The heterogeneous repercussions of killing Osama bin Laden on global terrorism patterns
| Author | Daren Fisher,Michael H. Becker |
| Published date | 01 May 2021 |
| Date | 01 May 2021 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1477370819850103 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
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Article
European Journal of Criminology
2021, Vol. 18(3) 301 –324
The heterogeneous
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https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370819850103
DOI: 10.1177/1477370819850103
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Osama bin Laden on global
terrorism patterns
Daren Fisher
The Citadel Military College of South Carolina, USA
Michael H. Becker
University of Maryland, USA
Abstract
The United States has adopted the targeted killing of high-ranking members of terrorist
organizations to disrupt terrorist networks and exert general deterrence. The most salient of
these killings occurred on 2 May 2011, when US Navy Seals killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan.
Although general deterrence suggests this should result in decreased subsequent terrorism, high-
profile targeted killings can also result in increased terrorist violence through backlash. This study
uses dual trajectory analysis to examine the divergent influence that the killing of bin Laden had
on global terrorism trends between November 2007 and May 2014. These analyses reveal that
killing bin Laden did not have the desired deterrent impact on global terrorism or on terrorism
committed by Al Qaeda.
Keywords
Dual trajectory models, general deterrence, Osama bin Laden, targeted killing, terrorism
Introduction
The impact of the September 11 bombings committed by Al Qaeda in the United States
(US) were heralded as a ‘black swan’ terrorism event that qualitatively changed global
terrorism and responses to terrorism (LaFree et al., 2014). These attacks resulted in the
Corresponding author:
Daren Fisher, Department of Criminal Justice, The Citadel Military College of South Carolina,
330 Capers Hall, 2 Lee Avenue, Charleston, SC 29409, USA.
Email: dfisher3@citadel.edu
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European Journal of Criminology 18(3)
deaths of nearly 3000 people, and also led to more than 40 percent of US adults experi-
encing trauma-related symptoms of stress (Schuster et al., 2001). These widespread trau-
matic impacts were often cited within political discourse to justify the creation of
government agencies, increased military expenditure, and a greater policy focus on ter-
rorism worldwide (Daskal and Vladeck, 2014). Scholars and political analysts have also
noted that the response to these events was qualitatively distinct from all previous
responses to terrorism (Fisher et al., 2018). Driven partially by public and political pres-
sure for a decisive counterterrorism response and the desire for retribution (Anker, 2005),
the US use of targeted killings was expanded as a method to eliminate terrorist leaders
and accomplish these goals (Carvin, 2012).
Despite long-standing moral and legal opposition (Blum and Heymann, 2010), this
increased use of targeted killings by the US in response to the September 11 attacks
legally stemmed from Public Law 107-40 or, as it is commonly known, the 2001
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) (Daschle, 2001). Specifically tied to
the September 11 attacks, the AUMF made legal the unilateral use of military force by
the President against individuals, organizations, or nations ‘to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States’ (Daschle, 2001: 1). This policy shift
supported the expanded role of military unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) programs in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Pakistan, and legally permitted the CIA to kill Al Qaeda
militants (Orr, 2011). Targeted killings conducted by drones and other methods emerged
as a prominent tactic for the US and other governments to combat terrorism (Wilner,
2010), often as an alternative to the hazardous and costly deployment of troops (Byman,
2013). For the purposes of this article, targeted killings are the ‘intentional slaying’ of
individual terrorist leaders and facilitators ‘undertaken with explicit governmental
approval’ (Wilner, 2010: 309). As noted by Hepworth (2014), targeted killings are typi-
cally distinct from raids enacted with the explicit goal of capture and interrogation,
which are a high risk high potential reward alternative. These strikes are designed to
decapitate, incapacitate, and otherwise disable the hierarchy of vertically structured
groups by targeting specific individuals in tactical and political leadership positions
within violent extremist organizations (Carson, 2017; Cronin, 2009).
