The Impact of UN Sanctions and Their Panels of Experts
| Author | Tom Cargill,Alex Vines |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070201006500104 |
| Published date | 01 March 2010 |
| Date | 01 March 2010 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
The impact of UN
sanctions and their
panels of experts
Sierra Leone and Liberia
Sanctions applied against Sierra Leone and Liberia by the UN security council
are phased and have fared differently. UN sanctions were first imposed on
Sierra Leone in 1997 and on Liberia in 1992 and were mostly symbolic
in nature. This changed in 2000 through proactive monitoring by expert
panels—individuals hired by the UN as consultants for a limited time to
provide advice and counsel to the appropriate sanctions committee. Experts
dedicated to the Sierra Leone and Liberian sanctions regimes played an
important role in improving the implementation of the sanctions, and, in the
case of the panel for Sierra Leone, provoked a new sanctions regime against
Liberia. Indeed, the Liberia sanctions regime represented the first time the
council applied sanctions against a state for interference and support of
rebels in another. Arguably, had it not been for the compelling information
Alex Vines is director of regional and security studies at Chatham House and a part-time
lecturer at the school of international studies and social sciences of Coventry University.
Tom Cargill is the assistant head of Chatham House’s Africa program. This chapter
expands on part of a report written for Chatham House on the effectiveness of panels of
experts in Africa, and the authors are grateful to one of the contributors to that report, E.J.
Hoogendorn, for his contributions.
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| Alex Vines and Tom Cargill |
provided by the Sierra Leonean panel of experts, sanctions against Liberia for
interference in Sierra Leone would not have been changed as dramatically
as they were—from an arms embargo only to a series of targeted measures
aimed at disrupting the funding and travel of the president of Liberia and
his supporters.
This article outlines the events that led to the application of sanctions
by the security council, assesses the contribution of panel experts to the
stabilization of the conflicts, and outlines the reasons for their diminished
utility over the life of the sanctions regimes. The article also highlights
that sanctions regimes have different phases and that their impact can
vary over time. This is influenced by politics but also by the priorities and
professionalism of the individuals appointed to UN expert groups and the
support provided by the relevant UN peacekeeping operation.
SIERRA LEONE
In 1996, under heavy domestic and international pressure, democratic
elections took place for the first time since 1967 in Sierra Leone, leading to
the election of a former UN official and leader of the Sierra Leone People’s
Party, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. On 30 November 1996, Kabbah signed the
Abidjan peace agreement with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which
had been attempting to overthrow successive governments since March
1991. The Sierra Leone army was increasingly resentful of the power it had
lost, however. Led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who was awaiting trial
for a coup attempt in 1996, military members—many from the Republic of
Sierra Leone military forces—loyal to him and backed by members of the
RUF, joined forces. On 25 May 1997 a coup attempt was successful, placing
Koroma and his new government, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(AFRC), at the helm. The economic community of west African states‘
(ECOWAS) military arm—ECOMOG (mainly Nigerian soldiers)—had been
on the ground since the early 1990s trying to keep the peace, but, in essence,
had been fighting for the now-exiled Kabbah government. It was from this
point that international and regional sanctions played a role in the conflict.1
1 This study does not analyze the impact on Sierra Leone of the arms embargo on
Liberia (pursuant to S/RES/788 adopted in 1992), a principal source of support for
the RUF.
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| The impact of UN sanctions and their panels of experts |
THE ROLE OF SANCTIONS IN THE 1997 COUP AND AFTERMATH
In response to the May 1997 coup, ECOWAS imposed a “general and total”
arms embargo against Sierra Leone, as well as a prohibition on the supply
of petroleum products and a travel ban on members of the military junta.2
ECOWAS appealed to the security council throughout June, July, and August
of 1997 to apply sanctions as well.3 The council agreed and adopted its first
resolution on the situation, 1132, in October 1997. Because of the continuing
violence and growing humanitarian crisis, the council declared that the
situation constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region
and invoked chapter VII. The initial objectives of the council were for the
military junta to relinquish power and restore democracy to Sierra Leone.
