The King v David Jonathan Holden
| Jurisdiction | Northern Ireland |
| Judge | O'Hara J |
| Neutral Citation | [2022] NICC 29 |
| Date | 25 November 2022 |
| Court | Crown Court (Northern Ireland) |
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Neutral Citation No: [2022] NICC 29
Judgment: approved by the court for handing down
(subject to editorial corrections)*
Ref: OHA11989
ICOS No: 19/005923
Delivered: 25/11/2022
IN THE CROWN COURT IN NORTHERN IRELAND
SITTING IN BELFAST
___________
THE KING
v
DAVID JONATHAN HOLDEN
___________
Mr C Murphy KC with Mr S Magee KC (instructed by the Public Prosecution Service) for
the Crown
Mr F O’Donoghue KC with Mr I Turkington (instructed by MTB Solicitors) for the
Defendant
___________
O’HARA J
Introduction
[1] The defendant is a former soldier who is charged with a single count of
manslaughter. The charge is that on 21 February 1988, contrary to common law, he
unlawfully killed Aiden McAnespie. It is not disputed that a bullet fired from a
multi-purpose machine gun (“MPMG”) controlled by the defendant killed
Mr McAnespie. What is disputed is how that came about and whether the
prosecution has proved the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
[2] At an earlier stage in the Crown Court proceedings the defendant applied for
a No Bill ie a ruling that on the available evidence, even taken at its height, the
charge against him could not be proved. I rejected that application in a ruling given
on 20 August 2021.
[3] The defendant also applied for a ruling that the case against him should be
dismissed as an abuse of process. By agreement, and in accordance with legal
authorities, that application was stayed until the prosecution had presented its
evidence. At that point I heard the abuse of process application along with an
application that there was no case for the defendant to answer because no reasonable
jury (or judge) properly directed on the law could find the defendant guilty. (By this
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point in the case the prosecution had confirmed that it was proceeding on the basis
of gross negligence manslaughter.)
[4] I gave a ruling on 30 May 2022 rejecting both defence applications.
Accordingly, the trial continued with the defendant himself giving evidence. I have
now to decide, in light of all the evidence, whether the prosecution has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the unlawful killing of
Mr McAnespie on the basis of gross negligence manslaughter.
Legal Principles
[5] I remind myself that the onus is, and remains on, the prosecution to prove its
case. It can only do so by satisfying me beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty. If I find that he is probably guilty, I must acquit Mr Holden.
Similarly, if I feel that he has been dishonest in any of his evidence I must still acquit
him unless I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt. Being wrong or
dishonest in his evidence is not in itself a basis for convicting the defendant.
[6] While many of the facts in this case are not in dispute, what happened in the
sangar in which the defendant had the MPMG on 21 February 1988 is disputed. The
defendant is the only person who was there at the time. He has given his account of
what he did and did not do. It is not for him to disprove the prosecution case. As
Mr O’Donoghue put it during his closing submission, the prosecution has to
disprove the defendant’s account and do so beyond reasonable doubt. If that is to be
done, it has to be by my consideration of the evidence and by me drawing inferences
on the basis of which I find the defendant guilty. However, in drawing any such
inferences I also have to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that I should reject
any alternative interpretations or inferences which are consistent with the defendant
not being guilty.
[7] In the context of this case I am also obliged to consider, in the defendant’s
favour, the impact which the passage of time has had on his ability to recall relevant
details from 1988, to challenge any prosecution evidence or to call any evidence in
his own defence. This is an issue which I addressed, in particular, at paras [58]-[59]
of my ruling on 30 May 2022. I now remind myself that the passage of time remains
an issue both generally and especially perhaps to the extent that it affected the
defendant when he himself gave evidence.
Background
[8] In February 1988 the defendant was an 18 year old soldier, a Guardsman in
the Grenadier Guards. He was born on 20 October 1969 and joined the army on
14 October 1986. He then underwent basic training until July 1987 and further
training beyond that, including training on a range of firearms. (The extent and
nature of that training is to some degree a matter of dispute, especially in relation to
his familiarity with a GPMG.)
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