The Industrial Court as an Independent Private Arbitrator
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1965.tb01083.x |
| Author | Olga L. Aikin |
| Published date | 01 May 1965 |
| Date | 01 May 1965 |
MAY
1965
NOTES
OF
CASES
367
THE
INDUSTRIAL
COURT
AS
AN
INDEPENDENT
PRIVATE
ARBITRATOR
THE object of the Fair Wages Resolution of the House of Commons
(the present one was agreed by the House
in
1946)
is to ensure that
government contracts are only awarded to those employers who are
“
good
”
employers. To achieve this end the Fair Wages Resolu-
tion is incorporated in the actual contract made by the government
department with the contractor. The Resolution tries to ensure
that employees receive fair wages and terms and conditions of
employment, and also insists that the employer
(‘
shall recognise
the freedom of his work people to be members of trade unions.”
However, this Resolution does not give any rights to the employees,
even though its main purpose is to persuade employers to be at
least reasonable in their attitudes towards their employees. The
Resolution is
no
more than a term in the contract of supply.
It
is
probably a condition and not a mere warranty.
It
was the precise effect
of
this incorporation of the Resolution
in a contract of supply that had to be decided in
R.
v.
Industrial
Court,
ex
p.
A.S.S.E.T.2
The employer had a contract with the
Ministry of Health
for
the supply of anti-glare spectacles. The
A.S.S.E.T.S alleged that the employer was in breach of the Fair
Wages Resolution; they said there ,had been a refusal to negotiate
with them followed by some victimisation of members of the union.
The Ministry of Labour, who found that they could not settle the
matter with the employers, decided to refer the question to the
Industrial Court
for
decision as they were empowered to do under
clause
8
of
the Resolution-
(‘
In the event
of
any question arising
as to whether the requirements
of
this resolution are being observed,
the question shall,
if
not otherwise disposed of, be referred by the
Minister
of
Labour
.
.
.
to an independent tribunal for decision.”
The employer claimed that the Industrial Court lacked juris-
diction to deal with this matter and the Industrial Court postponed
the hearing
in
order that the question of jurisdiction might be
determined first. A.S.S.E.T. then sought mandamus to compel the
Industrial Court to deal with the issue. Thus two questions arose:
(a)
had the court jurisdiction
?
and
(b)
could mandamus be issued
to
compel the court to make
a
decision
?
Although not expressly mentioned in the Resolution, the Indus-
trial
Court
is patently the most suitable body for deciding questions
relating to terms and conditions of employment, and the court
’
decided that the Industrial Court did have jurisdiction to hear this
matter, despite the large number of objections raised by the
employer.
These were, first, that the dispute lay between the A.S.S.E.T.
and the employer and not between the parties to the contract,
i.e.,
1
Fair Wages Resolution, 1946, para. 4.
3
“19641
3
W.L.R.
680;
[1964]
3
All
E.R. 130.
3
Association
of
Supervisory
Staffs,
Executives and Technicians.
4
Lord Parker
C.J.,
Wynn
and
Widgery
JJ.
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