The League of Nations as Confederacy
| Date | 01 October 1976 |
| DOI | 10.1177/004711787600500405 |
| Author | Paul Rivlin |
| Published date | 01 October 1976 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
1121
THE
LEAGUE
OF
NATIONS
AS
CONFEDERACY
by
PAUL
RIVLIN
This
article
compares
the
theory
and
practice
of
the
League
of
Nations
with
the
model
of
confederacy
as
presented
by
Professor
Christopher
Hughes
The
first
problem
of
any
such
analysis
is
that
the
League
neither
agreed
nor
achieved
an
exact
role.
Nonetheless
the
logic
of
the
Covenant
can
be
examined
and
projected.
The
projection
starts
with
&dquo;collective
security&dquo;
and
develops
through
the
League
Council,
the
Assembly
and
its
subsidiary
institutions.
At
the
same
time,
it
is
impossible
to
forget
the
sad
history
of
the
League’s
failure.
Although
the
institutions
and
Covenant
remained
almost
unchanged
throughout
the
League’s
life,
the
League
changed
radically.
Those
changes
cannot
be
pinpointed
exactly,
but
it
is
worth
listing
a
tentative
separation.
(i)
1919 - 21:
The
confederal
possibility;
(ii)
I921 - 28:
The
confederal
legacy
and
the
functional
successes;
(iii)
1928 - 34.
The
inadequacy
of
functionalism
exposed;
(iv)
1935 -
44:
The
failure
of
functionalism;
The
League
of
Nations
was
conceived
as
an
institution
to
end
conflict
after
the
war
to
end
all
wars.
It
fulfilled
an
emo-
tional
need,
especially
strong
at
such
a
time,
appealing
for
world
political
unity.
To
those
who
accept
the
principle
of
unity,
whether
for
religious
or
philosophical
reasons,
such
unity-in
Hegelian
terms - is
the
realisation
of the
spirit.
To
those
who
reject
ideological
or
natural
unity
but
who
believe
in
the
possi-
bility
of
agreement
amongst
men
of
’good
will’,
it
is
the
triumph
of
a
rational
collective
approach
to
universal
problems.
These
views
possess
an
intellectual
attraction
but
they
served
the
League
of
Nations
poorly.
As
the
League
provided
an
impetus
for
their
injection
into
the
everyday
conduct
of
world
affairs,
we
may
observe
the
interplay
of
ideologics,
institutions
and
international
relations
by
asking
-
How
and
why
did
the
League
fail?
There
are
many
easy
answers
starting
with
the
wickedness
of
Germany
and
Japan,
or
the
weakness
of
Britain
and
France,
or
the
wickedness
of
German
and
Japanese
politicians,
or
the
weakness
of
British
and
French
ones.
A
more
sophisticated
history
blames
pernicious
national
self-interest
for,
say,
the
1
Christopher
Hughes,
Confederacies:
An
Inaugural
Lecture
(Leicester
University
Press
1963).
1122
Hoare-I,aval
pact.
However
valid,
these
are
empirical
answers,
unique
historical
solutions
to
the
problems
of
international
relations.
Politics
looks
for
the
implications
and
consequences
of
institutional
forms
or,
as
C.
J.
Hughes
put
it,
&dquo;politics
is
.....
initially
the
study
of
’things’,
realities
in
the
mind
and
nature ......
situations&dquo;.‘
2
The
League
of
Nations
attempted
to
devise
means
of
con-
trolling
and
limiting
the
use
of
force
and
force
was
the
central
issue
in
the
establishment
of
the
League.
Yet
there
was
a
para-
dox
in
that
the
League
aimed
to
abolish
the
use
of
force,
but
had
first
to
introduce
its
own
force.
To
the
League,
force
had
to
be
the
first
not
the
last
resort,
and
it
was
defined
in
terms
of
the
process
of
collective
security.
II.
THE
LEAGUE
AND
COLLECTIVE
SECURITY
The
main
objective
of the
League
was
collective
security,
even
though
A.
J.
P.
Taylor
suggests
that
the
term
was
not
used
until
the
1930’s.3
We
may
certainly
agree
with
his
description
of
the
theory
as
being
&dquo;to
maintain
peace
and
security
by
armed
strength&dquo;.
When,
however,
he
writes
of
&dquo;an
alliance
of
existing
governments&dquo;
to
fulfil
this
function
it
is
a
contradiction
in
terms.
In
the
same
vein
Tanning
writes
that
&dquo;the
League
could
fairly
be
described
as
a
collective
security
club
for
sovereign
states&dquo;. ’
Both
fail
to
take
account
of
the
League’s
stated
func-
tion
to
restrict
states.
Article
2
Section
4
declares
that
the
state
&dquo;shall
accept
such
regulations
as
may
be
prescribed
by
the
League
in
regard
to
its
military,
naval
and
air
forces
and
arma-
ments&dquo;,
and
Article
16,
despite
later
’declarations’,
left
the
League
in
an
unambiguous
position.
&dquo;...
all
Members
of
the
League ...
hereby
undertake
immediately
to
subject
(a
state
resorting
to
war)
to
the
sever-
ance
of
all
trade
or
financial
relations,
the
prohibition
of
all
intercourse
between
their
nationals
and
the
nationals
of
the
Covenant-breaking
State,
and
the
prevention
of
all
financial,
commercial
or
personal
intercourse
between
the
national
of
the
Covenant-breaking
State
and
the
nationals
of
any
other
State
whether
a
Member
of
the
League
or
not.&dquo;
Collective
security
as
envisaged
in
Article
16
of
the
Covenant
of
the
League
of
Nations,
wrote
Morgenthau,
&dquo;demands
(that)
individual
nations
forsake
national
egotisms
and
the
national
policies
serv-
ing
them.&dquo;
2
Ibid,
p.2.
3
A.
J.
P.
Taylor,
The
Troublemakers
(London,
Panther
Hostory
1969)
p.156.
4
C.
A.
W.
Manning,
"The
Failure
of
the
League
of
Nations",
in
Agenda,
a
journal
of
reconstruction
li
(1942)
p.61
(reprinted
ed.
Cos-
grave
&
Twitchett,
The
New
International
Actors:
The
U.N.
&
E.E.C.)
5
Hans
J.
Morgenthau,
Politics
among
Nations
(New
York:
Knopf,
3rd
ed.
1961)
p.415.
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