The impartiality of Smith’s spectator: The problem of parochialism and the possibility of social critique
| Date | 01 April 2018 |
| Published date | 01 April 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885115572921 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of Political Theory
2018, Vol. 17(2) 174–193
!The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885115572921
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Article
The impartiality of Smith’s
spectator: The problem of
parochialism and the
possibility of social critique
David Golemboski
Georgetown University, USA
Abstract
Amartya Sen has argued that contractarian theories of justice inevitably fall victim to the
problem of parochialism, for the reason that they rely on a problematically narrow
conception of impartiality. Sen finds a corrective model of impartiality in Adam Smith’s
figure of the impartial spectator. In this essay, I argue that Sen’s invocation of the spec-
tator to resolve the problem of parochialism is unfounded, as the impartial spectator is
fundamentally a product of socialization that serves to propagate conventional moral
norms. I consider various interpretive avenues for ‘‘rescuing’’ the spectator from paro-
chialism, and ultimately conclude that a minor amendment to Smith’s account, resting
on the possibility of a conscience informed by moral pluralism, is required.
Keywords
Adam Smith, impartial spectator, impartiality, parochialism, Amartya Sen
Amartya Sen (2002, 2009: 124–152) has argued that contractarian theories of
justice, including Rawls’s ‘‘justice as fairness,’’ lack the conceptual resources to
ground critiques of local conventions. They inevitably fall victim to the problem
of parochialism, he suggests. The problem, on Sen’s view, is that these theories rely
on a conception of impartiality whose scope is insufficiently broad. The impartiality
modeled in the original position, for example, successfully mitigates the personal
biases that burden the moral judgment of individual persons, but it fails to trans-
cend the assumptions and norms that persons internalize as a product of their
social/cultural/political context. A corrective account of impartiality, according
to Sen, is found in Adam Smith’s imaginary figure of the impartial spectator.
The centerpiece of Smith’s moral theory, the impartial spectator supplies a
Corresponding author:
David Golemboski, Georgetown University, 37th & O Sts. NW ICC 681, Washington, DC 20020, USA.
Email: dg379@georgetown.edu
disinterested perspective from which to judge an agent’s actions.
1
On Sen’s reading,
the impartiality of Smith’s spectator is preferable to that of Rawls’s original posi-
tion because is not bound by convention. It models an ‘‘open’’ conception of
impartiality, in his terminology, rather than a ‘‘closed’’ one, such as Rawls’s.
In this essay, I concede that Sen’s critique of parochialism in social contract
theory is convincing, but argue that his invocation of Smith’s impartial spectator as
a superior alternative to less thorough conceptions of impartiality is unfounded.
That the impartial spectator is capable of transcending the biases embedded in a
cultural context is by no means apparent, as a close reading of Smith’s Theory of
Moral Sentiments will show. In fact, as I will ultimately argue, the impartial spec-
tator is essentially a projection of socially-acquired moral sensitivities—and is thus
unable to provide a perspective from which to question or critique those sensitiv-
ities. It too is bound by parochialism. This conclusion is of particular importance
for political theory, insofar as ‘‘closed’’ impartiality is of limited use in assessing the
rightness or wrongness of alternative political structures. However, as I will argue,
a slight amendment to Smith’s account can resolve his problem of parochialism for
the impartial spectator.
This paper proceeds in five sections. First, I overview Smith’s theory of morality
and the role of the impartial spectator within it. The second section introduces the
problem of parochialism and Sen’s critique of impartiality in Rawls’s theory of
justice. In the third, I consider the interpretation, advanced by Sen and others, of
Smith’s spectator as modeling ‘‘open’’ impartiality. In the fourth section, however,
I rebut that interpretation, defending instead a ‘‘closed’’ interpretation of the spec-
tator’s impartiality. In the fifth section, I consider three responses to the parochi-
alism of Smith’s spectator that may redeem its significance for political theory. The
first two of these responses are interpretive approaches that frame how the impar-
tial spectator may serve as a political–theoretical resource in spite of the constraints
on its impartiality imposed by convention. I ultimately reject these as inadequate,
but as a third response, I propose a constructive amendment to Smith’s character-
ization of the spectator by which it could overcome the problem of parochialism.
The impartial spectator in Smith’s moral theory
The foundation of Smith’s moral theory is not impartiality, but rather sympathy.
2
Sympathy has to do with a person’s feeling of concern for the well-being of
another. The emphasis on feeling distinguishes sympathy from mere other-
regard. Sympathy involves what Smith calls ‘‘fellow-feeling.’’ When a person
takes note of another’s feelings, she will often ‘‘feel something which, though
weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them’’ (14). This occurs not through
some immediate sharing, but rather by a function of the imagination. When we
observe another person who is caught up in some particular emotion or sensation,
we tend to imagine ourselves in his or her situation, and thereby acquire a sense of
what the other is feeling. Smith affirms that it is impossible to access the sensations
of another directly, but by means of imagination one can ‘‘enter as it were into
[another’s] body, and become in some measure the same person with him’’ (13–14).
Golemboski 175
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