The interplay of structure and agency dynamics in strike activity

Published date10 August 2012
Date10 August 2012
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/01425451211248523
Pages518-533
AuthorRalph Darlington
Subject MatterHR & organizational behaviour
The interplay of structure and
agency dynamics in strike activity
Ralph Darlington
Salford Business School, University of Salford, Salford, UK
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to build on the insights of mobilisation theory to examine the
interplay of structure and agency dynamics in strike activity. It proposes to do so by investigating
the 2007 36-hour strike undertaken by 2,300 engineering and infrastructure workers employed by the
private consortium Metronet on the London Underground, focusing attention on the relationship
between workers’ militancy, trade union leadership and left-wing politics within a highly distinctive
and union favourable “opportunity structure” context.
Design/methodology/approach – Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with 24
RMT union informants within Metronet and the London Underground (including union members,
reps, branch and regional officers); analysis was made of documentary industrial relations and trade
union material; and personal fieldwork observation.
Findings – Although favourable specific contextual and contingent factors served as both
provocations and resources for strike action, notably in enhancing workers’ bargaining position and
lending feasibility to a strike mobilisation approach, the role of trade union leadership and left-wing
politics at every level of the union in collectivising workers’ experiences and aspirations in forms
which directly encouraged combativity was also crucial.
Research limitations/implications – The specificity of the case study limits the degree of
generalisation that can be made to other industries. Researchers are encouraged to test the proposed
analytical approach further.
Originality/value – The paper provides case-study empirical evidence into an important arena of
employment in the UK, contributes to our understanding of the multi-dimensional causes of strike
activity; and adds an important political dimension to the analysis of collective mobilisation often
neglected in both industrial relations and social movement literature.
Keywords United Kingdom, Trade unions, Strikes, Leadership, Trade unionism,
Mobilisation theory, Metronet
Paper type Research paper
1. 1ntroduction
Ironically, despite the massive decline in the level of strike action over the last 30 years,
combined with the weakening of the strength of trade unionism and demise of the
Communist Party and the radical left, the popular media, as well as by many HR
managers (Edwards, 2003, p. 11; Head and Lucas, 2004), have often continued to view
workplace conflict and strike activity as being caused by union “mi litants” who
foment, exacerbate and exploit workers’ grievances to encourage them into tak ing
unnecessary forms of industrial action. Of course , such a one-dimensional explanation
was often articulated during the industrial unrest that that swept Britain during
the 1970s and early 1980s, with blame for the high strike rate at BL car plants, for
example, firmly placed on respective Communist and Trotskyist shop stewards’
influence, dubbed by the tabloid press “Red Robbo” (Derek Robinson) in the former and
“The Mole” (Alan Thornett) in the latter. Likewise, Margaret Thatcher branded Arthur
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/0142-5455.htm
Employee Relations
Vol. 34 No. 5, 2012
pp. 518-533
rEmeraldGroup PublishingLimited
0142-5455
DOI 10.1108/01425451211248523
The research on which the paper draws was funded by an award from the British Academy
(SG: 40064).
518
ER
34,5
Scargill and the other “militant” leaders of the 1984-1985 miners’ strike as a furtive
political clique hell-bent on the subversion of the British state (Thatcher, 1993, p. 339).
Yet such a so-called agitator “theory” (sic) of strikes has on occasion continued to be
deployed today, notably with reference to the National Union of Rail, Maritime and
Transport Workers (RMT) and the high level of industrial unrest on the national
railway and London Underground networks.
For the London Evening Standard, for whom “there are three certainties in this
world: death, taxes and the RMT union threatening to being transport misery to the
capital”, it is the union’s “hard-left” militant leaders who should be held entirely
responsible for the high level of strike activity: “They are throwbacks to the
pre-Thatcher days of militant trades unionism [y] with an easy formula of impossible
demands followed by immediate threats of industrial action as a device to bounce
managers into making concessions they cannot afford” (22 and 29 June 2004).
Following a strike in 2007 the paper displayed a front-page photograph of RMT
general secretary Bob Crow alongside the headline “The Man Who Stopp ed London
in its Tracks” and carried a full-page article headlined “Inside the Loutish and Macho
World of the RMT Henchmen” (4 and 5 September 2007). Likewise Boris Johnson,
Conservative Party London Assembly Mayor, has singled out the “the RMT leadership
[who] have their thumb around the windpipe of London commuters [y] it’s time to
draw a line under the days when a few militant unionists can hold the greatest
city in the world to ransom” (The Greater Londoner, March 2008; Guardian, 4 March
2008).
Of course traditionally many industrial relations academics have refused to accept
such a populist “agitator” explanation fo r strikes. Instead broader structu ral causes
of strikes have traditionally been emphasised, in which workplace collective action is
viewed as the outcome of underlying social structures, processes and relations. Over
the years a number of explanations have focused on different contextual features to
explain why strike activity can vary over time and between workplaces, organisations
and industries, including: the economic cycle and level of unemployment (Hanson,
1921); the size of the workplace/employer (Prais, 1978); degree of community isolation
of occupational communities (Kerr and Siegel, 19 54); nature of conflict-handling
and collective bargaining arrangements (Ross and Hartman, 1960; Clegg, 1976), and
different types of technology (Chinoy, 1955; Walker and Guest, 1957). In all these
cases, it is argued distinctive structural and organisational factors are respon sible for
encouraging workers to develop a consciousness of collective grievance, fo rm a strong
emotional attachment to their unions, and develop the opportunity and willingness to
engage in strike activity. From such a perspective there is often the acknowledgement
not only of the underlying structural nature of the contradictory social relations
between workers and management that gives rise to industrial conflict, but also the
specific and genuine grievances and justifiable demands that motivate workers to
protest at managerial action (see e.g. Gouldner, 1955; Donovan, 1968; Bean and Stoney,
1986; Darlington, 2006).
Therefore, to wholly attribute industrial disputes to militants in way in which the
agitator theory attempts to do, explaining com plex social processes exclusively in
terms of the intervention of key individuals (some of whom may be politically
motivated) is to exaggerate their influence. Instead, to understand why workers
are sometimes open to suggested strategies for action, and why they find certain
arguments persuasive in terms of their appropriateness, feasibility and effectiveness,
we also need to consider a variety of other potentially influential “opportunity
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Interplay of
structure and
agency dynamics

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