The impact of criminal prosecutions during intrastate conflict
| Author | Geoff Dancy,Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343317732614 |
| Published date | 01 January 2018 |
| Date | 01 January 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
The impact of criminal prosecutions during
intrastate conflict
Geoff Dancy
Department of Political Science, Tulane University
Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm
School of Public Affairs, University of Arkansas at Little Rock
Abstract
The International Criminal Court’s interventions have prompted debate about the wisdom of criminally prosecuting
combatants while attempting to build peace in conflict-ridden societies. Previous research fails to distinguish between
different types of trials. Using a large-N dataset of three types of criminal trials undertaken during internal conflict –
domestic security trials of rebels, domestic human rights trials of state agents, and international war crimes trials of
both – this article tests a theory of the compellent effect of criminal prosecution on conflict termination. We find
that, even when accounting for endogeneity, rebel trials are associated with a higher probability of conflict termina-
tion, while trials of state agents are weakly associated with conflict persistence. We argue that the former compel the
opposition to discontinue fighting, while the latter signal to rebels a lack of government resolve. We also find that the
effect of international trials, which at times appear weakly associated with conflict termination, is endogenous to
international intervention more generally.
Keywords
civil war termination, criminal prosecution, human rights, transitional justice
Introduction
In Colombia, where the International Criminal Court
(ICC) has conducted a years-long preliminary examina-
tion, negotiations between the government and the rebel
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) hinge
on how to address human rights violations committed by
all sides during 50 years of war. Activists demand that
perpetrators be held criminally accountable, while for-
mer combatants hope to avoid trials. Faced with this
dilemma, policymakers have pondered how the prospect
of criminal justice affects peace settlements.
1
Do
criminal prosecutions of armed combatants during vio-
lent intrastate conflict help bring about the end of fight-
ing? This question was once relegated to the fringes of
transitional justice discussions, which focused on the
consequences of prosecutions after political transitions.
However, the issue of justice in the midst of armed
conflict has come to the forefront with the ICC’s
repeated interventions into active conflict zones in coun-
tries such as Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), Sudan, and Libya.
Academics and policymakers debate the alleged pacify-
ing effect of criminal prosecution. Rationalists expect sol-
diers to respondto criminal indictments or arrestorders by
digging in their heels and fighting even harder, in order to
avoid the risk of a lengthy prison stint (Vinjamuri &
Snyder, 2015). By contrast, norms theorists argue that
Corresponding author:
gdancy@tulane.edu
1
At the time of writing, the government and FARC have agreed on
limited criminal accou ntability for both side s. See Julian Palmer,
‘Applauding the Ceasefire between the FARC and Colombian
Authorities and Looking to the Challenges Ahead’. Council on
Hemispheric Affairs, 15 July 2016 (http://www.coha.org/
applauding-the-ceasefire-between-the-farc-and-colombian-
authorities-and-looking-to-the-challenges-ahead/#_ftn22, accessed
28 July 2016).
Journal of Peace Research
2018, Vol. 55(1) 47–61
ªThe Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343317732614
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