To this end, targeted travel and petroleum sanctions were imposed, along
with an arms embargo. The targeted travel sanctions applied to members of
the military junta and adult members of their family, unless the travel was
for verified humanitarian reasons. The petroleum ban required all states
to stop the supply to Sierra Leone of petroleum and petroleum products,
although the government of Sierra Leone and the UN were exempt. The
arms embargo applied to all of Sierra Leone. The council created a sanctions
committee and requested that ECOMOG, which had been in place since
the early 1990s, report to the Sierra Leone sanctions committee on any
sanctions-busting activity.
In paragraph 14 of resolution 1132, the council specifically requested
that all concerned, including ECOWAS, the UN, and other international
humanitarian agencies, “establish appropriate arrangements for the
provision of humanitarian assistance and to endeavour to ensure that such
assistance responds to local needs and is safely delivered to, and used by, its
intended recipients.” This, however, ran counter to ECOWAS’s sanctions
regime that explicitly ordered “member States to abstain from shipping and
delivering humanitarian goods to the illegal regime,” except with the prior
approval of ECOWAS, a situation that created tension between ECOWAS
and the security council and for ECOMOG on the ground.
2 The embargo applied to all of Sierra Leone, technically including the government-in-
exile it was trying to assist.
3 S/1997/499, 26 June 1997; S/1997/646, 30 July 1997; S/1997/695, 29 August 1997.
| International Journal | Winter 2009-10 | 47 |
| Alex Vines and Tom Cargill |
By October 1997 there were UN sanctions on weapons, petroleum
products, and travel, and ECOWAS sanctions on weapons, petroleum
products, travel, all business, and (effectively) humanitarian aid. In addition,
NGOs began restricting the provision of humanitarian aid because of severe
budget constraints resulting from a reduction in donations linked to the
various sanctions and because there was confusion about whether or not aid
would be allowed into the countries as an exception to the ECOWAS and/
or UN sanctions. Indeed, the diminished aid was viewed by many in the
country as another form of sanctions.
There was, understandably, much confusion about the role of the
sanctions and decreased aid. The reasons for the imposition of the three de
facto sanctions regimes were very different. The mandate of the operations
on the ground also needs to be considered. The security council explicitly
relied upon ECOMOG to enforce the sanctions it authorized. Because
ECOMOG was based in the capital, Freetown, and because ECOMOG
was mandated to enforce the UN sanctions in addition to monitoring the
security situation for ECOWAS, what should have been very clear differences
between the sanctions and on the issue of humanitarian aid became blurred
and confused.
In October 1997, just 15 days after the UN had imposed sanctions, the
AFRC signed the Conakry agreement, providing for a transfer of power to
Kabbah by April 1998. This too has been attributed to impact of the UN
sanctions. However, the agreement was a result of negotiations that had taken
place, with breaks, since the coup. It is likely that UN sanctions encouraged
the AFRC to negotiate, but former AFRC figures have argued that it was so
distracted by internal and regional crises that the UN was not a significant
factor. ECOWAS, which after all was the “front end” of UN sanctions, was
of much higher concern. Kabbah was returned to power and the AFRC-RUF
junta removed in early 1998. This too has often been touted as a victory for
UN sanctions, a claim that needs to be treated with some caution given that
the AFRC-RUF junta was in fact removed from Freetown by an ECOMOG
military assault for failing to honour the Conakry agreement. The question,
then, is whether sanctions played a role in weakening the AFRC and will be
addressed more fully below.
THE RETREAT AND REINVIGORATION OF SANCTIONS: 1997-2000
Following the restoration of the Kabbah government in 1998, the UN
removed sanctions imposed on Sierra Leone as a whole and reimposed the
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| The impact of UN sanctions and their panels of experts |
arms and travel ban on nongovernmental forces by resolution 1171 on 5 June
1998.
Despite these bans, and because the government of Sierra Leone lacked
a credible army, the RUF and its AFRC allies steadily tightened their grip
throughout Sierra Leone. Their efforts were bolstered by support from
Charles Taylor, the president of Liberia, who was the principal customer for
diamonds mined by the RUF...
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