Similar to notable terrorist attacks (LaFree et al., 2014), high-profile targeted killings
are intended to qualitatively impact terrorist conflicts. The targeted killing of high-rank-
ing and influential terrorist leaders may leave an enduring impact by escalating a con-
flict, leaving lasting influences on the legitimacy of sovereign nations, or by providing
salient deterrent messages (Luft, 2003). In the most notable of these strikes, on 2 May
2011, US Navy Seals killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. US President Obama claimed
this as ‘the most significant achievement to date in [the US’s] effort to defeat Al Qaeda’
(Obama, 2011). Although this killing prompted feelings of relief and of fulfilled retribu-
tion among the US public (Mitchell, 2012), the impacts that this killing had on global
terrorism trajectories remains unclear.
Due to the strategic consequences, alongside the questionable legal and moral justifi-
cation for targeted killings, the study of this tactic to reduce future terrorism is among the
top priorities of the study of terrorism and violent extremism. The empirical literature on
this topic has previously been criticized for overgeneralizing findings, leading to claims
that a false consensus has arisen that targeted killings have never been effective (Johnston,
Fisher and Becker
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2004). Since targeted killings may yield divergent impacts for the threats posed by both
individual terrorist organizations and the terrorist threat more generally (Carvin, 2012),
exploring the potential for heterogeneous impacts is of primary concern. Because a sin-
gle targeted killing may simultaneously decrease some terror threats while increasing
others (Carson, 2017) and unexamined heterogeneity can mask counterterrorism impacts
(Fisher and Meitus, 2017), previous null findings from studies examining the impact of
targeted killings on subsequent terrorism may be due to unexamined variation (see Hafez
and Hatfield, 2006). Indeed, recent examinations exploring this potential heterogeneity
have revealed that the targeted killing of high-profile Al Qaeda leaders ‘may have rallied
support for the global jihadist base’ despite the null findings from some quantitative
approaches (Carson, 2017: 213). This study builds upon these studies by focusing on the
‘most infamous’ of these targeted killings (Carson, 2017: 192) – that of Osama bin Laden
– through exploring the repercussions that this killing had on international terrorism
trends between November 2007 and May 2014.
Deterrence and terrorism
For nearly a decade, the US and numerous national partners invested time and huge
resources in the attempt to punish bin Laden for the role he played in the September 11
terrorist attacks. On numerous occasions, US President George W. Bush publicly stated
that, to win the war against terrorism and deter future acts of terrorism, it was necessary
to capture or kill terrorist leaders. As demonstrated in the quote below, the intended pun-
ishments for bin Laden for these attacks were explicitly framed as a ‘message’ to deter
any potential terrorist seeking to attack Americans:
To win this war we must be able to detain, question and, when appropriate, prosecute terrorists
captured here in America, and on the battlefields around the world.
After the 9/11 attacks, our coalition launched operations across the world to remove terrorist
safe havens, and capture or kill terrorist operatives and leaders… We will send a clear message
to those who kill Americans: No longer [sic., matter] how long it takes, we will find you and we
will bring you to justice. (Bush, 2006)
Prominent terrorism scholars including Hoffman (2009) also suggest that, as Al Qaeda
cannot be defeated by military means alone, contending that killing and capturing Al
Qaeda commanders and operatives is required. Cronin (2009) extends this perspective
by noting that any outcomes will depend upon key organizational, personal, and contex-
tual characteristics, reinforcing this claim. Whereas Hoffman (2009) presents a theoreti-
cally inspired rationale for his position and Cronin (2009) draws upon historical
examples, others have drawn entirely upon moral arguments to justify the targeted kill-
ing of terrorists (see Schmitt and Shanker, 2011). With qualitative evidence that targeted
killings may create a cycle of fear within terrorist organizations leading to the execution
of members suspected of being informants (Schmitt and Shanker, 2011), scholars have
resorted to making non-empirically based inferences in suggesting ‘something more than
correlation was at work here’ (Byman, 2006: 103). Consequently, although there is justi-
fication for the continued use of targeted killings to alter terrorist organizational
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European Journal of Criminology 18(3)
structures, there is doubt as to whether the killing of any individual terrorist could influ-
ence the decisions of other terrorists through deterrence.
Before reviewing the direct empirical literature...
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