The Impact of the ECOWAS Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy
| Author | Frederick Cowell |
| Published date | 01 September 2011 |
| Pages | 331-342 |
| DOI | 10.3366/ajicl.2011.0015 |
| Date | 01 September 2011 |
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has attempted, via a process of constitutional convergence, to develop a series of norms that will entrench good governance and democracy in its member states. The Protocol mandating this process has in practice been better at preventing coups d’état and the illegal overthrow of governments than it has been at fostering a culture of good governance. This paper analyses the substantive law of the ECOWAS Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy and some of the cases in which it has been deployed.
Out of the fifteen states in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) only two have never been subject to a military coup or an unconstitutional change of government. During the 1980s military coups in Ghana and Nigeria led to ECOWAS being dominated by increasingly authoritarian governments, and in the 1990s the eruption of decade-long civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone saw numerous coups and counter-coups.
ECOWAS adopted the 2001 Democracy and Good Governance Protocol (the Protocol) in an attempt to deter and prevent military coups and unconstitutional changes of government. The Protocol contains a ‘trigger mechanism’ that automatically suspends states from ECOWAS in the event of an unconstitutional change of government and contains numerous provisions relating to electoral law and constitutional transfers of government. The Protocol is similar to African Union (AU) mechanisms which prohibit coups and unconstitutional changes of government.
See African Union,
ECOWAS was originally envisaged as a Regional Economic Community (REC) but due to both external and internal pressures it began to adopt a common security policy. In 1978 ECOWAS adopted a protocol prohibiting aggression between member states and prioritising the peaceful settlement of disputes. This imposed no positive duties upon member states and complemented existing principles within the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) charter. The 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence went further by creating a legal regime that would trigger armed intervention by an ECOWAS force against a member state in some limited circumstances.
A. Adedeji, ‘ECOWAS: A Retrospective Journey’, in A. Adebajo and I. O. D. Rashid (eds),
The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) sent troops into Liberia to assist the Interim Government of National Unity in 1990, and into Sierra Leone in 1998 to assist the government of President Kabbah which had been deposed in a coup. The 1999 Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution put ECOMOG on a permanent footing and expanded its functions to allow it to conduct more complex peacekeeping missions. Technically this conflicted with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as by creating powers of intervention, it went beyond a self-defence mechanism. Given the indifference from the UN and the international community towards West African wars in the 1990s and the reliance on regional peacekeeping, it was argued that there had been a failure of the UN's self-assumed protection mandate necessitating involvement by another actor.
A. Abass,
A. Abass, ‘The New Collective Security Mechanism of ECOWAS: Innovations and Problems’, 5(2)
The Protocol was signed at the 25th Conference of Heads of State and Government in Dakar in 2001.
‘ECOWAS’ Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance’, Presentation to the Sahel and West Africa Club, Presentation Note available at
The specificity of these provisions reflects the various tactics that regimes have used to circumnavigate domestic constitutions. The Protocol also mandates ECOWAS election monitoring missions and mutual cooperation and support in elections. Some of the Protocol's provisions were adopted before its ratification and election-monitoring teams were used in Togo and Guinea-Bissau, and some states even implemented its provisions in domestic legislation.
M. Diallo, ‘The ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol and Defence and Security Forces Relationships to Political Power’,
The Protocol is unambiguous as to its stated purpose of mandating ‘constitutional convergence’, indicating that states agreed in the drafting process that domestic law should aim towards harmonisation on matters of succession.
Article 1(b).
Additionally the Protocol clearly states that there shall be ‘zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means’.Article 1(c).
1993 Revised ECOWAS Treaty articles 3(2)c and 4(c).
K. S. A. Ebeku, ‘The Succession of Faure Gnassingbe to the Togolese Presidency: An International Law Perspective’, 30
This conceptually legitimates ECOWAS's actions when applying the Protocol's coercive measures as member states are not only in violation of community law, a pre-requisite of ECOWAS membership, but are also failing to adhere to their own domestic law. The structure of ECOWAS security law entails that member states implicitly acknowledge that in some security areas their sovereignty is seceded to the wider community and that their internal security is a matter of common interest.
See A. M. S. Bah, ‘West Africa: From a...
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