The implications of Brexit for the governance of telecommunications markets in the United Kingdom
| Pages | 2-20 |
| Date | 09 January 2017 |
| Published date | 09 January 2017 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/DPRG-07-2016-0036 |
| Author | Ewan Sutherland |
| Subject Matter | Information & knowledge management,Information management & governance,Information policy |
The implications of Brexit for the
governance of telecommunications
markets in the United Kingdom
Ewan Sutherland
Ewan Sutherland is
Visiting Adjunct Professor
at LINK Centre, University
of the Witwatersrand,
Braamfontein,
South Africa.
Abstract
Purpose –This paper aims to analyse the implication of the exit of the UK from the European Union
(a.k.a. Brexit).
Design/methodology/approach –This paper analyses the options for the UK and the freedom this
creates for the government to design its system of governance for the telecommunications and related
economic sectors.
Findings –Brexit, other than the Norway Option or membership of the European Economic Area,
allows the UK Government considerable freedom to reshape its system of governance for
telecommunications. The strongest influence in such a redesign would be vested commercial interests,
with the risk of subsequent underperformance and insufficient rigour.
Research limitations/implications –Events have moved relatively quickly, yet the outcome of the
negotiations remains difficult to predict, beyond broad scenarios.
Social implications –There will be a need for greater involvement of consumers and business users
in the process of recasting the regulatory governance system if it is not to be for the benefit of vested
interests.
Originality/value –This is the first substantive analysis of Brexit for the telecommunications sector.
Keywords United Kingdom, European Union, Telecommunications industry, Governance,
International mobile roaming, Single market
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
The results of the UK referendum on membership of the European Union (EU) held on 23
June 2016 came as a shock, not least to many who had voted for Brexit (Hobolt, 2016). It
was immediately followed by the realisation that the winning side was backtracking on
promises of increased expenditure on the National Health Service (NHS) and curtailed
immigration, and had been cavalier in its total absence of planning. Dougan (2016) called
the Brexiteers “dishonest” and “criminally irresponsible”, whereas the Advertising
Standards Authority merely noted that political communications were not covered by its
codes, that otherwise require honesty and truthfulness (ASA, 2016;White and Johnston,
2016). There was no coherent view of what Brexit meant (Table I), how long it might take,
what was to be negotiated under the poorly drafted Article 50 TEU (Treaty on the European
Union)(Hofmeister, 2010;Wyrozumska, 2012) and the separate EU–UK trade agreement,
or how four decades of EU legislation, only some of which had been transposed, was to be
continued, revised or repealed, to provide for the promised improved competitiveness and
greater economic freedom, now that the dead hand of Brussels had been cast off (Mason,
2012). In particular, there was no view on whether the UK was to remain part of the single
market, a territory without internal borders or other regulatory obstacles for the free
Received 24 July 2016
Revised 3 November 2016
Accepted 4 November 2016
PAGE 2 DIGITAL POLICY, REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE VOL. 19 NO. 1, 2017, pp. 2-20, © Emerald Publishing Limited, ISSN 2398-5038 DOI 10.1108/DPRG-07-2016-0036
movement of goods and services (EC, 2016c), or of the EU Customs Union[1]. Even the
constitutional measure to invoke Article 50 TEU was subject to judicial review, with the High
Court rejecting the use of the royal prerogative in favour of a parliamentary decision[2].
There were calls for a second referendum, including a petition that generated a
parliamentary debate (BBC, 2016;Bogdanor, 2016;Clegg, 2016;Hansard, 2016), or for a
general election to confirm the decision and its terms, although these will not be available
for some years. There were half-joking references to a “Hotel California scenario”, from the
lyric “you can check out, but you can never leave”, with the complexities overwhelming the
decision to go[3]. The questions that arise for the telecommunications sector are a very
small part of a much larger constitutional, economic and political picture, but are important
in themselves and may be relevant for other sectors and other countries.
A central feature of the referendum campaign was use of the internet, especially social
networking, in a post-factual politics that eschewed data and knowledge, favouring
assertion and the opinions of pundits (Oborne, 2016;Bell, 2016;FT, 2016). In particular,
Michael Gove, a leading Brexiteer, likened the “experts” favouring “remain” to Nazi
scientists (Riley-Smith and Wilkinson, 2016). There was little effort to rely on facts, with
politicians instead producing sound bites, memes, tweets, blogs and opinion pieces. This
reflected the disruption and transformation of global political discourse linked to disrupted
and fragmented media, and the ability of citizens to select partisan flows, with which they
agree, to participate in and amplify them, of whom a small proportion attacked and abused
their opponents (Enli and Skogerbø, 2013;Gruzd and Roy, 2014;O’Hara and Stevens,
2015;Hong and Nadler, 2015;Stromer-Galley, 2016). Yet, the best known British political
platform, Momentum, a hard left technology-enabled movement, was largely silent
(Birchall, 2016). These changes had been made possible by innovations on the internet,
with apps, services and data analyses available to political parties, activists and individuals
Table I Single market access options after Brexit
Option Single market Description
Status quo ante Full access Full EU membership. Legally, requiring Article 50
TEU not to be invoked or, if invoked, to be
withdrawn. Politically it requires a second
referendum or a general election
Boris Island Full access Outside the EU treaties and the CJEU: “British
people will still be able to go and work in the EU;
to live; to travel; to study; to buy homes and to
settle down” but with asymmetric control over
migration to the UK, limited by a points-based
assessment (Johnson, 2016)
Norway[5] Full access Membership of the European Economic Area
(EEA) and of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA), largely unchanged
contribution to the EU budget and free movement
of people, but without any say in future directives,
regulations and treaties
Switzerland Limited access Membership of EFTA and a number of sectoral
agreements with the EU-27, without access to the
services single market, notably without financial
services passport facilities, but probably with free
movement of people
Albania Very limited access Falling back on the WTO most favoured nation
(MFN) status, with tariffs on goods and with
almost no access for services (Rachman, 2016)
Minford Island Very limited access Unilateral removal of all tariffs and no specific
agreement with the EU, probably destroying
significant numbers of manufacturers (Minford,
2015)
VOL. 19 NO. 1 2017 DIGITAL POLICY, REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE PAGE 3
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