitnus,"
and for
the
first
time
in
history
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