The India-Canada Civilian Nuclear Deal
| Author | Anita Singh |
| Date | 01 March 2010 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070201006500115 |
| Published date | 01 March 2010 |
| Subject Matter | Coming Attractions |
Anita Singh
The India-Canada
civilian nuclear deal
Implications for Canadian foreign policy
Regimes to control weapons of mass destruction have been impressively
effective, making nuclear acquisition less simple and significantly more
expensive. Yet despite these mechanisms, a few states still find it to their
self-defensive, prestigious, or strategic advantage to develop nuclear
weapons, regardless of the dramatic international response to these
proliferation decisions. India, in 1974 and then again in 1998, made such
a decision, testing a nuclear device and announcing its intention to become
a nuclear weapons state. Since this announcement, India has been an
international nuclear pariah, a status compounded by its refusal to sign the
nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the comprehensive test ban treaty, or the
Anita Singh is a doctoral candidate in international relations at Dalhousie University.
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| Anita Singh |
fissile material cut-off treaty.1 It is this breach of the international regime
that has raised questions, frustration, and even anger about the 2005
announcement that India and the United States were negotiating a civilian
nuclear transfer agreement, effectively transforming 35 years of American
and international nuclear policy. Detractors from the agreement declared
the end of the international nonproliferation regime, arguing that the deal
rewards India’s nuclear proliferation and signals to other aspiring nuclear
states that legitimacy is gained by those that “wait it out.” Supporters of the
deal argue that the regime has been so strict in implementing the principles
of nonproliferation and disarmament that there has been no room for states
like India, undermining the regime’s ineffectiveness.
Canada made the decision to pursue its own nuclear transfer agreement
with India in August 2008, following negotiations at the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, yet few
analyses have examined the effects such a deal would have on Canada’s own
foreign policy. Not only has this decision determined Canada’s own nuclear
position, but it changes Canada’s nuclear relationship with the United States
and the larger international nuclear regime, and affects its broader South
Asian foreign policy.
While the bulk of debate has focused on the deal’s nonproliferation and
disarmament effects, this article argues that the Canadian decision to sign
a deal has major positive outcomes. First, the article offers a brief nuclear
history of Canada’s bilateral relationship with India. It goes on to establish the
context of US nuclear policy leading up to the deal, particularly in relation to
the events of 11 September 2001. It then details the central objectives of the
so-called 123 deal (after section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act), particularly
India’s energy requirements and the US nonproliferation stipulations;
examines the major arguments for and against the 123 agreement in the area
of international nonproliferation, with a focus on how these perspectives
1 India has long argued that the global nonproliferation regime is discriminatory,
allowing nuclear states to have weapons but forcing others to adhere to a “second”
class of citizenship. Therefore, it advocates “efforts for negotiations on a universal,
non-discriminatory and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty that would prohibit
the future production of fissile material for weapons purposes.” See “India and
disarmament,” Indian embassy in the United States, Washington, 2008, www.
indianembassy.org. Arguably the most comprehensive examination of India’s nuclear
program is George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
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| The India-Canada civilian nuclear deal |
relate to Canada’s nuclear objectives; and, finally, discusses three major
arguments supporting the Harper government’s decision to sign a civilian
nuclear deal with India.
CANADA’S HISTORICAL NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA
For obvious reasons, Canada’s nuclear policy developed in parallel to its
bilateral relationship with India. At the time of India’s independence, there
was a friendly relationship between India’s Jawaharlal Nehru and Canada’s
Louis St. Laurent and Lester B. Pearson. Nehru’s commitment to peaceful
civilian nuclear energy and global disarmament was assuring to Canadian
leaders, who insisted that India begin its civilian nuclear program with
investment in the CANDU reactor. While Canada was committed to the
idea of peaceful nuclear energy, there was hesitation by some members
of the government who recognized that India’s nuclear interests might be
less benign than once assumed. Canada’s decision to move forward with a
nuclear transfer relationship with India was based on three arguments. First,
it was possible that other states would offer India nuclear technology, but at
least Canada would be in a position to offer the adequate safeguards to stop
proliferation. Second, it was assumed that the newly formed International
Atomic Energy Agency would play a role to ensure India’s reactors were
properly safeguarded. Third, Canada thought that India did not have the
technical ability to pursue a military program based on the CANDU design.
It was not until Nehru’s death in 1964, against a backdrop of hostile
Indo-Pakistani relations and a military and territorial loss to China in 1962,
that India’s new Congress government became interested in pursuing a
military nuclear program.2 India’s subsequent nuclear test was a particular
shock to Canada, as India’s three CANDU reactors had been intended only
for civilian purposes. Canada’s hard-line reaction to the test stemmed from
its own failures, as the government felt India’s nuclear proliferation was the
product of its failed attempt to monitor compliance, assure verification, and
insist on safeguards on the CANDU reactors.3 With Canada’s reactors, India
2 Stephen Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
2001), 167-68, 159-90.
3 Ross Neil, “India’s rise to nuclear power status,” in Wade Huntley and Karthika
Sasikumar, eds., Nuclear Cooperation with India: New Challenges and New Opportunities
(Vancouver: Simons Centre for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research,
2006), 39; Zia Mian et al., “Fissile materials in South Asia and the implications of the
US-India nuclear deal,” Science and Global Security 14, no. 2 (2006): 117–43.
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| Anita Singh |
was able to transform from a “nuclear-capable” state to one with the ability
to develop its own reactors.
Because the negotiations had resulted in less-than-satisfactory safeguard
mechanisms, India’s nuclear test resulted in an immediate strengthening
of Canada’s nuclear policy. Before the tests, Canada focused on two major
nuclear objectives, the strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty,
which had been formalized in 1968, and ensuring that Canadian technology
would not be used for “illegal” nuclear proliferation. After the tests, the
policy established that Canada would not engage in nuclear trade with any
non-signatories of the nonproliferation treaty, would insist on unconditional
full safeguards on all Canadian nuclear transfers, and would implement a
full cessation of trade for nuclear-testing states.
Because of India’s perceived betrayal, the Canada-India relationship
remained rocky throughout the 1970s, and it was not until the late 1980s
that Canada allowed some leeway vis-à-vis the Indian nuclear program.4
In a “new moral imperative” to avoid all potential humanitarian and
environmental disasters, Canada took steps to offer safety inspections to
all states with CANDU reactors. To show its commitment to nuclear safety
without supporting weapons proliferation, Canada remained firm that its
support would only exist for critical safety problems. Thus in 1992, when
India requested that this support be extended to both its IAEA safeguarded
and its non-safeguarded reactors, the deal fell apart.
Negligible improvements to Canada-India relations throughout this
period were not spontaneous; rather, the two states had worked towards
improving relations since the fall of the Soviet Union and India’s subsequent
economic liberalization and growth. India’s economic growth was not ignored
by foreign states and in January 1996, then-Prime Minister Jean Chrétien
led a 300-person Team Canada delegation to India. The government’s
objective was to match India’s business requirements to existing Canadian
capabilities, emphasizing opportunities for Canada in the growing Indian
market. Team Canada was composed of several ministers, premiers, and
businesspeople, and returned with 75 contracts worth $3.4 billion dollars.5
4 India’s shift in nuclear plans coincided with a decline in India-Canada relations.
Arthur Rubinoff, “Canada’s re-engagement with India,” Asian Survey 42, no. 6
(November-December 2002): 843.
5 “Team Canada mission,” confederation of Indian industry, 1996, www.tcm-mec.gc.ca;
Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, “Canada-India relations: The need to re-engage,” Asia Pacific
Foundation of Canada’s roundtable on the foreign policy dialogue, March 2003.
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