The Impact of Suppliers’ Adoption of Voluntary Labour Codes/Certifications on Job Quality in Global Supply Chains: The Sri Lankan Case of Garments without Guilt
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12538 |
| Date | 01 December 2020 |
| Author | Mevan Jayasinghe,Larry W. (Chip) Hunter |
| Published date | 01 December 2020 |
British Journal of Industrial Relations doi: 10.1111/bjir.12538
58:4 December 2020 0007–1080 pp. 844–873
The Impact of Suppliers’ Adoption of
Voluntary Labour Codes/Certifications
on Job Quality in Global Supply Chains:
The Sri Lankan Case of Garments
without Guilt
Mevan Jayasinghe and Larry W. (Chip) Hunter
Abstract
Codes of conduct and certifications on labour standards are designed to
distinguish export manufacturing suppliers oering higher quality jobs from
those oering poor quality jobs. However, previous research suggests that such
codes/certifications have a limited impact on job quality. These studies do not
dierentiate between ‘compliance-based codes of conduct’ that retailers enforce
on suppliers and ‘voluntary labour codes/certifications’ that suppliers adopt at
their discretion. We examine the relationship between suppliers’ adoption of
the Garments without Guilt (GwG) voluntary labour code/certification and
job quality using fieldwork and longitudinal data on Sri Lankan export apparel
suppliers. We find that GwG adoption is associated with higher base pay and
safer work, while base pay is lower for GwG adopters that are simultaneously
subject to retailers’ enforcement of compliance-based codes.
1. Introduction
Do codes and certifications that define standards for labour actually improve
workers’ well-being in global supply chains? Although codes, such as Nike’s
‘supplier code of conduct’ and the Fair Labor Association’s (FLA) code,
typically require new work practices and investments that are subject to
inspection and certification by the retailer or their agents, previous research
suggests that such codes of conduct (CoCs) are associated with ‘only modest
and uneven improvements in working conditions and labor rights’ (Locke
et al. 2009: 319). Studies across multiple industries have found evidence of
‘high rates of non-compliance’ with CoCs enforced by retailers (Bartley and
Mevan Jayasinghe is at Michigan State University. Larry W. (Chip) Hunter is at Washington
State University.
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2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Voluntary Labour Codes/Certifications and Job Quality 845
Eges-Zanden 2016: 232). In an illustration of this ineectiveness,after several
years of Apple Inc.’s enforcement of the FLA code, more than 60 per cent of
workers employedby Apple’s largest supplier receivedpay insucient to meet
basic needs (Fair Labor Association (FLA) 2012).
Nearly, all prior studies considering the eects of CoCs have focused
on suppliers’ compliance with codes as ‘the principal way both global
corporations and labor-rights nongovernmental organizations seek to
remediate poor working conditions in global supply chain factories’ (Locke
et al. 2009: 320). This ‘compliance-based’ model focuses on the roleof retailers
in enforcing minimum International Labor Organization (ILO) standards
(Mayer and Gere 2010; O’Rourke 2003; Vogel 2008). Recent work shows,
however, that the same retailers that enforce compliance-based CoCs on
suppliers also undermine standards through price and lead time pressures
(Anner 2018; Bartley and Egels-Zanden 2016).
In light of this experience, scholars and practitioners have suggested
that sustainable improvements in working conditions may rest on suppliers’
voluntary commitments rather than the imposition of CoCs on suppliers by
retailers (Barrientos and Smith 2006; Locke et al. 2009). A ‘voluntary labour
code/certification’ (VLCC), for example, codifies a system of principles on
labour standards,including the fair payment of wages and provision of safety,
within a certification that is designed to be adopted by suppliers at their
own discretion through independent verification of their working conditions
(Jayasinghe 2016). We develop this idea conceptually and empirically,
describing a case of suppliers’ adoption of a VLCC and examining its
relationship with job quality. Our case study, set in Sri Lanka, suggests
a dierent path for improving job quality that broadens the range of
discretionary policy options for suppliers. We investigate the extent to
which suppliers’ adoption of a VLCC is associated with higher job quality,
and consider whether the VLCC adoption–job quality relationship diers
for suppliers that are simultaneously subject to retailers’ enforcement of
compliance-based CoCs.
We examine Garments without Guilt (GwG), the only VLCC in the Sri
Lankan apparel industry at the time of our study. We draw on original field
research, including interviews and primary quantitative data from a sample
of export apparel manufacturing plants in Sri Lanka that covers 39 per cent
of the population of that country’s export apparel plants. Our case study
investigates the eectiveness of VLCCs in increasing base pay and safety
for workers in the global supply chain, with the implication that research
on labour standards, global supply chains and private regulation should
be expanded to distinguish clearly between suppliers’ use of voluntary and
compliance-based codes/certifications.
2. Retailer-Enforced Compliance-Based CoCs: What do we know?
In the late 20th century, as developing economies competed for foreign
investment, national labour laws and the power of organized labour
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2020 John Wiley& Sons Ltd.
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