The Ideal of Uptake in Democratic Deliberation

DOI10.1177/0032321719858270
AuthorMary F Scudder
Date01 May 2020
Published date01 May 2020
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719858270
Political Studies
2020, Vol. 68(2) 504 –522
© The Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0032321719858270
journals.sagepub.com/home/psx
The Ideal of Uptake in
Democratic Deliberation
Mary F Scudder
Abstract
This article explores the concept of deliberative uptake, which I define as the fair consideration
of the arguments, stories, and perspectives that citizens share in deliberation. Reinterpreting the
democratic force of deliberation, I argue that it comes in large part from uptake, rather than
inclusion or influence. As I show, however, citizens often struggle to take up what others have to
say, especially those with whom they disagree. These issues of what I call limited uptake undermine
democratic possibilities in pluralistic societies, but are not adequately captured in discussions
about how to enhance the democratic quality of deliberation. In addition to expanding inclusion,
we must find ways to broaden the enactment of deliberative uptake. After explaining the nature
and significance of fair consideration, I present strategies for improving and assessing deliberative
uptake and address the risks of taking up undemocratic inputs.
Keywords
deliberation, uptake, listening, inclusion, difference
Accepted: 24 May 2019
Introduction
This article explores the concept of deliberative uptake. By uptake I mean the fair consid-
eration of the arguments, stories, and perspectives that particular citizens share in delib-
eration. In what follows, I reinterpret the democratic force of deliberation, showing that it
comes in large part from the uptake of participants’ inputs. Efforts to democratize delib-
eration must go beyond inclusion to consider the extent to which citizens’ perspectives
are actually taken up by others. After inclusion, it is uptake that ensures citizens have a
say in the laws to which they are held.
The concept of uptake, however, has been undertheorized by both deliberative demo-
crats and their critics. Borrowing the term “securing uptake” from Austin’s (1962) speech
act theory, James Bohman (1996: 58) introduced the term to deliberative democratic
Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA
Corresponding author:
Mary F Scudder, Purdue University, Beering Hall 2299, 100 North University Street, West Lafayette, IN
47907-4161, USA.
Email: scudder@purdue.edu
858270PCX0010.1177/0032321719858270Political StudiesScudder
research-article2019
Article
Scudder 505
theory as a measure of “the success of dialogue.” Bohman’s (1996: 58–66, 116–118) brief
but valuable treatment is still the most significant analysis on the subject to date. Iris
Young (2000: 25) also mentions the concept, defining it as “when someone speaks [and]
others acknowledge the expression in ways that continue the engagement.” Although
these two accounts have shed initial light on this aspect of the deliberative terrain, neither
provides adequate elucidation of the distinctive significance that uptake has for delibera-
tive democratic theory.
Furthermore, while others have recognized the need for something like uptake in
deliberation, for the most part they have stopped short of giving it pride of place in their
accounts of the normative power of deliberation. For example, deliberative democrats
have long identified the importance of mutual respect among participants as well as the
need for citizens “to be flexible and open enough to undertake a genuine evaluation of
[others’] opinions” (Chambers, 1996: 100; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996: 79). More
often than not, however, these references to something like uptake or fair consideration
(I use these terms interchangeably) are presented as background conditions or underlying
assumptions of deliberative democratic theory. Uptake, however, is more than a back-
ground condition. Similar to the claims others have made in regard to inclusion, I contend
that uptake is “not simply an ethic added to democratic deliberation,” but a “central ele-
ment of what makes deliberative democratic processes democratic” (Mansbridge et al.,
2012: 12). Uptake gets at the normative core of meaningfully democratic deliberation.
Further treatment of uptake is warranted not only because of the significant normative
weight it carries, but also because of the difficulty we have achieving it. The difficulty we
have really considering what others have to say, especially those with whom we disagree,
undermines democratic possibilities in large, complex, and diverse societies. Moreover,
these issues of what I will call limited uptake are not typically captured in discussions
about exclusion, nor are they adequately corrected by efforts to expand inclusion. To date,
deliberativists seeking to address concerns of exclusion have focused on expanding
access to deliberative fora and increasing opportunities for participation in public spheres.
But as we succeed in broadening the diversity of voices included in a deliberative system,
we nevertheless must also confront the challenge of uptake: ensuring these voices are
actually heard and ultimately considered.
Take, for example, the Black Lives Matter movement, which has used its collective
“voice” to protest racial injustice in the United States and resist an unequal status quo. Of
particular concern to this movement is the impunity with which police officers use lethal
force against Black Americans. As the movement gained attention in popular discourses,
however, certain dominant segments of society, including many White middle-class
American citizens and political elites, responded by insisting “all lives matter.” This retort,
essentially a non-sequitur, reveals an ungenerous reading of the movement. Here, the actual
arguments and grievances voiced by Black Americans are ignored or else misunderstood
and, as a result, their experiences are rendered invisible and their voices inaudible. Whether
disingenuous or not, this response to the Black Lives Matter movement shows the limita-
tions of democratic deliberation and political action when others do not conscientiously
engage with a group’s claims. If inclusive deliberation is to have a meaningfully democratic
impact, we must search for ways to broaden the enactment of deliberative uptake.
Critics of deliberative democracy, often referred to as “difference democrats,” have
consistently contended that certain features of democratic deliberation make it ill-suited
for achieving democracy in contexts of deep difference.1 The difficulty we have securing
uptake across difference would seem only to confirm these charges. As I will show,

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT