The historical approach and the ‘war of ethics within the ethics of war’
| DOI | 10.1177/1755088218786306 |
| Published date | 01 October 2018 |
| Date | 01 October 2018 |
| Author | Christian Nikolaus Braun |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1755088218786306
Journal of International Political Theory
2018, Vol. 14(3) 349 –366
© The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/1755088218786306
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The historical approach
and the ‘war of ethics
within the ethics of war’
Christian Nikolaus Braun
University of Durham, UK
Abstract
Contemporary just war thinking has mostly been split into two competing camps,
namely, Michael Walzer’s approach and its revisionist critics. While Walzerians employ
a casuistical method, most revisionists resort to analytical philosophy’s reflective
equilibrium. Importantly, besides employing different methods, the two sides also
disagree on substantive issues. This article focuses on one such issue, the moral equality
of combatants, arguing that while a methodological reconciliation between the two
camps is impossible, contemporary debate would benefit from a ‘third-way’ approach.
Presenting James Turner Johnson’s historical method as such an approach, the article
suggests that while revisionists are correct in considering the symmetry thesis as
ethically indefensible, in order to arrive at this judgement, it is not necessary to employ
far-fetched thought experiments and the use of historical cases is preferable. The root
cause of Walzer’s problematic reasoning vis-à-vis the symmetry thesis, the historical
approach reveals, is his uneasy relationship with the just war tradition. Contributing to
a deeper understanding of the respective approaches’ differences, the article seeks to
move the focus of contemporary just war away from a narrow intra-disciplinary divide
and towards an engagement with substantive questions.
Keywords
Historical just war, James Turner Johnson, just war method, moral equality of
combatants, revisionist just war, Walzerian just war
Introduction
Contemporary just war debate has mostly been split into two competing camps, namely,
Michael Walzer’s approach and its revisionist critics in which both sides disagree on both
Corresponding author:
Christian Nikolaus Braun, School of Government and International Affairs, University of Durham, Al-Qasimi
Building, Elvet Hill Road, Durham DH1 3TU, UK.
Email: christian.n.braun@durham.ac.uk
786306IPT0010.1177/1755088218786306Journal of International Political TheoryBraun
research-article2018
Article
350 Journal of International Political Theory 14(3)
substance and method. The Walzerian or ‘traditional’1 just war pursues an ethics of war
which is state-based and collectivist whereas revisionists reject this foundation, arguing
instead from a position they refer to as reductive individualism. While the former camp
employs a casuistical approach (Walzer, 2015: xxii), the latter takes pride in belonging to
the school of analytical philosophy. As casuists, Walzerians reason from real-world
events while most revisionists prefer to elaborate on other-worldly thought experiments.2
One consequence of their very different methods is that the two camps hardly engage
with each other’s work. A narrow intra-disciplinary divide has emerged and debate has
become ‘confusingly polarized’ (Clark, 2017: 331), leading to the impression of a ‘war
of ethics within the ethics of war’ (Vaha, 2013: 183). While some scholars have attempted
to start an exchange between the two camps, these efforts have largely been met with
indifferent silence.3 This article argues that just war debate, due to the two camps’ funda-
mental methodological disagreements, will continue to be split and any attempt of bring-
ing the two together on methodological grounds must fail. This conclusion derives not so
much from doubtlessly existing academic egos, but more so from the analytical camps’
search for moral truth which requires abstraction and thus has little to no place for the
messy circumstances of real-world employments of force. Arriving at this conclusion,
however, does not mean that just war thinkers should built an intellectual fire protection
wall which prevents the other side’s substantive thought from spreading. This article sug-
gests that contemporary just war thinking would benefit from a ‘third-way’ approach
whose method parts with both Walzerians and revisionists. Employing the historical
approach of James Turner Johnson, the article seeks to illuminate one of the fiercest bat-
tles in the ‘war of ethics’, namely, debate over the moral equality of combatants which
Walzerians defend and revisionists reject. Reflecting on the moral symmetry thesis by
using Johnson’s method, it turns out that, while revisionists are correct that there cannot
be a moral equality between just and unjust combatants, in order to arrive at this judge-
ment, it is not necessary to rely on artificial thought experiments.
Proceeding in a straightforward manner, this article starts with a basic overview of the
‘war of ethics’. Beginning with a presentation of Walzer’s casuistical method, it will be
argued that Walzer, while considering historical cases, does not vigorously engage the
just war tradition. Instead of pointing out how his argument fits in with the development
of just war, Walzer starts from the legalist paradigm which itself is the result of numerous
‘renegotiations’ (O’Driscoll, 2008b) of just war thinking. This section is followed by a
presentation of the method his revisionist critics employ. Providing an impression of the
‘war’ between Walzer and his critics, Walzer’s passionate response to revisionists will be
discussed thereafter. Due to the distinctiveness of their respective approaches, the argu-
ment will be put forward that a methodological reconciliation between Walzerians and
analytical just war thinkers is impossible. The ‘the moral equality of combatants’ section
provides an illustration of the disagreement between Walzerians and revisionists by
introducing the debate about the symmetry thesis. In order to demonstrate that this debate
is far from being settled, Walzer’s recent case for considering Islamist terrorists the legal
and, following his reasoning, moral equals, too, of US soldiers will be discussed. The
following section compares the contemporary just war thinking of both Walzer and his
critics with the historical mode of just war reasoning as represented in Johnson’s work.
It will be pointed out that Johnson’s method, like Walzer’s, casuistically investigates
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